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Foreword 
The capitalisation study on capacity building programmes under the 9th EDF, sponsored by the 
European Commission, took place between September 2008 and April 2009. It was undertaken by 
independent experts, namely Maurizio FLORIDI – sociologist and specialist in the dynamics of non state 
actors in the ACP countries -, Beatriz SANZ CORELLA – socio-economic and management expert, 
specialist in support and advisory services for civil society experts and  training, formulation and 
monitoring of EDF programmes -, and Stefano VERDECCHIA, a participatory local development expert. 
 
Being a capitalisation study, the team  in charge with the study focused their attention on the concrete 
experiences which characterised the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF and, in particular, on 
best practices. A selection of the latter is presented herein, by way of example, in order to illustrate 
possible solutions to the problems that affect the majority of NSA support programmes. 
 
The team was confronted with various problems; theoretical and methodological on the one part and, 
on the other, organisational. 
 
In terms of theory and methodology, the study required the adoption of two approaches: quantitative 
and qualitative, each involving different analytical logics and methods. In addition, the needs of the 
qualitative approach forced the team to increase the number of field missions. As such, in addition to 
the 3 missions foreseen in Ethiopia, Uganda and Dominican Republic, a further 5 missions were added 
with a view to enriching the overall quality of the study, which took place in Suriname, Malawi, Burkina 
Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. 
 
As to the constraints of the organisational side of the project, the major problem was, firstly, the 
collection of documents relating to the 40 NSA support programmes and, secondly, the analysis of a 
quite significant number of pages, not an easy task when the time and budget considerations are taken 
into account. 
 
The team would like to highlight the importance of the restitution seminar held in Brussels on 1-3 April, 
which allowed the team to meet with a large number of actors (35 representatives of the ECDs in the 
ACP countries, 15 members of the PMU and AIDCO, DEV and RELEX representatives) on the themes and 
first results of the study. 
 
The team would, in particular, like to thank the services of the European Commission Delegation in the 
38 studies involved in the study, as well as the PMUs of the 40 NSA support programmes for their 
cooperation and availability in the collection of the documents needed for the analysis. 
 
Lastly, we would like to offer a sincere thanks to the members of Unit E4, notably Ms. Susana El-Kum 
Molina, the in house Commission study coordinator and her support staff for the invaluable assistance 
and advice provided. 
 
Maurizio FLORIDI, Beatriz SANZ CORELLA and Stefano VERDECCHIA 
 
May 2009 
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The capitalisation study on the NSA capacity building programmes under the 9th EDF, involving around 
40 programmes in 38 ACP countries, has allowed identifying strong and weak  points in the EC  strategy 
under the Cotonou era. 
The results of the implementation of this first generation of NSA support programmes confirm the 
significant added value brought by the Community to the development process in ACP countries,  and 
the positive role of EC programmes in increasing public sector's accountability vis a vis citizens. 
While there is no such a thing as a theoretical or methodological formula for the identification, 
implementation and evaluation of these programmes, it is nonetheless possible, on the one hand, to 
identify common tendencies and, on the other, to select a certain number of positive experiences which 
can act as a reference point for the continuation of NSA support in the framework of the 
implementation of the 10th EDF.  
Types of NSAs 
In the identification phase, a NSA support programme must address the question of what are the 
characteristics and  added value of each family of non state actors, with regard to the goals of the 
programme and, in general, to the implementation of the Community strategy in the country. 
At a general level, a distinction must be made between the different NSAs' structures in order to refine 
the methodologies aimed at comprehending their modus operandi and, above all, their differences. In 
essence, the notion of non state actor is quite broad, and it includes  multiple families of actors which 
are not homogenous and which have complementary, yet fundamentally different vocations. This 
difference has a very concrete value to the extent that belonging to one family or another can 
determine an organization's  eligibility for access to programme resources. 
While different NSAs families may share  similar objectives, each family can bring, on the basis of its 
own specialisation, skills, and experience, a specific contribution to the ACP countries' strive  in the 
direction of sustainable development through good governance and enhanced citizenship. 
In order to ensure that each family of actors can fully contribute, it is important to enable  them to play 
their roles by taking into account their specific vocation and individual technical skills, all while bearing 
in mind the different organisational levels (grass roots, intermediary and advisory, and 3rd and 4th level 
umbrella organisation).  Secondly, capacity building must be carried out on the basis of a clear 
distinction between the individual, organisation and institutional level. 
It is thus necessary to adopt a differentiated strategy that takes three aspects into account: 
differentiation between families of actors, differentiation between organisational levels of NSAs, and 
differentiation between spheres of capacity building. 
Support to NSAs poses a certain number of problems, both in relation to the efficiency and impact of 
supported activities, and for what concerns the respect of EDF procedures. The paradox in some cases 
is that organisations which, in principle, provide the most guarantees with regard to their adherence to 
rules and procedures are not necessarily those that will ensure viable medium to long term results. In 
reality, the less well-equipped organisations often represent the most active forces of society, notably at 
the local level, where the majority of collective actors do not possess formal structures or official 
recognition. 
A project or programme intending to provide support to NSAs cannot ignore the existence of these new 
actors, which represent relevant and emerging social instances, and that tend to act according to their 
profound sense of social responsibility while they work to provide efficient and innovative solutions to 
the question of sustainable development. 
In this sense, it is imperative to acknowledge – as foreseen under the Cotonou Agreement – the 
organisational structures of those NSAs that escape the  models traditionally recognised in the juridical 
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and political framework. In sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, one has to deal with a new generation of 
NSAs created by the structural and democratic adjustment process, that often refuse labels and formal  
operational rules and that are, by contrast, no less effective in their social action. 
At a concrete level, it is necessary to ensure that the eligibility criteria for access to funding provide 
these emerging actors the opportunity to participate, and that the types of actions that can be 
undertaken be kept as broad as possible. In other words, it is necessary for  the support programme or 
project to be based on the demand of actors, rather than being supply-driven.  
       The aim of NSA support programmes 
and their strategic positioning 
If certain programmes under the 9th EDF were focused on capacity building as a goal in itself, or were 
generically aimed to the overarching goal of fighting poverty, those conceived under the 10th EDF 
cannot afford to neglect the new contexts characterised by profound changes in the formulation and 
management of public affairs. 
Important political and institutional changes are in fact already underway in most ACP countries. These 
changes, at the national as well as, more importantly, the local level, include a progressive political and 
administrative decentralisation that opened up new perspectives in terms of governance and, more in 
general, new forms of relationships between the State and its citizens. 
All NSA support programmes and, in particular, those supporting civil society, must therefore face the 
question of the relevance and strategic positioning of different types of organisations,  vis a vis the 
new challenges raised by governance in all its forms. In other words, the civil society capacity building 
programmes conceived in the framework of the 10th EDF must incorporate a basic element of the new 
cooperation agreement: the political dimension. This means that a NSA capacity building programme 
cannot be limited to the strengthening of individual actors, but must as well focus on the links between 
the actors themselves and, above all, between the actors, their contexts, and their institutional partners, 
notably the State in all its manifestations. 
NSA support programmes should therefore promote a stronger connection between NSA and their 
context of reference. Due attention must be paid to the relevance of supported NSAs' activities, which 
must not be too distant from the social and political problems that the countries are experiencing, and 
which should provide a relevant contribution in terms of governance best practices. In order to achieve 
this, the NSA support programmes under the 10th EDF must take into account five main principles. 
The first is that each programme needs to be strategically positioned in the social, economical, 
institutional, cultural, as well as political context of the country in which it is implemented.  
In other words, an NSA support programme cannot in any case be “neutral”  as regard to the context in 
which it is intervening and, more importantly, in the context of civil society. The “neutrality” of  a 
programme is actually neither a strong point nor an indicator of objectivity, but a flaw to the extent that 
it prevents the programme from positioning itself in an explicit way. 
This strategic positioning should  necessarily take into account 1) the main principles at the basis of EC’s 
development policies, with particular focus on the Cotonou Agreement; 2) the policy choices made by 
the Community and expressed  in the CSP; 3) the concrete reality of NSAs, their role within the context 
and, above all, the interests and strategic issues they deal with. 
The second principle concerns the positioning of the programme as regards the often-evoked question 
of its neutrality. A programme can never be neutral, due to that fact that it must, above all, place itself 
strategically in the context of governmental and Community policies, of the technical and financial 
partners present in the country, as much as within the dynamics of the NSAs themselves. In this regard, 
the programme in its different stages will inevitably cause a perturbation in existing social dynamics.  In 
fact, such perturbation comes into existence already at the stage of DSP discussions.   
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The third principle is linked to the pluralistic nature of NSAs.  A NSA support programme dealing with  
the internal dynamics of civil society must at all costs avoid any intervention modality that aims to 
ensure a monopolistic position for umbrella organisations with regard to the policy dialogue with the 
government and donor organisations. The programme must, instead, support the current dynamics 
within civil society, respecting the vocations of each actor, and in coherence with national development 
strategies, the community strategy outlined in the CSP, the principles of EC development policy and, 
above all, the social and economic issues NSAs are asked to deal with. 
The fourth principle is the need to recognise the specific nature of NSA support programmes, which 
should be based on a process approach,   where  actors guided through long-term couching and 
mentoring and to avoid the project/micro-project approach, that emphasizes immediate outputs. The 
idea of a process which requires adequate time to produce a visible impact is actually at the very core of 
the capacity building concept.  
The fifth principle is that NSAs should not be considered as an alternative to existing power. On the 
contrary, their added value should be seen in terms of what NSAs can offer in terms of creative and 
innovative solutions in the direction of  sustainable development. 
In fact, the governance approach foresees the active and responsible participation of all stakeholders, 
with  their specific vocations and mission, in the development processes. Participation is not limited to 
the contribution of beneficiaries, it is an interactive process of dialogue and cooperation, along which 
each actor, on the basis of its proper specialisation and prerogatives, must attempt to integrate the 
perceptions of others. 
Identification of capacity building programmes and mapping exercises 
Under the 9th EDF mapping exercises have often been limited to a statistical survey of NSAs, and have 
been  generally informed   by a static and descriptive logic. On the contrary, the establishment of a 
programme requires  a dynamic framework where, aside from the quantitative and qualitative 
information on the actors themselves, key elements are provided to understand  the actual social and 
political challenges in the context of which  non state actors are asked to operate. 
These fundamental elements include: 1) a classification  of NSAs based on their characteristics, the 
strategic issues and challenges they face given the country social, economical and political contexts, 
and their future perspectives; 2) the identification of  key actors among NSAs, the assessment of  their 
capacity building needs,  according  to which category and structural level they belong to; 3) the 
analysis of the country juridical and institutional framework with respect to NSAs, as well as of the 
areas for cooperation between governmental and non governmental actors; 4) the review  of the 
existing cooperation framework between NSAs and EC; 5) a map of stakeholders in the domain of 
NSAs support, including the different approaches they adopt. 
In addition to this, mappings must also include local capacity building resources (universities, private 
sector, local NGOs, research centres, etc.) in order to provide an exhaustive analysis in terms of both 
demand and supply. Regarding NSAs' involvement in the mapping exercise, several modalities have 
been experimented in the whole of the ACP states over the course of the 9th EDF. In general, the choice 
of including NSAs in the mapping was linked to the specific situation in the country at the time, taking 
into account the advantages and disadvantages of each option. 
The mapping exercises of the 10th EDF will require a significant change of mentality. If, during the 9th 
EDF, it was mainly aimed at updating knowledge in order to better identify or implement specific 
programs, under the 10th EDF mapping must, imperatively, be linked to the identification of a global 
strategy for NSAs' inclusion in all forms of European cooperation and, in particular, in political dialogue, 
bearing in mind the new aid modalities. In other words, it is necessary to evolve from a sectoral to an 
integral vision of NSA support, which raises the question of what is the role of NSAs in EC cooperation as 
a whole, and not just in specific programs. 
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Today's challenge is that of mainstreaming the theme of NSAs into all European cooperation, according 
to a governance approach. This also involves undertaking sectoral mapping exercises. This new 
approach, already tested by other donors with an established sector policy, is of fundamental 
importance to the extent that the exercise can provide precious indications for the implementation of 
the Community strategy outlined in the CSP on the basis of sector priorities. 
Institutional set-up, programme management modalities, role and profile of TA, cooperation 
with donor organisations 
As regards management modalities, five possible options exist, within two general types of management 
(centralised or decentralised), namely: indirect centralised management by a private company (article 
23.6 of annex IV of the Cotonou Agreement); joint centralised management with other donors (pool 
fund system) and/or International Organisations; indirect centralised management by a NGO -through 
grant contracts – (article 23.6 of annex I of the Cotonou Agreement); direct decentralized management 
(with or without TA); indirect decentralized management by a private entity (consulting firm) or NGO. 
The “direct decentralized management" modality is, on the whole, the preferred option under the 
NSA support programmes of the 9th EDF, followed by the “direct centralized management” one. The 
other mentioned modalities have revealed much less practical. 
With  regard to the management modality of the programme, it is up to the different Delegations, on 
the basis of the mapping study's results (or, in absence of that,  of the feasibility study), to consider 
which category the country belongs to,  and to agree with the NAO on the approach to be adopted. The 
cost of certain management modalities is an important factor and, sometimes, a constraint to the 
implementation of NSA support programmes. The choice of how to manage a programme is usually 
linked to 3 factors: the national context, the goals of the project and the skills required. 
With regard to the responsibilities of the Monitoring and Steering Committee, the experience of NSA 
support programmes under the 9th EDF shows a large variability when it comes to interpretation, as well 
as some common trends. 
The variability is typically exemplified by the frequency of the Committee's  meetings, which can vary 
from one to four times a year and, secondly, by the different interpretations of the Committee's duties 
and prerogatives. These go from the simple validation of work undertaken by the PMU to the 
Committee's being made part in every decision of the programme, including the selection of activities 
or, in some cases, even the recruitment of support personnel. 
The common tendency is however for the Monitoring and Steering Committee to be nothing more than 
the place where decisions taken elsewhere (subject of a prior agreement between the programme, the 
NAO and the EC ) are formalized. In short, the MSC is usually not a forum for assessing the programme 
development but, rather, an occasion for validation. Such a situation risks of jeopardizing the relations 
with stakeholders as much as the programme institutional set-up. 
For what concerns the inclusion of NSAs in the programme monitoring and steering bodies, 
independently of the chosen formula, the fundamental question is how to ensure, on the one hand, the 
representativity of members who are there in the name of NSAs, and, on the other, to avoid conflicts of 
interest. The experiences show that the most appropriate  procedure in certain contexts is that of 
including resource persons linked to the NSA world rather NSA representatives themselves. 
Several actors intervene in the implementation of NSA support programmes, each with a very precise 
role. In this sense, non state actors are, at the same time, actors and beneficiaries. As such it is 
fundamental that the NSAs are not considered as a single block, but as a relatively heterogeneous 
entity. In essence, as much in the role of actor as in that of beneficiary, NSAs must be considered 
according to a differentiated approach in order to be able to distinguish the different missions and 
vocations and, by consequence, the various capacity building needs.  
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The NAO should play a double role: the programme supervisor through the Monitoring and Steering 
Committee, as well as the facilitator in the dialogue between NSAs and government at the level of the 
programme activities, especially those involving State-NSA cooperation, in all of its dimensions. 
The role of EC Delegations involves two aspects; they are “critical observers”, ensuring that the 
appropriate  and competent NSAs are identified and included in the new cooperation framework 
according to the principles of the Cotonou Agreement; and “facilitators”, in the sense that they 
guarantee access to clear and transparent information,  and that they contribute to the development 
and capacity building of NSAs. 
Lastly, as regards RCAs or Intermediary Organisations, it is important to note that there is a risk of 
tying- up collaboration under the programme with the specific logic of service contracting. In reality, 
RCAs should not be seen as mere programme antennas, but as opportunities for the creation of new 
focal points for civil society at the regional level, something that is perfectly consistent with the mission 
of most umbrella organisations operating at such scale. 
Another fundamental aspect is the role and profile of the technical assistance responsible for the 
implementation of NSA support programmes. Experiences under the NSA support programmes of the 
9th EDF revealed a widespread tendency to consider  Technical Assistance as almost exclusively dealing 
with  administration and book keeping, while NSA support programmes should adopt a different 
approach. TA in these new programmes must first and foremost have the role of facilitating the social 
processes which are underway, by making available their capacity building tools, in the respect of the 
different missions and vocations of NSAs. 
In a general sense, the drafting of ToR (in the procurement note phase) and the criteria for the 
integration of skills are also key aspects of the selection phase of TA. 
It would be interesting to link European NGOs, which have a significant experience in supporting 
Southern NSAs , in providing technical assistance.  These NGOs could actually bring a significant added 
value to the implementation of a new generation of capacity building programmes with which large 
scale European consulting firms  are often not familiar enough . 
One of the reasons why European  NGOs are often left out is that EDF procedures for TA contracts 
require  not only the direct financial responsibility of the contractor but also its capital adequacy, 
documented by bank guarantees. 
These findings, which denote a feeble presence of International NGOs (INGOs), not only in technical 
assistance but also as partners in NSA/civil society support programmes, strongly contrast with the 
presence and dynamism of  INGOs in a significant number of ACP countries. 
In fact, European and International NGOs have, historically, had a significant role in the emerging and 
strengthening of  civil society organisations in ACP countries, notably in the domain of the promotion 
and protection of human rights. 
Recently, some international and European NGOs have started to experiment alternative forms of fund-
raising by positioning themselves directly within the ACP countries for the implementation of 
programmes and projects, either in collaboration with local actors (often as sub-contractors) or by 
competing  with national actors. At the other extreme, an increasing number of international NGOs are 
progressively getting involved in the capacity  building of local NGOs. Therefore, a stronger  
coordination among different actors involved in capacity building programs (including INGOs), and that 
share the same vision on how to support civil society organizations, would represent an efficient way to: 
1) capitalise on the experiences underway or already completed and; 2) create synergies to the benefit 
of CSOs and their strengthening. It is thus necessary for the new programmes to take INGOs into 
account as technical and financial partners already rooted in the country and, on the basis of a critical 
analysis of their visions, approaches and modus operandi, establish a partnership with them. 
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As regards management aspects, backstopping is a very important aspect of TA. The role of 
backstopping can be extremely beneficial for supporting local staff, at the condition that a distinction is 
made between two types of backstopping: administrative and technical. 
From the analysis of the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF, it emerges that only a minority of 
programmes adopted a proactive and institutionalised approach to the cooperation with other donor 
organisations, besides the implementation of a few punctual activities and the routine  consultation 
events. The situation is however changing, and it is hoped that cooperation among donors, notably the 
Member States as well as international organisations, will increase under the 10th EDF. In essence, as 
donors begin to seek an increased harmonisation in the spirit of the Paris Declaration and other 
initiatives, we will assist to the  emergence of new common financing systems, aimed at making 
funding more reliable and independent from the day-to-day donors' management.  This is the case, for 
example, of the new pool funding systems. 
Capacity building: operational approaches and modalities in the framework of the 9th EDF 
programmes 
The NSA support programmes under the 9th EDG generally integrated several components, from 
strengthening  the capacity of individual organisations and their representatives to the relational 
aspects of networking, and to the questions of political dialogue with the State. 
The multi-dimensional nature of programmes strictly follows the systemic nature of capacity building. 
In effect, capacity building needs to be conceived as a process that seeks, with the active participation of 
concerned actors, to consolidate their capacities in order for them to evolve and adjust to new context-
specific  demands. Programs should therefore encompass three dimensions: the strengthening of 
individual capacities, including strategic leadership skills; the organisational dimension, with a particular 
attention to the aspects of identity, as well as to the efficiency and efficacy criteria; and, finally, the 
strengthening of the relational dimension, which means the organizations' capacity to cooperate with 
other actors, but also the establishment  of a judiciary  and institutional framework appropriate to 
respond to the needs of organisations and to their demand of participation in public policy. Such 
regulatory environment should be conceived not only as an external factor constraining or enabling NSA 
development, but also as an element that can be reformed and transformed in the process. 
Four main approaches were identified within the NSA support programmes of the 9th EDF. These can be 
placed on a continuum, from a purely reactive approach, based on the call for proposals instrument, to 
a programmatic and proactive approach, based on the elaboration of a capacity building plan, on the 
basis of a strategic analysis. The majority of programmes currently rely on a fundamentally reactive 
approach, where the calls for proposals are the preferred mechanism for addressing NSAs' capacity 
building needs. In this respect, the experience of 9th EDF programmes showed how the call for proposal 
mechanism, but above all  the logic and approach often underlying it,  may impoverish the nature of a 
programme, by generating a number of scattered, stand-alone and poorly coordinated initiatives that 
are managed according to the same logic of the “pre-Cotonou” micromanagement projects and/or 
thematic programmes. 
On the other hand, some  recent experiences have shown that the call for proposals instrument can be 
adapted to the capacity building needs of NSAs, on the condition that it is considered as a tool and not 
as an end in itself. 
As regards alternative tools, the proactive capacity building plan presents some interesting aspects. 
Whereas the adoption of this tool is somewhat recent, there is already some evidence of NSAs' positive 
reaction as, on the one hand, the tool is more effective in targeting their capacity building needs, and, 
on the other, it generates a less intense  competition among NSAs. 
Experience has showed that at least five conditions must be met in order for this tool to be effective, 
namely: an in-depth knowledge of NSAs and their context, as well as of their capacity building needs 
and the strategic issues they deal with; a significant investment in human resources; the set up of an 
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often complex information gathering system; the PMU's strong capacity  to communicate the relevance 
and innovative nature of the tool, and its differences in comparison to calls for proposals; in this case 
the PMU must not only have an administrative and book keeping  role within the programme, but it 
should be able to support and facilitate  the dynamics of the actors; the PMU should therefore possess  
the appropriate technical skills. 
The question of procedures 
The specificity of NSA support programmes, due to the peculiar characteristics of non state actors and 
the nature itself of capacity building, poses a series of procedural problems that deserve not only to 
be evoked but also concretely analysed in order to identify short and medium-term solutions. 
Thanks to the active participation of a number of programmes and delegations in the restitution 
workshop on 1st -3rd April 2009 in Brussels, some operational issues and recommendations   have been 
identified. 
 
The programme monitoring and evaluation system  
The monitoring and evaluation of NSA support programmes presents a twofold challenge: on the one 
hand, the NSA support programmes deal with social dynamics that are not easily measurable and, on 
the other, there is neither a history nor a tradition of EC  intervention in this area and, thus, no lesson 
learned to benefit from. 
In reality, the major difficulty in evaluating a process, and not an activity, such as NSA capacity building, 
is that it can only have an impact in the medium to long term. This contrasts with the needs of the 
monitoring and evaluation exercise, which is usually carried out during and immediately after the 
programme. 
The evaluation of this type of programmes has to do with  long-term social dynamics, by their nature  
difficult to quantify, and must therefore identify  the appropriate impact indicators, relevant to the 
nature of NSA capacity building. One promising direction is the use of impact indicators that capture  the 
institutional and organisational changes generated  within the beneficiary organisation. The time 
factor is decisive, bearing in mind that such changes can only be measured 6-12 months after the end of 
a programme. 
Evaluators should also be ready to overthrow the standard evaluation logic, by recognizing that 
apparent failures can actually turn into successes. 
A capacity building activity that is judged today a failure, as the planned amount in the WP has not been 
spent, could be considered tomorrow a success, thanks to the long-term positive dynamics that it 
generated. In fact, NSA support programmes intervene in a complex context where no one can master 
or foresee all the long-term effects of a given activity. 
There are also  effects that were not foreseen by the programme but which, by contrast, bear a 
significant importance to the ends of NSA capacity building. The capacity building activity must be 
therefore evaluated not only against its intended objectives, but, more broadly, in terms of the wide 
range of dynamics that it produced. 
Information and communication within NSA support programmes 
Communication with all concerned actors is a transversal capacity building instrument of any 
programme. It should be  a “two-way”  process between the programme and non state actors, 
particularly those belonging to the third and fourth level  organisations. 
Communication should include the sharing of experiences and good practices between non-state 
actors, technical assistance experts, staff of the Delegations, and all national actors concerned, including 
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donor organisations.   To maintain and strengthen the ties between the programme and the social and 
political challenges NSAs face, communication tools should be adapted  to the context and the intended 
target groups. 
In essence, the role of communication should be, on the one hand, to express the coherence of the 
programme with EC country strategies, and, on the other, to strengthen  the strategic positioning of 
NSAs in the country socio-political framework. 
The programme experiences in many countries clearly show the importance of transparency. To inform 
the public opinion, notably NSAs, about programme management modalities, as well as about the 
management tools adopted by the PMU, is an important transparency factor, and it is facilitating  
element  in the PMU's work, particularly for what concerns its  interaction with NSAs. Disseminating 
information on the progress and challenges during implementation confers more strength and 
legitimacy to the programme. 
Finally, all NSA support programmes and, in particular, civil society programmes, should draw a clear 
distinction between visibility and external communication. 
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1. THE CONTEXT: LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE ROLE OF NSA AND THE OBJECTIVE OF 
CAPACITY BUILDING 
 
One of the great innovations of the Cotonou Agreement lies in the legal and political 
recognition of the participation of non state actors (NSA) in the development and cooperation 
process. On the one hand, this participation is defined as one of the fundamental principles of 
cooperation (Article 2 – Fundamental principles). On the other hand, and for the first time in 
the history of EU-ACP (European Union – African Caribbean and Pacific) cooperation, a new 
chapter on the actors in this partnership recognises the complementary roles played by civil 
society, the private sector and decentralised local communities together with the central 
administration in the development and cooperation process. 
The definition of national development strategies, however, remains the responsibility of the 
ACP governments; but it is imperative that Non-State Actors (NSA) are involved at every stage 
of the process; consultation, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Thus, 
the Cotonou Agreement introduces new measures to promote participatory approaches in 
order to ensure the involvement of civil society and of economic and social actors, especially: 
▪ through the provision of appropriate information on the  ACP-EC  partnership agreement; 
▪ by ensuring consultation with NSA on the economic, social and institutional reforms and 
policies to be supported by the EC ; 
▪ by facilitating the participation of NSA in the implementation of programmes and projects; 
▪ by providing non state actors with the necessary capacity building support  
These objectives express the desire of the European Commission not to limit the role of NSA to 
a technical contribution to the struggle against poverty. The reinforcement of NSA is seen as 
an objective in itself for the foundation of a civic culture, enhanced democracy and good 
governance. 
 
 
2. CAPITALIZATION STUDY ON THE SUPPORT PROGRAMMES FOR NSA UNDER THE 9TH 
EDF 
In order to support NSA in their role as responsible, informed and competent partners in the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the country and thereby reinforce the country’s 
democratic foundations, a large proportion of the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) of 
the 9th EDF included a capacity building programme for NSA.  
Under the 9th EDF, 42 NSA capacity building programmes were approved in 38 ACP countries 
for a total of approximately €202 million. 
Within the framework of the 10th EDF, even though not all the NIPs have yet been signed, the 
sum earmarked for the capacity building of NSA confirms the fundamental necessity of this 
sector in order to ensure that NSA are able to fulfil their roles both in the development of their 
country and in the implementation of the Community’s strategy. 
The execution of a review of these programmes highlights the importance of this issue, both 
for the countries which have not yet initiated the identification of programmes under the 10th 
EDF as much as for those already implementing or preparing to do so. 
The first mid-term evaluations are underway. These have already highlighted a series of 
problems which should be taken into consideration to ensure that effective solutions can be 
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identified: notably the risk that these capacity building programmes may, on the one hand,  
turn into micro projects, or even micro-realisations and, on the other, into technical assistance 
programmes focused on administrative and financial tasks (limited to dealing with calls for 
proposals), and neglecting their essential role of facilitator. 
This shows, as reported in the Terms of Reference of the study, that the implementing strategy 
for Community support of NSA is still centred on the logic of financing projects and has not 
really progressed towards the logic of guiding actors through the national processes of 
transformation at political, institutional, economic and social levels. In order to ensure a 
stronger impact and a greater degree of viability in Community support, it is no longer 
necessary to manage a series of calls for proposals and tendering projects, but to actually 
implement the new political and cooperation agenda of the EC; one which invites collaboration 
alongside NSA as indispensable players in the global development process, recognising the 
diversity of NSA, their different roles and the added value in each sector, as well as in each 
phase of cooperation.  
The capacity building programmes for NSA, which will be developed in the framework of the 
10th EDF, will need to integrate the lessons learned from the 9th EDF programmes, while 
placing themselves at the centre of the Community’s global strategy, building bridges 
between these programmes and the other sectors supported to promote effective 
participation by NSA in the definition of public policy (building their capacity as actors in the 
governance sphere).  
 
2.1. Objectives and scope of the study 
The global objective of this study was to capitalise on the various experiences gathered from 
the NSA capacity building programmes financed under the 9th EDF in order to improve the 
approach logic and strategic use of these programmes with a view to enhancing the impact of 
EC support to NSA in their role as governance actors. 
In order to attain this global objective, a threefold specific objective was determined: 
 
OBJECTIVE 
OF CAPITALIZATION 
 
(i) To produce a conceptual, methodological and operational 
document to support the NSA correspondents within the 
Delegations in ACP countries and the units at Head Office 
responsible for support to NSA, along the entire strategic 
programming chain as well as management of cooperation 
programmes (strategic programming at a national level, 
identification and formulation of programmes and initiatives in 
support of NSA, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of 
these programmes and dialogue on cooperation). 
 
OBJECTIVE 
OF  
DISSEMINATION 
 
(i) On the basis of the conceptual, methodological and operational 
review, to produce a training module (in PowerPoint) aimed at 
the NSA correspondents in the Delegations in ACP countries 
and the units at Head Office responsible for support to NSA.  
 
 
OBJECTIVE 
(ii) To organise a three-day restitution and training workshop in 
Brussels for the NSA correspondents within the responsible 
delegations and the Head Office staff to inform them of the 
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OF  
TRAINING 
 
key concepts and challenges relating to support for NSA. This 
workshop had the twofold objective of presenting the main 
conclusions and recommendations contained in the study and 
testing the training module that has been developed. 
In terms of scope, as specified in the terms of reference, the analysis of the capacity building 
programmes focused on a number of key questions concerning the different stages in the 
strategic programming cycle of cooperation.  At the same time, two levels of analysis must be 
defined:  
(i) a first level of analysis which looks beyond the capacity building programmes of NSA in 
order to place the review of these programmes within a wider context, exemplified 
by the participatory approaches adopted, as much by the EU in its intervention 
strategy, in terms of dialogue and monitoring of cooperation, as by the ACP 
governments. 
(ii) a second level of analysis consisting of the review of key questions regarding the 
identification, teaching, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the NSA 
capacity building programmes that have been financed under the 9th EDF. 
The following diagram illustrates these two levels of analysis and the principal stages related 
to them: 
Figure 1 : The two levels of analysis  
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Source: the authors 
2.2. Research timetable 
Inception 
phase 
October – 
November 
2008 
The research team collected all the necessary documentation regarding 
the 42 NSA capacity building programmes (NIPs, financing arrangements, 
ToRs and reports on mapping studies, identification of topics, feasibility 
studies,  involvement of and recruitment by the Project Management 
Unit (PMU), evaluation studies, reports on PMU activity, audit and 
external monitoring reports, guidelines for calls for proposals, the 
minutes of meetings of the Pilot Committee and the Selection 
Committee, evaluation reports, monitoring reports, final reports on 
seminars, and any other document relevant to this research). This 
information was collected by mail or by means of telephone interviews, 
whether through the services of the Commission’s Head Office or in the 
ACP countries. On the basis of the documentation collected, it has been 
possible to analyse 40 programmes carried out in 38 countries1. 
Execution 
phase  
 
November 
2008 – 
January 
2009 
The analysis of the 40 programmes was carried out in two stages: 
x A first stage of rationalisation and synthesised analysis (based 
on a selection of key questions entered on a synthesised 
analysis slip) of all the existing capacity building programmes in 
ACP countries, with an initial identification of possible good 
practices, innovative experiences and lessons learned. At the 
end of this stage, a definitive selection of countries for an 
analysis in greater depth was made.  
x A second stage of in depth analysis of the 16 selected countries 
(based on the key questions grouped in an in-depth analysis file) 
and identification and recording any good practices, innovations 
and lessons learned, in order to illustrate the methodological 
approach of the document as a guide for each of the proposed 
phases. 
In addition to the analysis of the available documentation, 7 field trips 
were carried out (in Ethiopia, Uganda, the Dominican Republic, Surinam, 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Malawi) with the aim of collecting more data on 
"good practices" in different contexts. These countries were chosen 
because of their relevance as regards to the study’s goals and because of 
the absence of detailed information on them in Europe. The experts in 
charge of the study conducted interviews, either on the spot or in 
Europe, with the various stakeholders: representatives of NSA, 
representatives of national and local government, other interested 
parties, NSA correspondents and other members of the delegations 
responsible for other projects as well as for Community support 
programmes for NSA, and members of the administrative bodies. 
Phase for the 
preparation 
March – Organisation of a three-day workshop in Brussels (1st -3rd April) for the 
NSA correspondents in Delegations and in the Head Office to inform 
                                                 
1 In the case of 2 programmes the analysis was not possible due to incomplete documentation 
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and 
organisation 
of the 
restitution 
seminar 
April 2009 them of the key concepts and challenges regarding support to NSA. The 
main conclusions and recommendations of the review were presented. 
The workshop was held on the Commission premises. Among 
participants, on top of representatives from 35 Delegations, there were 
15 PMU members responsible for the NSA support programmes 
(especially to civil society) in all the relevant geographical areas.  
Phase for the 
preparation 
of the draft 
report 
 
March – 
April 2009 
The team of experts drew up a report which includes both a general 
section on the involvement of NSA in Community cooperation and an 
account of the lessons learnt and their recommendations according to 
the different cyclic stages of the project (identification, formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation). The report gives concrete 
examples (case studies) to exemplify best practices, difficulties 
encountered and lessons learnt.  
 
Phase for the 
finalisation of 
the report 
and the 
training 
module  
April - May 
2009 
At the end of the workshop, the team of experts provided a final version 
of their study and a training module for the NSA correspondents, 
including the principal key points to be taken into account when 
'identifying, formulating and implementing programmes’. 
 
Regarding the choice of 16 countries for the in-depth analysis, 4 criteria were adopted for the 
sake of a framework that is generally representative of the problems addressed and the 
different national contexts. In particular, these were: 
• The distribution of the 16 chosen countries among three different contextual 
categories (see table below). From the 16 selected countries, seven belong to 
Category I, six to Category II and three to Category III. 
• The progress made by the different programmes; in this instance the team chose to 
analyse programmes at different stages of development (inception, mid-term or 
completed). It must be stressed that the team gave preference to programmes which 
were well advanced, so as to obtain as many indications and examples of best 
practices as possible. As such, 8 programmes are in their final phase, 5 are under-way 
and 3 are in their inception phase. 
• Geographical zones; 5 of the countries are in West Africa, 4 in East Africa, 2 in 
Southern Africa, 1 in Central Africa,  2 in the Caribbean, and 2 in the Pacific. 
• Linguistic contexts; language is important insofar as, where certain subjects are 
concerned, – in the first instance capacity building, – the cultural context, and even the 
approach, will change according to the different schools of thought that have 
developed in an English-speaking or French-speaking environment. Thus, of the 16 
countries, 7 are Anglophone, 6 are Francophone (including Cameroun, some of whose 
regions are also English-speaking), and the last three 3 are respectively Spanish, 
Portuguese and Dutch. 
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Below is a list of the 16 countries according to the first criterion, i.e. their grouping in three 
contextual categories according to the degree to which NSA are involved in political dialogue2: 
Countries with a culture 
of participation by NSA 
in the development 
process 
Countries with a somewhat 
limited tradition of dialogue 
with and participation by NSA 
Countries with very limited 
NSA participation  
Benin 
Mali 
Senegal 
Uganda 
Dominican Republic 
Malawi 
Tanzania 
Angola 
Niger 
Cameroon 
Suriname 
Vanuatu 
Papua New Guinea 
 
Mauritania 
Somalia 
Ethiopia 
 
 
  
 
The synthesised analysis extended to 22 other countries (with 24 project analyses) on which 
the team already had adequate documentation. These are the following: 
 
Countries with a culture 
of participation by NSA 
in the development 
process 
Countries with a somewhat 
limited tradition of dialogue 
with and participation by NSA 
Countries with very limited 
NSA participation  
 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
Mauritius 
Zambia 
 
 
 
Burundi 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Gabon 
Guinea-Conakry 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Mozambique 
Nigeria 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
Djibouti 
Equatorial Guinea 
Gambia 
Guinea-Bissau 
Namibia 
 
                                                 
2 The team in charge of the study would like to note that the proposed distribution of countries into the three 
categories must be considered on the basis of a changing definition. It does not therefore reflect more than a 
subjective evaluation for a small period and is susceptible to changes depending on the evolution of the context. 
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2.3.  Methodological approach 
2.3.1. The methodological framework  
In terms of the methodology of the study, the team undertook two approaches, quantitative 
and qualitative. 
 
For the quantitative approach, the study took the following into account: 
 Statistical processing of the information collected through the use of a grid for in 
depth analysis of the 16 NSA support programmes; 
 Statistical processing of the information gathered  through the use of a grid for global 
analysis of the 24 NSA support programmes; 
 Statistical processing of the information gathered through the use of a grid for the 
analysis of the websites of NSA support programmes and the websites of the ECDs. 
 
The qualitative approach took the following into consideration: 
 Analysis of the documentation of the NSA support programmes, with a special 
emphasis on the identification of best practices; 
 In depth interviews with stakeholders of the NSA support programmes in the field (7 
countries) and by telephone or email; 
 Content analysis of the websites of the NSA support programmes and the ECDs. 
 
2.3.2. Technical tools 
As far as the technical instruments are concerned, 3 grids were used for the analysis of the 
documentation collected. These include: 
 A grid for the in depth analysis of the 16 NSA support programmes (see annexe 1); 
 A grid for the global analysis of the 24 NSA support programmes (see annexe 2); 
 A grid for the analysis of the NSA support programme web sites (see annexe 3). 
 
2.3.3. Sources 
As regards sources, the team used primary and secondary sources. 
 
Primary sources, or direct sources, included: 
 The NSA support programme managers within the ECDs; 
 The NAO services of the countries included in the implementation of NSA support 
programmes under the 9th EDF; 
 The PMU responsible for NSA support programmes; 
 The Technical Assistance contract holders for the implementation of PMUs in NSA 
support programmes; 
 The responsible geographic members of AIDCO Unit E4; 
 Key personnel (or resource personnel). 
 
As regards secondary source, or indirect sources, the team consulted the following 
documents: 
 The 10th EDF CSPs/NIPs; 
 The PRSPs;  
 The Financing Agreements; the programme identification files and the Financing 
Proposals; 
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 The ToRs of the programme identification studies; 
 The identification studies (including mapping where available); 
 The Tender Dossier for the recruitment of the TA; 
 The Programme Estimates; 
 The guidelines of the Calls for Proposals, the evaluation reports and the list of selected 
projects (including project fiches); 
 Programme reports;  
 Evaluation reports (mid-term and final); 
 All other documentation related to the implementation of programmes; 
 The websites of programmes and ECDs 
2.4. Key notions adopted by the research 
2.4.1. The notion of NSA and Civil Society 
In a general sense, the Cotonou Agreement defines non state actors as a large range of 
development actors outside government circles, in which the private sector, economic and 
social partners (as well as trade unions) and civil society in all of its forms are included, 
according to the characteristics of each country. 
In essence, the definition of non state actors or civil society is a question that runs the risk of 
being too complicated if this definition has to have an unequivocal, universal character. As 
affirmed by the Cotonou Agreement, each of the ACP countries can themselves define, 
according to their own contexts, which are the collective actors belonging to civil society or, 
more in general, which enter into the category of non state actors. 
It is this that a great disparity appears in the ACP countries. While the trade unions in Guinea, 
for example, are considered as a part of civil society, in the majority of ACP states they belong 
to the social and economical partners grouping. By the same token, faith-based organisations 
organisations in DRC and Zambia are considered to be among the most active actors, while in 
Niger, for example, these organisations are not at all considered as civil society actors and, as a 
consequence, are not eligible for community funding. Again, the Unions in Guinea are 
considered as a civil society actor, while in DRC they are seen as economic and social partners. 
The question of the composition of non state actor families is, in any case, not a theoretical 
exercise, but an extremely practical and operational one, as it on the basis of these definitions 
of NSAs and CSO that the eligibility criteria for community financing are formed in each 
country. 
Bearing in mind the restrictions linked to the great variability in terms of the notion of NSAs 
and civil society in each ACP country, it is fundamental that a single notion based on elements 
and characteristics that transcend each individual context is established. This notion must take 
a dual necessity into account; on the one hand the inclusive capacity of the notion of NSAs and 
Civil Society in order to avoid excluding key actors from the development process and, on the 
other, the selective capacity of the notion itself. 
As regards inclusion, the concept must bear in mind the plurality, in terms of multiplicity and 
heterogeneity, of organisational structures unique to non state actors and, more importantly, 
civil society, where associations, often informal, at a grass roots level, have the same social and 
political legitimacy as platforms, networks and NGOs (women, development, human rights 
etc.) placed at an intermediary level which should not include a superior level in a hierarchy 
that shouldn’t exist. 
Nonetheless, the concepts of non state actors and civil society must, equally, have a selective 
capacity. In effect, if, on the one hand, the concept must include all collective actors working 
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in the field of social, economical and cultural development of any given country, then, on the 
other, one must be able to operate an objective selection process to the detriment of all those 
who, within the same society, work solely for a particular goal. 
This second selective nature of the concept allows for a distinction to be made between the 
different collective actors focused on social responsibility and the entities which, without any 
real associative assize, are just the manifestation of the actions of several individuals, often 
motivated by their own interests. 
While the actions of individuals are entirely legitimate in the social and political domain, they 
have no real relation to collective actions and, for all that, cannot be considered in a context 
where non state actors are borne in mind the key issues in the case of social and economical 
development. 
According to this approach, non state actors and, in particular, civil society, are made up of the 
entirety of actors active on a local, regional or national level and who are the bearers of a 
focus on social responsibility, that is to say that they express an intention and operate in 
favour of social and economical development in their own territory in the interest of the 
collective, often through the creation of public good or services of public interest. 
When it comes to the nature of actors, it is important to remember that, at the heart of civil 
society, there are, equally, forces other than collective actors at work. These include social 
actors who are more undetermined and, despite the fact that they are the holders of a high 
degree of subjectivity and innovation in the sense of public and social change, do not have the 
necessary stable organisational structure. This category often includes women, youth, peasant 
movements and union movements, etc. 
These social actors, therefore, by virtue of their propulsive force, working in a transversal way 
through society, represents the fertile ground for the birth of collective actors who, with a 
strong institutional and organisational capacity, can solidify and implement the aspirations and 
changes in society according to a self development and governance perspective, often on a 
local level. 
2.4.2. The notion of capacity building 
 
Capacity building has become a recurring theme, even a “buzz word” in institutional literature 
and the agenda of the leading public administrations, international agencies and 
nongovernmental organisations. In effect, one can note a revitalised presence of terms such as 
capacity development, institutional modernisation or good governance in the different policy 
or strategy documents of these organisations, as much as in their progressive integration into 
the list of objectives of a plethora of cooperation programmes and projects. Still, regardless of 
its rising importance from the point of view of dialogue and organisational practice, it does 
not, at this point in time exist a single and unequivocal definition of the concept of “capacity 
building”. 
 
Originally, the concept was associated, notably within the multilateral organisations of the 
World Bank, to the macroeconomic stability goals and sustainable growth objectives in the 
countries undergoing development. Today, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), defines capacity building in terms of the creation of an appropriate model of society 
for the pursuit and/or achievement of human development objectives, summed up in the 
Millennium Declaration. 
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In a stricter “institutional” sense, capacity building refers to the process of ameliorating the 
skills of individuals and the institutional support of one or several organisation3. This definition 
may be enhanced by two key concepts4 :  
• On the one hand, the notion of mission: capacity building must contribute to aiding 
the organisation fulfil its mandate 
• On the other hand, the notion of the greater good: capacity building must aim to 
optimise the living conditions of the commune and its populace, that which forms the 
keystone of social movements. 
 
In the framework of the present study, and in respect of the Cotonou Agreements, the 
adopted notion of capacity building is the following: “Contributing to the facilitation of the 
consolidation, in unison with the actors, of their capacities on an individual, organisational 
and sectoral level to allow them to evolve and adapt themselves to the new demands of the 
context in order to play their part in the structure of a partnership”. 
 
This capacity building notion implies a certain number of considerations: 
 
• There must, above all, be a core of skills that can be reinforced; 
• Capacity building must be done through direct participation (on all levels) with the 
persons and organisations involved; 
• The concept of means, capacity building must not be considered an end in itself; 
• The idea of processes: capacity building needs sufficient time to have an impact; 
• Its multidimensional nature: capacity building can, and should by preference, be 
applied to four different levels from a holistic viewpoint: the institutional level, the 
organisational level, the relational/sectoral level and the institutional level; 
• Capacity building focuses on the attainment of a concrete objective, even a 
contribution to the changing of attitudes within the concerned organisations and 
individuals. In this sense, the capacity building programmes must integrate monitoring 
and evaluation systems into their results; 
• The importance of the environment, in a first instance as a conditional factor (positive 
or negative) on the capacity building possibilities and, in a second, as an element that 
one can hope to transform; 
• Finally, adaptation to the local context and the essential need for flexibility and the 
ability to adapt: there are no “magic formulas”, nor a single formula for capacity 
building. The different approaches that exist are based on a plethora of strategies, 
methodologies and resources focused as much on changing mentalities as to the 
development of certain key technical skills and the transmission of knowledge and 
skills. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Clark, John: Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press; 
1991. 
4 McPhee y Bare dans De Vita & Fleming: Building capacity in non-profit organizations. The Urban Institute; 2001. 
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1. DEFINITIONS AND TYPES OF NSA  
Aside from the terminological questions concerning the definitions of non state actors and civil 
society, one of the main problems for the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF was that 
of how to choose the family of actors to support. In reality this question presents a great 
difficulty in the sense that numerous types of actors from many different families enter into 
the category of “non state actors”. 
As of its identification, an NSA support programme must face up to the question of the 
characteristics and the added value that each family of non state actors brings to the 
objectives of the programme and, more generally, the implementation of the community 
strategy of the country. The following paragraphs try and provide some initial response on the 
methodological and operational plan on the basis of the experiences garnered under the 9th 
EDF. 
 
1.1. The private sector/civil society dialectic 
On the grand scheme of things, it is useful to make a preliminary distinction between the 
different components of NSAs. In reality, it is not about asking oneself on what NSAs are, a 
subject already discussed ad infinitum, but to hone the methodologies for comprehension of 
their modus operandi and, above all, their differences. 
In essence the notion of NSA is quite large and the entity is composed of several families of 
actors which are by no means homogenous and which have vocations that, however 
complementary, are entirely different. The importance of this difference has uniquely useful 
application. Indeed, at the level of National Indicative Programmes, much mention is made to 
the notion of NSAs when, in reality, it is civil society that is considered, in the majority of 
projects, to be the beneficiary of the support and capacity building programmes. 
This can bring problems, especially as regards to the expectations of different actors, as can be 
observed in a few countries where the representatives of patrons and, on the whole, the 
private sector, has posed a plethora of problems regarding their exclusion in terms of certain 
NSA support programmes. On the other hand, the attempts to create platforms representative 
of all of the families of NSAs, in some cases, unfortunately under the direct initiative and 
support of the Delegations, failed due to divergent vocations and interests, as is the case with 
patron and trade unions. 
In addition, the panorama offered by the 40 programmes analysed shows how a significant 
percent, 20%, of these programmes explicitly address themselves as well to civil society as to 
the private sector, as demonstrated below. 
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Apart from one or two, that is to say “limited”, experiences, the nature and logic of the 
support to the private sector and civil society are not really compatible within such a capacity 
building programme if they are approached in this way. If, for example, the aspect of 
democratic or associative life, or even that of action in favour of the poor is one of the 
fundamental criteria even at the level of eligibility for CSOs, these aspects do not bear much 
relevance for the private sector. 
While the private sector is of critical importance to the goals of sustainable development, an 
importance evidenced and underlined at the level of the new elaborations in terms of EU 
development policy and at the level of the new Community strategy for the African continent, 
its role is purely linked to the economic sphere and much less to that of social development 
and the democratisation process underway in the majority of ACP states, notably sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
1.2. The principle of differentiated analyses  
It is becoming increasingly usual to identify NSAs as NGOs, especially development NGOs. 
Indeed, while their importance may be fundamental in a large number of countries as regards 
the goals of the democratisation, legitimisation and multiparty process, there is a risk that 
other collectives of actors on the same level as the non profit private sector or the associative 
grass roots movements will be forgotten. As regards the latter, it often appears with no formal 
structure or official recognition on the part of the State, despite their vital role in terms of 
identifying efficient solution for sustainable development and local governance. 
By contrast, the reality of umbrella organisations, which often have a role that cannot be 
ignored in the lobbying activities vis a vis the State and, above all, in terms of the elaboration 
of sector policy, cannot afford to be omitted. 
This typology, suggested equally by the “Users Manual for NSAs5” promoted by the ACP 
Secretariat, allows, among others, the avoidance of all confusion as to the role and positioning 
of each actor within civil society, the aim being to avoid competition between actors unable to 
share the same starting point. The values, mission, technical skills, functioning, and 
                                                 
5 ECDPM and ACP Secretariat, Cotonou Agreement – User Manual for Non State Actors, Brussels, February 2004 
(page 32: “Definition of non state actors” and page 101: Information flow between non state actors”. 
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leadership of a grassroots organisation cannot be compared with that of a higher-level 
umbrella organisation, even if they are of the same area or field. 
The typology is founded on four levels of analysis (or structure) which are presented in the 
following diagram. In this diagram each of the four arrows in the left hand column represents 
one of the four structural levels of NSAs, which are (from top to bottom): Fourth-tier 
organisations made of platforms and consultations forums; third-tier organisations made of 
umbrella organisations such as networks, federations and coordination bodies; second-tier 
organisations made up of formally constituted actors with an advanced structural level and 
finally, grass-roots organisations. 
As regards the small black arrows, these represent the communication flows and the 
horizontal and vertical relations between organisations. 
 
Figure 2 : Differentiated actor analysis 
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Source : Maurizio Floridi and Beatriz Sanz Corella 
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As regards the four levels of analysis of NSAs, the first level is made up of grassroots 
organisations, cooperatives, socio-economic organisations, farmers´ unions, women’s and 
youth groups, faith-based organisations, clubs, radio programme audience groups, cultural and 
sports groups, community interest groups, etc. These are created in rural and urban areas by 
groups of people who get together in order to suggest joint solutions to problems of the 
immediate local context, defend their rights or improve their living conditions and access to 
basic public services (health, education, etc.). These organisations, of limited geographical and 
thematic scope, are often largely informal and financed by their members’ contributions 
(membership based organisations). 
The second level is made up of formally constituted actors with an advanced structural level, 
oriented towards social responsibility, that work for the benefit of the population and of its 
accompanying organisational forms on the first level. Development NGOs, non-profit 
organisations that accompany development dynamics, human rights organisations, union 
organisations, religious entities, etc., belong to this typology. 
Of course, this category contains very varied entities in terms of size or degree of 
establishment in the territory. One can find development NGOs that act locally or a large 
national organisation such as a union. However, beyond the size or reach at the local, national, 
provincial or regional levels, the same principles govern these organisations, which usually 
operate in a similar way. For example, a large number of actors on this level receive external 
funds in order to carry out specific or one-off actions within the framework of programmes 
and development projects. 
The third level is made up of “umbrella” organisations — basically, coordinated groups, 
federations and networks — consisting of a group of organisations that decide to get together 
and collaborate along a thematic and/or geographic rationale. The organisation arising out of 
this collaboration is usually conceived of as a forum for exchange, communication and 
consultation between the member organisations, as well as a tool for offering services to the 
member organisations in areas such as capacity building, external projection, defence of 
collective interests, etc. 
Platforms and consultation forums: designed as consultation forums, platforms constitute real 
“groupings of umbrella organisations" (that is, composed of networks, coordinated groups, 
collectives, etc.) that are often characterised by their degree of flexibility and permeability. 
They are created in order to take a common stance with respect to common external 
problems, public authorities, donor policies, etc. 
This typology of NSA enables an understanding, from the mapping exercise, as it will be further 
analysed in the chapter on identification of capacity building programmes and mapping 
exercises, the positioning of the various organisations, as well as the problems linked to each 
level and the solutions to be recommended in the framework of a support and capacity 
building programme.  
 
1.3.  The question of differing vocations and the differentiation between 
actors 
While the experiences gained in several countries have, until now, revealed important 
convergence points for all NSAs, 9th EDF programmes have always brought about a need for 
differentiation in terms of their particularities.  
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The differentiation strategy must take three aspects into account: differentiation by family of 
actors, differentiation by organisational level of NSAs and the differentiation as regards the 
spheres of capacity building. 
1.3.1. Differentiation of families of actors 
The analysis of the 40 NSA support programmes has shown that, beyond the common aspects, 
especially in terms of the stakes, it would be useful to take certain particularities into account. 
In effect, each family can provide a specific contribution to the process of sustainable 
development. 
In terms of the membership of the types of actors to the three NSA families, significant 
differences can be found on a national basis. In general, membership of civil society consists 
of the associations and organisations linked to religious movements, sporting group, cultural 
associations and the media. Trade unions, orders and professional or socio-professional 
associations, research centres and, in some countries, universities are part of social and 
economic partners. 
This general tendency must, of course, be nuanced: in Guinea Conakry, for example, the 
syndicates and professional orders are considered to belong to the family of civil society and in 
Niger, to point out another example, religious movements - thanks to a questionable choice of 
the ECD, which goes against the practice of most member States in the country, for example 
the Danish Cooperation - are not at all considered as NSAs. Finally, in some countries chambers 
of commerce and agriculture are considered as actors belonging to civil society, while in others 
actors are considered a Para State reality. 
It is the same for local authorities, for which ambiguity as to their positioning is reinforced  by 
the presence of thematic financial lines that address NSAs and local authorities6  at the same 
time, or through a trend, no doubt positive, of supporting partnering (according to the multi 
actor approach) between NSAs and local authorities in the decentralisation support 
programmes. 
It is important to note that this discussion is not a theoretical exercise or abstract from 
development sociology. Quite the opposite, the question acquires a very concrete sense that 
the membership of an actor to one or other family can determine its eligibility in terms of 
access to resources under the programme. The question also concerns the programmes 
focusing solely on the civil society family, seeing as in a few states some relatively varied and 
different actors are entered into this category. 
Although the objectives of the three NSAs families are similar, each family can bring, on the 
basis of its own specialisation, its skills and experiences to efforts that the ACP states are in the 
process of deploying so as to attain sustainable development through good governance and 
control by the citizens. 
In this sense, the contribution of the civil society family is priceless in terms of the experience 
in development policy that it brings, as well as the consideration of marginalised groups, 
whereas the employers (or private sector) can offer their experience and expertise in terms of 
the vision of economic dynamism focusing on the increase of wealth, as well as the resources 
for diversification and the valorisation of economic activities. When it comes to trade unions, 
their contribution is fundamental not only for as a vehicle for the notion of citizenship which 
surpasses the logic of demand but also for mobilising the informal sector. 
                                                 
6 The reference made is to the thematic line “Non state actors and local authorities”.  
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So that each family of actors can contribute to its full potential, it is important to implant the 
condition that each actor plays its role in respect of its specific vocation and its respective 
technical skills. 
 
1.3.2. The differentiation by organisational level 
If the vocations and characteristics of the 4 organisational levels of NSAs differ considerably, 
the analysis and intervention strategies of support must therefore take into account the role 
that each level plays and can more actively play in the development of countries. 
In effect, if the grassroots organisations of the 1st level can guarantee social mobilisation and 
territorial ownership,  2nd level organisations (with their strong points, especially on the level 
of civil society) can place their skills and capabilities at the disposal of the development 
efforts. 
When it comes to umbrella organisations of the 3rd level, they can facilitate access to the 
resources of their members, information and, above all, the capitalisation of experiences. This 
level is equally important in the assurance of a national vision regarding the problems of 
governance and development, as well as the actions of lobbying as much on the level of policy 
as in regards to the operational conditions of their member organisations. 
Finally, the umbrella organisations of the 4th level have a primordial role not only in terms of 
political dialogue on national development strategies, but also on the level of coordination 
between the different families of NSAs. 
Each structural level, therefore, thanks to its specific role and strategic positioning, can bring 
its own contribution to the efforts of a country when it comes to good governance and the 
fight against poverty. 
The differentiation strategy therefore proves useful and necessary to ensure that each level 
is reinforced in the exertion of its role and prerogatives at the service of the collective 
interest and the development of a country.  
By contrast it is important to recognise the major differences for all that concerns the 
organisation of each NSA family according to the level of organisation, as shown in the table 
below. 
Table 1 : NSA families and levels of organisation 
  
CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
EMPLOYERS / PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
 
TRADE UNIONS /ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL PARTNERS 
NSA Platforms  
4th Level Coalitions, collectives  Inter-trade unions 
3rd Level Networks, federations, 
unions, etc 
Umbrella organisations Trade Unions 
2nd Level NGOs, associations Employers Organisations Workers organisations 
1st Level Grassroots organisations Workers grassroots 
organisation 
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As one can see, it is often impossible to distinguish on the first level between the civil society 
family and that of the employers or private sector. It is rare still to find organisations of the 
fourth level in the private sector. 
 
1.3.3. The differentiation by level of capacity building 
The capacity building of NSAs cannot be done without making a distinction and a clear 
analysis of the beneficiaries, while often the analysis of the 40 programmes highlighted a 
tendency to consider NSAs as a single bloc. The following graph shows the categories of 
beneficiaries to which the 40 programmes were aimed.  
 
 
The capacity building actions must be individualised in terms of the needs of the beneficiary 
organisation. In order to achieve this, it is fundamental to know the level of intervention: the 
actions concerning the level of the organisation differ in fundamental ways from those that 
concern the sectoral level. 
In other words, what is required is a conception of NSA capacity building in terms of facilitating 
support and accompaniment to enable endogenous processes of association. This 
understanding of Capacity Building should underpin the needs’ identification phase as much as 
the implementation of capacity building actions. In terms of the first, it is vital to remember 
that the capacity building needs perceived by an organisation can differ considerably from the 
real needs. Only an activity that guides the actor through this delicate phase can, therefore, 
guarantee an efficient analysis and a correct targeting of the actions to be taken. 
When it comes to the second aspect, it is about guaranteeing the institutional support of 
actors through the development process of their capacity starting with a clear distinct 
between the individual level, the organisational level or the institutional level, as analysed in 
chapter 2.4.1. on the composition of programmes and the approaches and tools deployed for 
capacity building. 
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The importance of a differentiation strategy concerns objectives as much as needs. An 
organisation can have need solely of reinforcement on certain limited technical skills for which 
specific reinforcement methods must be adopted or better yet a global intervention for 
example through a strategic planning exercise that involves the verification of the mission on 
the part of the organisation itself. 
 
1.4.  The question of grassroots organisations and emerging actors 
Support to NSAs poses a certain number of problems in the scheme of efficiency and the 
impact of the action as much as in adherence to EDF procedures. These two elements present 
several paradoxical aspects in the sense that the organisations that, in principle, provide the 
most guarantees on the level of adherence to the regulations and procedures are not always 
those that ensure viable results in the mid-long term. 
In effect, the resources placed at the disposition of NSAs by the donor organisations (this 
applies particularly to the European Union of which the intervention instruments, notably the 
EDF, are quite heavy on the procedural side) prioritise the more structured levels of 
organisations to the detriment of the other actors and, in particular, grassroots organisations 
(1st level organisations). 
Yet it is they that are often the more active forces of society, especially on the local level, 
where the majority of collective actors engaged do not have the formal structures nor are they 
officially recognised. It is on this level, in effect, where the great changes take place, in terms 
of social and economic developments, as well as in terms of the promotion of free public 
political expression, the promotion of human rights, the promotion of the right to security, the 
promotion of the right to education and health, in the management and prevention of 
conflicts, the fight against impunity and corruption, in the promotion of the rights of workers 
and manufacturers. 
On top of this is a consideration of the tendency of “traditional” actors of civil society, NGOs 
and development associations. While they may have had an essential role over the last two 
decades in the management of environmental crises (the great droughts of the 80s and the 
local food crises); the social crises (the prevention of conflicts and poverty); and political crises 
(the democratisation process, multipartite systems and the respect of human rights), these 
organisations still only represent a very limited part of the associative and collective 
movement which is present in the societies of ACP states. 
A project or programme which aims to support NSAs cannot ignore the existence of new actors 
who, by channelling social energy at its base, are always more focused on action according to 
a profound consciousness as regards their social responsibility all while identifying efficient 
and innovative solutions to the question of sustainable development. 
These new grassroots actors (women, youth, traditional and religious leaders, retired 
businessmen, teachers, churches as well as thematic networks at local and regional levels), 
that the world of NGOs and development associations, as well as the State and donor 
community, have a tendency to consider as subject to “educate” and “train”, are the bearers 
of great social and technical innovation in the field of economic and social development. 
Of course it is necessary to have the courage to recognise, as was foreseen in the Cotonou 
Agreement, on the juridical and political level, NSAs which often escape the traditional modes 
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of association, as is in fact happening on a few programmes (for example Niger and DRC). In 
sub-Saharan Africa there is, in effect, a new generation of NSAs spawned by the structural 
adjustment of democratisation that often reject the internal etiquettes, as much as the 
internal operating rules, and yet are not less efficient in their social action. 
In general, the priority of these emerging actors is not to endow themselves with a statute or 
to be officially recognised to obtain the funds of international donor organisations, but to find 
the most efficient solutions to eliminate the constraints that hinder development in their 
territory such as  the degradation of the environment, poverty, exclusion of women from social 
society, the prevention of conflicts, religious intolerance, the violation of human rights, 
security, youth unemployment, access to land and the basic needs regarding health and 
education. 
As for the difference of “traditional” NSAs, above all NGOs and development associations as 
well as umbrella organisations concentrated in the capital cities, which often have the habit of 
accepting “the rules of the game” set by donor organisations, the role of emerging actors in 
our eyes is often unequal and anti-democratic. For these actors a community organisation 
based on a hierarchy, competition, egalitarianism and the mastery of one sole activity is not 
necessary a condition of success, as certain capacity building programmes often lead one to 
believe, through the adoption of an ideological approach and a messianic logic, neither of 
which are pertinent or efficient. 
Focusing on these emerging actors requires a reconnaissance of who they are and what they 
do. To ensure they are eligible within the framework of a capacity building programme, they 
are either adapted to the rules and procedures by significantly changing them, or even 
distorting them, or the rules and procedures are adapted to their identities and their 
characteristics.  In this sense, every capacity building programme which aims to “structure” 
them or help them “evolve” towards mature associative forms is doomed to fail. 
On the concrete project or programme implementation plan for support to NSAs, it is 
necessary that the eligibility criteria for access to funds allow these emerging actors to reach 
them and that the type of implementable actions are not restricted, but are as large as 
possible. In other words, it is necessary that the support programme or project is based on the 
demand of these grassroots actors and not the supply of capacity building formulas. 
 
1.5.  Towards a new approach to NSAs  
This approach must be based firstly on the three families of NSAs, which are civil society, 
employers or the private sector and trade unions. Indeed, all diagnostics, actions and analyses 
need to bear in mind the different missions and vocations that are at the foundation of these 
three families of actors. 
If it is evident that the totality of NSAs have a fundamental role to play in good governance 
and the sustainable development of the country, as previously recognised by the Cotonou 
Agreement, it is always necessary that each family of actors can play the role that it is suited to 
in the public arena according to its characteristics and, above all, bring its own added value. 
This differentiation by family of actors cannot suffice. In effect, within the same family, there 
needs to be a distinction between the different levels of organisation. A grassroots 
organisation does not function the same way as an umbrella organisation, nor with the same 
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mission. In addition to this the contributions that each level of structure can provide for good 
governance, the control of citizens and the fight against poverty differ in a fundamental way in 
relation to the technical skills, methods and positioning of each type of organisation. 
In other words, this new approach replies to the need of differentiation as the analysis and 
inclusion of NSAs in the public arena of each country is taken into account. This necessity is 
even more important if one takes into consideration the policies and strategies of NSA support 
and capacity building. 
Indeed, a large employers umbrella organisation, which could include several times the 
personnel of the civil services considering member organisations and the total turnover of 
affiliated companies, which could come close to or surpass the national budget, has the 
capacity for an impact on public policy that is completely different compared to a small 
development association that operates on a local scale in a department or rural community. 
The two organisations have a common vocation to put their know-how and tools at the service 
of the community to contribute to the country’s development, but it is evident that their 
missions and their capacities are completely different. 
This reflexion is of fundamental strategic importance when it comes to capacity building. 
Indeed, if the inclusion of NSAs and, in particular CSOs, in the EU strategies and programmes 
can be traced back to the Lomé Convention, which recognised (through decentralised 
cooperation, the micro-realisations programmes of the 6th EDF and the old budget lines, since 
then thematic programmes) a significant added value in these actors in terms of the execution 
of certain tasks (awareness raising, animation, training, etc equally within the framework of 
the realisation of large socio-economic infrastructures), the Cotonou Agreement opens large 
perspectives for NSAs not only as service contractors but also as actors of dialogue and 
development by the same token as governmental actors. 
This new juridical and political role of NSAs is accompanied by a renaissance in the importance 
of capacity building which needs to allow these actors to better play this part as actors on the 
whole. Yet each family of actors and each structural level within the same family must be able 
to profit from opportunities which are offered by the Cotonou Agreement as much in the 
specific role plan in social and political dialogue as in the allocation of resources. 
It is thus on the basis of these reflexions that it is important to identify an approach that it is 
both theoretical and methodological and allows all of the families and types of actors to 
benefit from the opportunities offered by new orientation in terms of the development 
policies and protocols of EU-ACP partnerships. 
This approach should, therefore, be taken in terms of reconciling the needs on the one hand of 
assembling NSAs as legitimate actors and gifted with intentions regarding the themes of good 
governance and equitable and sustainable development and, on the other, to avoid 
neglecting families or types of actors that are less familiar with the procedures of Community 
intervention and, in particular, those of the EDF.  
It is evident, as in the experience currently underway in several countries (notably in Senegal, 
as well as DRC, Gabon, etc.) in the framework of the 9th EDF showed, that certain families of 
actors, trade unions as well as employers, not used to projects’ formulation that require 
limited support without achieving mastery of EDF procedures, run the risk of being 
discriminated against by the competition of other civil society actors, such as NGOs, which 
have a long tradition and in-depth technical knowledge in terms of the presentation and 
formulation of projects. 
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By contrast, it is important to note that this tendency may be replicated within the same 
family of actors. Indeed, the experiences mentioned and the numerous testimonies gathered 
on the ground by the team to this effect have evidenced that the competition between 
organisations belonging to the second level of the civil society family (NGOs and intermediary 
associations) and organisations of the first level (grass roots organisations) risks to be 
detrimental to the latter, doubtless less equipped in terms of the formulation of projects and, 
above all, with the completely different capacity building needs in relation to other actors in 
their same family. 
The present approach therefore proposes a process that takes into account this double 
necessity: on the one hand the need to recognise the totality of NSAs as actors bearing 
positions and points of view that need to integrate themselves into those of the governmental 
decision makers and, on the other hand, to recognise the specifications and differences within 
the same NSAs of a country.   
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2. THE PURPOSES OF NSA SUPPORT PROGRAMMES AND THEIR STRATEGIC POSITIONING  
 
Every NSA support programme must have a clear purpose and satisfy a set of guiding 
principles to which the programme’s strategies, methods and activities, as well as the actors 
involved, must conform whether at the level of the programme’s supposed beneficiaries or of 
agents of institutions. This is a basic fact, since monitoring and evaluation cannot be carried on 
without reference to certain parameters, notably that of the programme’s relevance. 
2.1.  Analysis of purposes 
 
Analysis of the purposes of the 40 programmes studied, in terms of thematic contents of the 
specific aims pursued, yields the following chart:  
 
 
As denoted by the graph above, the themes contained within the objectives of the 
programmes are relatively general and, on the whole, refer to aspects linked either solely to 
the life of organisations (for example the institutional and technical capacity building of NSA) 
without defining their role (development actors vs. “service delivery” contractors), or themes 
that could be defined as too vague, even ambitious (for example the contribution to 
development and the fight against poverty). By contrast, the precise, focused themes, linked 
as much to questions of national governance (for example the improvement of dialogue with 
the State and the participation in the process of elaboration and monitoring of public policies) 
as to questions of local governance, democracy, human rights and dialogue with the State, 
remain limited. This observation remains paradoxical considering the ultimate aim of these 
programmes, as regards the Cotonou Agreement; to reinforce the capacities of NSA and 
enable them to participate fully in the restructuring of governance, as much on a national level 
as on a local level, implicating a real institutional, political and social transformation process. 
If certain programmes under the 9th EDF focused on themes linked to capacity building in itself 
and/or were conceived in an overly general manner, taking development and the fight against 
poverty as a final goal, those in the framework of the 10th EDF cannot neglect the new 
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contexts characterised by profound changes in the concept and management of public space 
and affairs. 
In effect, significant institutional and political changes are already taking place in most of the 
ACP countries. These changes, on a national and, more importantly, on a local level, starting 
with processes such as the political and administrative decentralisation, have opened new 
perspectives in terms of governance and, more generally, new relationships between the State 
and its citizens. 
The following table briefly exemplifies some of these changes on a national and local level, as 
well as their implications for NSA. 
Table 2 : Institutional and political changes taking place on a national and local level and major 
implications for NSA 
 The governance challenges for civil society on a local 
level : the changes brought about by the 
decentralisation7  
The governance challenges for civil society on a 
national level : The changes brought about by the new 
agenda of donors and sector wide approaches8 
Decentralisation and democratisation reforms cannot 
succeed without the active participation of NSA, which 
are essential to assure the promotion of a better 
harmonisation with populations while prioritising best 
practices. Nonetheless, the participation of NSA will be 
ineffective unless it inspires and promotes a change of 
mentality and approach in the management of public 
affairs, conceived through meetings and public 
dialogue, necessitating:  
▪ The participation of different actors in the 
management of public affairs via the new 
rules and modus operandi pertaining to 
communal democracy (following a voter – 
elected logic which is, above, political).  
▪ The different actors tackle the construction 
and, ultimately, the management of a new 
public affairs identity, delimited by the new 
system, where each actor is called upon to 
play its role, which includes a redefinition 
exercise regarding economical, social and 
cultural relations.  
Within this setting the onus falls to NSA, in their role of 
support and mentoring, to surpass the purely 
administrative logic and systems to be an active actor 
and fill the local development plans with relevant 
content, in line with social responsibility and the 
collective interest, as well as within the logic of 
governance. In effect, local administration alone cannot 
fulfil this role; partners, as well as civil society and the 
Current aid strategies are based on the premise that 
donors need to support the development of nationally 
owned policies rather than impose externally defined 
policies on recipient governments. At the same time, 
donors, including the EC, are focused on being more 
strategic and focused on results.  The MDGs articulate 
results which require the development of national 
policies for their achievement, and most major donors 
have signed up to supporting countries in their pursuit 
of these goals.  The harmonisation process is related to 
this approach, whereby donors elect to harmonise 
processes and, where possible, align with country 
policies and procedures.   
This change of emphasis, focusing on the importance of 
local development and ownership of policies, has led 
to a change in expectations about the role that can be 
played by civil society.  Civil society is now seen to have 
an important role in helping build country ownership of 
policies (by being engaged in discussions and dialogue 
about those policies), and also an important role in 
holding governments to account – in ensuring that 
policy commitments are met.  This is in addition to the 
more traditional roles that many civil society groups 
play in the implementation of policies (service delivery 
activities).   
These new roles, as evinced in the report of McGee & 
Norton9 on the experience of civil society participation 
in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Document (PRSD) 
process, are: 
                                                 
7 Further information on the role of civil society in the decentralisation process can be found in the document 
“Support to decentralisation and local governance in third countries” Collection Tools and Methods, Reference 
Document n°2, European Commission, January 2007 (pages 33-35).  
8 “The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, sector approaches and monitoring of policy 
implementation”. Draft January 2009. AIDCO/E/4. European Commission.  
9 “Participation in poverty reduction strategies: a synthesis of experience with participatory approaches to policy 
design, implementation and monitoring”. IDS Working paper n. 109 (2008)  
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local private sector will be necessary.  
In order to achieve this, civil society organisations will 
have to promote social and political dialogue with all of 
the other actors (administrative and private sector) in 
exercising their rights and duties; the basis of the 
notion of citizenship.  
• Representation of the interests of specific 
groups in relation to government and other 
sectors of society;  
• Mobilisation of social actors to increase their 
consciousness and impact;  
• Regulation and monitoring of state 
performance and the behaviour and actions 
of public officials;  
• Developmental or social action (service 
delivery) to improve the well being of their 
own or other constituencies 
 
 
All NSA support programmes and, in particular, those in support of CSOs, will, therefore, need 
to confront the question of the relevance of their strategic positioning regarding new stakes 
and challenges posed by governance in all of its dimensions. In other words, the civil NSA 
building programmes conceived within the framework of the 10th EDF programme, in the era 
of the Cotonou Agreement, must have a link to a basic element of the new cooperation 
agreement: the political dimension. This means that a NSA capacity building and support 
programme cannot limit itself to the individual actors, but should rather focus on reinforcing 
the existing links between the actors themselves and, above all, between the actors, their 
context and the institutional partners (notably the State in all of its guises).  
Programmes’ goals, objectives, strategies and methodologies must, to this effect, be oriented 
to promote an optimised anchoring of NSA to their context of reference. This must be ensured 
through the relevance of the supported activities, which cannot be conceived independently 
from the precise social and political issues characterising the country and for which NSA 
contribution, and civil society participation in particular, will be essential especially as regards 
the deployment of governance best practices.  
2.2. Analysis of guiding principles of 9th EDF programmes and orientations for the 
10th EDF 
 
In terms of the main principles, experience shows how an NSA support programme must 
respect a number of principles to remain coherent in terms of its vocation to support an 
institutional, political and societal transformation process, namely:  
 
2.2.1. The strategic positioning of a programme 
The first main principle concerns the need for each programme, as described above, to have its 
own strategic positioning in a precise context which reflects the social, institutional, 
economic, cultural and political reality of the country in which the programme is 
implemented. This positioning clearly concerns not only the national context, but also the civil 
society context and, more generally, that of NSA, which is defined by the stakes identified, by 
the dynamics in place and by the principles of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) and the 
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National Indicative Programme (NIP), which are the foundations of Community intervention, 
with the latter reflecting the indications and priorities of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS). 
In other words, an NSA support programme may not, in any case, be “neutral” as regards the 
context in which it is intervening and, more importantly, in the context of civil society. In this 
sense, the “neutrality” of the programme is neither an asset nor an indicator of impartiality but 
a mistake to the extent that this neutrality impedes the programme in placing itself in a clear 
and distinct manner. 
A programme must, therefore, research its position for three basic reasons. 
• The first reason is that each NSA support programme must take its inspiration from 
the major principles that constitute the basis of the EU’s development policy. 
Supporting NSA for the sole reason that they require assistance runs the risk of 
representing not only a tautology, but also resulting in inefficiency if this support is not 
in relation to the end goals of NSA interventions. In other words, programmes must 
devote themselves to reinforcing NSA not from a generic stance but by formulating 
the support in line with the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement, therefore allowing NSA 
to soundly fulfil their role in terms of the development of their country and, in 
particular, in the management of public affairs on a variety of levels: national, regional 
and local. 
This must be done in harmony with the need to take into account the often neglected 
aspects in NSA support programmes: the cross cutting issues. In reality, these cross 
cutting issues (gender, human rights, environment etc.), which are strongly linked to 
the overarching principles at the foundation of the EU’s development policy, are often 
briefly mentioned in the preparatory documents and, subsequently, disappear in the 
implementation phase. It is interesting to note to this effect that the in depth analysis 
of the 16 NSA support programmes has shown that the cross cutting issues were only 
taken into account properly on 3 programmes (Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) 
while a further 2 paid a token tribute to them (Mauritania and Botswana); the other 
11 programmes, in general, neglected these cross cutting issues. 
• The second reason is that, apart from the major principles influencing EU development 
policy, the positioning of NSA support programmes must face up to the political 
choices made by the EU strategy in the CSP. It is not only a question of coherence or 
harmonisation with the Community strategy, but rather a shared vision of the end 
goals and mid to long term strategies promoted by the EU cooperation in a given 
country. This requires the programme, often for the sake of its neutrality, that it is not 
a detached reality, autonomous as regards the CSP but rather, thanks to its precise 
positioning, an integral part of the broader strategy. 
• The third reason why this positioning is essential is that the mission of a programme is 
to support NSA in the context of their role and, above all, in terms of the stakes at 
hand. In other words, a NSA support programme cannot be generic, but must be 
targeted and selective, and must, first and foremost, tackle the question of what is at 
stake. In this sense, the relevant criteria, be it for the activities of the programme or 
regarding the choice of actions and aid to actors, is of fundamental importance. 
By contrast, the effects of neutrality are often the cause of the transformation of NSA support 
programmes into micro-project programmes, or even micro-realisations, targeting only the 
accomplishment of a certain number of projects across a broad thematic spectrum, sometimes 
even in the framework of service-delivery and the realisation of basic socioeconomic 
infrastructures executed (often only partially) by NSA and financed according to a 
“convenience store” mentality.  
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2.2.2. The inevitable disruption of social dynamics and fictitious neutrality 
These reflections upon the necessity of strategically positioning NSA support programmes 
bring us to a seldom made objection, one which happens to be the refuge of neutrality’s 
partisans: with its clear positioning the programme will, in and of itself, be an active factor in 
the disruption of social dynamics. As such, it is important to highlight the fact that social 
dynamics in general and, more specifically in terms of NSA, is disrupted by the simple fact that 
an NSA support programme exists.  
In reality, this disruption is already coming to fruition well before a programme is launched. In 
many cases, it has led to a veritable flourishing of NSA and, in particular, CSOs (as in Niger, 
Mali, Chad and the DRC), or to a profound reorganisation of the networks, simply through the 
announcement of an identification mission for an NSA support mission. However, if we push 
the analysis a little deeper, it is possible to see that the most important changes in a country 
occur during the discussion regarding the CSPs which are, by nature, the precursor of the 
future programme strategic positioning. 
In effect, this change process at the heart of the NSA networking is a product of the CSP 
discussions, in the sense that the initial analyses determine the distribution of resources, and 
formulate the NIP. In a fair few countries the simple choice of decision makers to support NSA 
can favourise or accelerate the internal dynamics through the creation of new structures, 
especially as regards associative organisations. This is the case of the NSA platform for the 
monitoring of the Cotonou Agreement in Senegal, the Chad NSA Organisation (OANET), the 
Cotonou Task Force in Ethiopia, the NSA-Task Force Group in Tanzania and the Non State 
Actors Forum (NSAF) in Zimbabwe. 
It is thus possible to state that disruption is inevitable and that it follows a course strictly 
limited to the stages that characterise the implementation of an EU cooperation system. The 
latter, which is never neutral, obliges all NSA support programmes to place themselves 
strategically within the context of government policies and the Technical and Financial Partners 
(TFP), as much as the respective dynamics of NSA. 
 
2.2.3. Plurality and diversity of NSA and the distinction between structuring and 
networking processes  
In many countries assistance is provided in order to establish platforms and other associative 
organisations, each one with the aspiration of being the sole intermediary between the State 
and donor organisation, while hoping to represent the entirety of civil society and, even, NSA10. 
This trend, which NSA support programmes will have to confront, is often linked to the 
necessity of several figureheads of civil society to gain a more important political foothold and, 
thereby, a more legitimate ground upon which to open negotiations with the State. 
If on the one hand this is true of States which, on most occasions, find it hard to acknowledge 
the sovereignty of NSA, then, on the other hand, one cannot forget that fundamental 
components of the ACP NSA sectors, such as trade unions, people’s movements, human rights 
organisations and women’s organisations, may have problems positioning themselves in a 
                                                 
10 This phenomenon concerns the large majority of Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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single structure that runs the risk, at least in terms of formalities, of becoming a clone of the 
one party state present in a fair amount of countries up until the 90s. 
By contrast, NSA support programmes must take into account the distinction between the 
coordination or networking process and the structuring process. Too often the latter does not 
result from the NSA dynamics but represents the will of donors to use a set number of focal 
points at the heart of the NSA movement or even, as mentioned before, to facilitate the 
creation of a super structure. 
In effect, numerous NSA support programmes set, as part of their objectives, that of 
structuring. Although the process of regrouping NSA has existed for more than a decade, 
especially in African countries, it must be recalled that the regrouping and networking 
processes are a response to a coordination logic which functions fundamentally on a thematic 
and/or geographical basis. 
As such, most of the networking experience, such as that of thematic NGO groups and 
geographical NSA coordination mechanisms, concern actors which have several points in 
common and thus share a common agenda: either they operate in similar thematic spheres, 
or they are operating in the same geographical area. 
As such the NSA support programmes run the risk of poor positioning in the fact that they seek 
to structure and organise NSA independently of their own free will and the existing 
dynamism. This explains why the attempt of some donor organisations (primarily the UNDP, 
but the EU as well) to create national representative platforms in each country, promoted as of 
the year 2001, has utterly failed. 
It is important to note how this tendency and desire to structure ACP NSA from the outside 
began to manifest itself under the 9th EDF in the form of direct grants (sometimes of significant 
size), often provided without competition mechanisms and under the pretext of a monopoly 
that these actors began to take a hand in the national political spectrum (sensu lato). In reality, 
these actors often hold a very limited and partial representation of national NSA and, as a 
result, their legitimacy of institutional assizes at a governmental level remains questionable.     
The NSA support programme of Senegal is relatively noteworthy in that, to this effect, it not 
only significantly financed the “NSA platform for monitoring the Cotonou Agreement” (direct 
core grant for the operation and structure as well as the execution of activities related to its 
mission), but also included this organisation in all stages of the programme (Steering and 
Monitoring Committee, Selection Committee etc.) raising some noteworthy issues regarding 
conflicts of interest. This grant clearly raised some criticism among Senegalese NSA which, for 
the most part, do not feel represented by the platform. Similar situations have become 
apparent in other countries; Chad, Ethiopia and Cape Verde to name but a few. 
Unfortunately, despite the experiences of the 9th EDF, the use of direct core funding to support 
national ad-hoc platforms does not appear to have been omitted in a number of programmes 
under preparation for financing under the 10th EDF. Although in some special circumstances 
this tool may be of great use, it is always important to remain aware of the fact that the 
utilisation of direct funding may represent a tool at the service of a misplaced strategic 
positioning  on the part of the NSA support programme. This, as a result, brings an inevitable 
distancing from all of the NSA which are not represented within these platforms (often the 
large majority of NSA in any given country) and, in turn, brings the opinion that these platforms 
are “made in the EU”; ergo representing an alien intrusion into their dynamics. 
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As such, in this case, although the programme will have avoided the danger of being neutral, it 
will, by contrast, have positioned itself favourably towards an actor with which it may be able 
to establish privileged relations on the technical and political scheme of things, provoking a 
sentiment of rejection among the marginalised NSA. Their options are, thus, twofold: 
boycotting the programme and the opportunities therein (as occurred in Chad, as well as Mali), 
or adherence to a programme seen as little more than a means to access the resources of the 
programme as, lamentably, occurred in Senegal.  
In reality, a sound position of the NSA support programme on the internal dynamic scheme in 
relation to the associative movement of a country should abstain from any choice which would 
create a monopolistic position for organisations participating in political dialogue with the 
government and donor organisations. Instead, such a programme should focus on supporting 
the dynamics in place, obviously respecting the callings of the actors and the synergy with 
national development strategies, as well as the Community strategy outlined in the CSP, with 
the principles of the EU’s development policies and, above all, the socio-economic issues at 
stake which engage the different families of NSA in the specific national contexts.  
This can be done through the provision of support to the various and heterogeneous dynamics 
embedded in NSA endogenous networking efforts and processes of association, which 
characterise the societies themselves within the ACP states, as opposed to the award of direct 
grants to a unique umbrella actor which will inevitably tend towards a reproduction of the 
central scheme of the States. 
 
2.2.4. The evolving approach: putting the actor in the centre and understanding the 
systemic nature of CB 
The NSA support programmes appear to be vast and complex endeavours, as regards their 
aims, which seek profound changes across a variety of sectors as much as in the attitudes, 
behaviour and even the « raisons d’être » of NSA; the existing visions for development, aid and 
the prerogatives of different families of actors; the new roles of NSA (including watchdog 
roles), far above the sole service delivery of basic services; the promotion of a new mode of 
public affairs management and the promotion of a responsible and active citizenry, aware of 
its rights and duties; the creation of new spheres of participation, at a local and national level 
and learning new ways to elaborate, manage and implement public policies, where the NSA act 
as much as assist; the representation of specific interest groups as regards the government 
and other sectors of society; the mobilisation of social actors to heighten the awareness of 
their impact; etc. 
 
From this complexity follows the need to recognise the specific nature of NSA support 
programmes as programmes based on an actor approach and centered around the 
understanding that capacity building efforts need to be considered from a systems 
perspective, rather than the classical project approach, based on the action and following a 
“convenience store” logic, typified through the example of micro-realisations. 
 
Indeed, the strengthening of NSA, as much individually as collectively (in terms of sector 
support), cannot succeed without the adoption of a gradually and evolving approach, which 
requires sufficient time to allow for an impact. This same idea of evolution is at the foundation 
of the notion of capacity building. True, Capacity Building does not mean working towards a 
clearly-defined end situation, or following a single standard plan. On the contrary, the main 
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drive is to facilitate or enable endogenous processes of association among citizens in the South 
and linking and mobilising support for these processes at the national and international levels. 
 
2.2.5. Opposing forces, inter-actor dialogue and governance  
We are increasingly observing a tendency among certain programmes to consider NSA as a 
fundamental actor in establishing a counterweight to the State. As it is, this approach is 
contradictory to the Cotonou Agreement, which overtly states that it is essential to reconcile 
responsibility of national policies as regards development, which legitimately falls to central 
government, with the need to assure a better participation from NSA.  
In other words, it is about recognising the added value of NSA not in terms of their opposition 
but in terms of what these actors can provide in the identification of creative and innovative 
solutions to the problems of sustainable development. This is what is called a governance 
course, based on the participation of all relevant actors, both public and private, in respect of 
their values and missions, in the development process. From this perspective, participation is 
not limited to the contribution of beneficiaries, it is an interactive dialogue and cooperation 
process, during which each actor, according to its characterisations and prerogatives, must try 
to integrate the perceptions of others. The experience shows how dialogue with the respect to 
the character of each actor can bring positive synergies. By the same token this requires that 
development is everyone’s business, that everyone lives up to their responsibilities, in terms of 
their abilities, their possibilities and their engagement. 
 
3. IDENTIFICATION OF CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES AND MAPPING EXERCISES  
3.1. Quantitative analysis of mapping exercises and identification studies  
 
The identification of NSA support programmes holds particular importance due to the fact that 
it is over the course of this phase that the main choices can be made. These choices are able to 
significantly influence not only the scope and institutional arrangements of the programme 
but also its implementation modalities. In this phase the mapping exercise represents, without 
a doubt, a basic element of the NSA support strategy to be assured in the future programme. 
From the analysis undertaken by the study, it turns out that 27 of the 40 programmes taken 
into consideration -that is to say 67,5%- were preceded by  a mapping study, whereas 13 of the 
40 programmes analysed , 32,5%, did not rely on a mapping exercise. Nonetheless, it is useful 
to nuance this observation, as certain countries did not benefit from a mapping exercise 
financed by the EC, by the fact that feasibility studies were undertaken, on the basis either of 
mapping exercises undertaken by other donors (this is the case, for example, of the Dominican 
Republic with the identification of PRIL – Programa de Apoyo a Iniciativas Locales based on the 
heritage left by the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) FOSC11) or the evaluations of 
previous NSA support programmes (as is the case for Vanuatu). 
Likewise, it is also useful to highlight the fact that certain programmes, during their 
implementation phase, undertook mapping exercises, either comprehensive or focused on a 
number of particular questions, out of a desire to update the results of previous mapping 
                                                 
11 Fortalecimiento de las Organizaciones de la Sociedad Civil 
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studies and/or to promote a greater understanding of the social dynamics, as much on the 
level of technical assistance of the programme as on the level of NSAs themselves, for a better 
anchorage of the capacity building strategies.  
 
 
 
 
 
In terms of the year in which the mapping exercise was undertaken, as the graph below shows, 
they were, on the whole, undertaken in 2004 and 2005 (14 mappings out of a total 27 
analyses, i.e. 52%), coinciding with the inception of a significant number of 0th EDF NSA 
support programmes. Only 29.5% of the mappings were undertaken before or after this 
period. Unfortunately, in 18.5% of cases, the information on the date of the mapping was 
unavailable. 
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In terms of feasibility studies, either undertaken as a second programmed step in the 
identification phase: sometimes being regarded as an integral part of the mapping (as in the 
case of Zambia, Mauritania, Papua New Guinea, Uganda or Mali, among others), other being 
conducted independently, and subsequently to the mapping exercise (for example the case of 
Niger and Cameroon), of the 40 programmes analysed, 12 countries, or 30% of the total, 
undertook this exercise, while 28 countries, or 70% of the total programmes analysed, did not, 
as demonstrated by the graph below. 
 
 
 
It is useful to underline the fact that the motivation for undertaking feasibility studies has, 
sometimes, been guided by the need to surmount the shortfalls, as much on the conceptual 
side as on the methodological and operational sides, of the mapping exercises undertaken. 
This is the case, for example, in Cameroon, where in order to overcome the shortcomings 
noted in the mapping and identification study, a new feasibility study was launched in 2007. 
A first conclusion in this respect would, thus, be that the mapping was an important 
instrument and widely used, and that its use had been that of a pre feasibility study, on 
occasion even a feasibility study proper, in terms of identification and formulation of NSA 
support programmes under the 9th EDF, with respect to the agreements reached in the 
Country Strategy Papers. 
Nonetheless, as evidenced in the year of realisation for the mappings, it is necessary, for most 
of the exercises dated (over 50% of the mappings were undertaken in 2004 and 2005), that an 
update is carried out, either in the framework of an NSA support programme (for those 
programmes under way); either on the initiative of the European Commission Delegation and 
the National Authorising Officer as a preliminary step towards the definition of the NSA 
strategy for the 10th EDF. If this update is not undertaken, the NSA support programmes 
underway, as much as the Delegations, run the risk of adopting approaches that have little 
bearing on actual dynamics. NSAs change, evolve, develop new modus operandi  and new 
structures to respond to new situations and programmes, as much as the EC, must be 
conscious of these changes in order to continue to engage themselves in a pertinent, efficient 
and constructive manner.  
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3.2. Qualitative analysis of mapping exercises and identification studies  
 
In terms of the weaknesses of mapping exercises one can note that they are often limited 
either to a statistical and static census of NSA, or to an exercise conducted on a purely 
descriptive and static basis, while the need for the establishment of a programme is to have, at 
one’s disposition, a dynamic framework which, in addition to quantitative and qualitative 
information (the presence of NSA throughout the territory, sectors of intervention, networking 
experiences, political dialogue with NSA), the key elements are represented through a 
comprehension of the concrete gains and socio-political challenges which will engage NSA.  
In effect, the NSA support programmes do not intervene in an institutional void on the fringes 
of the current development and governance processes. Quite the contrary, as demonstrated 
by the strategic positioning of programmes, the mission of an NSA support programme is that 
of supporting NSAs as regards their role at the heart of any given context and, above all, as 
regards the stakes of their endeavours. It is for this reason that it is fundamental that the 
mapping exercise can take this context into account in order to anchor the analysis of NSAs, as 
much on the level of their double role both as low level contractors and as development and 
governance actors as on the level of inventory and comprehension of the capacity building 
needs. 
3.2.1. Fundamental elements a mapping exercise should take into account 
An analysis of the programmes shows that the fundamental elements and even the goals that 
the mapping exercise must take into account to be effective are as follows: 
▪ “Map out” the NSA sector, on the basis of major trends. It is useful to note, on this matter, 
that mapping exercises can have different approaches in terms of the scope of the study, 
able to cover both the entirety of NSAs as well as particular categories (for example solely 
on civil society, without considering the private sector, development NGOs, one sector in 
particular, etc.) 
▪ Outside the chosen range, it is important and worth remembering that it is the nature of 
the exercise to evolve from a static logic (which sees mapping as a treatise or monograph 
on NSAs) to a dynamic logic, according to which mapping is a living exercise, which must be 
periodically updated, in order to take account of the social, political, economic and 
institutional dynamics that it seeks to explain. As analysed in the document “The 
participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, in sector wide approaches and the 
monitoring of policy implementation”12: “It is also essential to consider inventory as a 
regular exercise, to be maintained and updated, rather than as a one-off exercise that sets 
the tone for all future endeavours with civil society organisations (...) The EC must adopt a 
‘diagnostic approach” in its views and relations with civil society, while constantly bearing in 
mind the changing structures, the emergence of organisations and the role that it can play 
in supporting the processes underway. In its analysis of CSOs, their roles, capacities and 
weaknesses, the EC can discover new institutions and potential drivers of change that could 
be supported”. 
▪ Identify the national stakes and future perspectives for NSA in the social, political and 
economical contexts. As demonstrated above, the “directory” approach must be avoided. 
Mapping exercises must serve to identify and analyse the processes underway according to 
a systematic perspective. Such a perspective must serve to explore, in any given context, 
the relations and interrelations between the NSAs themselves, and with other fundamental 
                                                 
12 « La participation des acteurs non-étatiques aux stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté, aux approches 
sectorielles et au suivi de la mise en œuvre de la politique ». Projet mai 2008. AIDCO/E/4.Commission Européenne 
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actors such as the government and donors. By contrast, it is important that the mappings 
can also adopt a historical perspective, from the need to understand the origin of the 
processes status quo, including those underlying the values, the links and operations of 
NSAs. 
▪ Identify the key actors at the heart of NSA (at the centre of each family and structural 
level). It is important to remain realistic and to realise that it is impossible to undertake a 
complete mapping of all of the NSAs present in a country. A selection should, nonetheless, 
be made on the basis of criteria such as the levels of structure, the areas of operation and 
the community cooperation, etc. 
▪ Evaluate their capacity building needs (in terms of the different levels and families). In this 
regard, the exercise should base itself on a differentiated analysis of the actors which 
needs to allow for a distinction between the different actors (grass roots organisations; 
second-tier organisations and third and fourth-tier organisations)  
The need to have an articulated typology of NSA and, in particular, of civil society, is, 
equally, linked to the need to avoid, at the level of the support of programmes and project, 
of placing grass roots organisations with limited means and capacity into competition with 
more structured organisations such as development NGOs and networks. 
The methodological principle of differentiated analysis of NSA must, therefore, allow the 
consideration of different NSA typologies, in order to better define the differences in terms 
of mission and vision, vocation and intervention methodologies of organisations present in 
the country, with the aim of differentiating between the capacity building needs and, 
therefore, actions that will require funding under future programmes. 
 
 
 
The mapping and identification study in Mali 
The mission, which took place in 2004, held, as an objective, that of identifying, through a highly 
participatory approach,: salient constraints that NSAs face, primary intervention themes; and (pilot) 
systems of direct support to Malian civil society. In order to achieve this, three groups of activities were 
undertaken: 
 
1. A mapping study of the civil society organisations in the form of a diagnostic that took into 
consideration: 
• The legal framework;  
• The types of civil society actors present in Mali and their areas of operation; 
• Functional analysis of civil society organisations with a particular attention to the 
different types of umbrella organisation (platforms, networks, federations, consortia 
etc.) active on the national level as much as on the local level; 
• The capacity building needs of civil society organisations; 
• The cooperation systems and other existing opportunities for civil society 
organisations; 
• The activities of donor organisation in Mali that favour civil society, with a special 
attention paid to the development cooperation programmes of the EU member states;
• Analysis and hierarchy of the main areas of intervention (following the 4 regional 
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workshops). 
 
2. Identifying the institutional and management arrangements for the civil society support 
programme on the basis of the mapping study and the results of the participative consultation 
with non state via the four regional workshops (in Sikasso, Mopti, Gao and Bamako) and a 
national synthesis workshop (in Bamako). Civil society organisations from other regions of the 
country were present at the four seminars, notably those of Ségou and Timbuktu at the Mopti 
workshop; the Koulikoro region at the Bamako workshop, and Kidal at the Gao workshop. 
 
3. A financing proposal project for a multi-year programme according to the simplified procedure 
and on the basis of the absorption capacity of civil society organisations. 
 
The three groups of activities were, for the most part, based on a comprehensive participative 
approach, implemented notably through the organisation of four regional workshops and a national 
synthesis workshop and two meetings with bilateral and multilateral donors and INGO, as well as 
through the numerous interviews and meetings held with all of the relevant stakeholders. 
 
 
 
▪ Analyse the juridical and institutional framework and environment in which the NSAs are 
evolving; and the grounds for cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental 
actors (grounds for cooperation available to different scales: local, regional and national). 
Here, the key questions to which mapping must seek to provide answers are, on the one 
part, what are the judicial, social, political and economical areas in which NSAs may act, 
notably as regards CSOs, and, on the other, what is the vision that the government has of 
NSAs and their role regarding the main processes and debates at work (for example in the 
area of design, implementation and monitoring of a poverty reduction strategy, the reform 
of administration, governance systems and accountability etc.). In addition, mapping must 
ask questions as regards the obstacles, windows of opportunity, the stakes etc. that call out 
at NSAs from the seat of government. 
▪ Analyse the cooperation framework that exists between NSAs and European cooperation, 
according to the principles advanced by Cotonou in terms of information, including NSAs in 
the political dialogue for monitoring and evaluation of cooperation strategies and 
programmes and including NSAs in the implementation of programmes. 
▪ Identify a map of stakeholders (including the adopted approaches) in the domain of 
support to NSA (donors, programmes, NGOs, universities, private contractors etc.). Again it 
is essential that mapping adopt a qualitative approach, while avoiding the descriptive and 
static nature of a “directory”, in order to explore the existing options and increase the 
coherence of interventions, with respect to the Agenda on Aid Effectiveness and the 
potential establishment of synergies between the different stakeholders as regards support 
to NSAs. Moreover, mappings must also bear the local offer into account as regards 
capacity building (universities, private sector, local NGOs and research centres, etc.) in 
order to have an exhaustive analysis of the situation, as much on in terms of demand as in 
terms of offer. 
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The two-phased identification process in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
 
The identification process, conducted between 2005-2006, was conceived in two phases: 
x Phase 1: Identification study, where the consultant prepared a comprehensive overview of CSOs in 
PNG and based on this study propose a strategy for how EU  may best support the civil society in PNG; 
x Phase 2: Feasibility study/project formulation phase: detail and appraise the chosen support strategy 
with a view of  preparing a financing proposal for an EU funded support programme. 
 
The identification study (first phase) covered the following elements: 
x A descriptive overview of the existing civil society organisations and their present networks in PNG – 
both at district and central level, and their mission or the mandate they have vis-à-vis members, 
including to what extent they can be considered representative of the members.  
x An appraisal of the capacity of these institutions to contribute to the development process in terms 
of policy dialogue and advocacy, and service delivery, including an analysis of the extent to which 
NSAs are currently partaking in implementation of service delivery for Government 
x An overview of PNG legislation pertaining to CSOs 
x An overview of the institutional mechanisms currently in place guiding the interaction between 
Government and NSA, and an analysis of Government’s views and strategies for involvement of NSA 
in the development process. 
x An overview of other donor initiatives related to funding capacity building of civil society, and 
options for synergies and development of coherence. In this connection it might be interesting for the 
consultant to analyse what added-value (actual or potential) civil society actors see for the EC in the 
business of supporting civil society. 
x Suggestions for mechanisms to be put in place in order for civil society to be involved in the 
programming, reviewing and evaluation of EC-PNG development co-operation. 
 
The feasibility study (second phase) delivered the following: 
x A reasoned strategy for how the EU may contribute to strengthening the role and functioning of 
the NSA sector in PNG, outlining the rationale for such a strategy and ensuring complementarity 
with other donor funded interventions.  
x Identification of indicators and sources of verification for project objectives, results and activities 
and incorporate required resources. 
x The institutional structure required for project implementation stipulating the responsibilities of 
various bodies. Different modalities for providing assistance may be required for different elements 
of the programme. 
x A proposed implementation plan with annual and overall cost estimates. This would have to be 
based on an assessment of the absorption capacity of the sector, taking other donor interventions 
into account.  
x A logical framework planning matrix   
x  
 
In conclusion, in terms of mapping characteristics, the following apply: 
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Mapping characteristics 
▪ Be dynamic and not static. Moreover, the programmes, as much as the delegations, should have 
more of a “diagnostic approach” or what could be called a “mapping attitude” as a precondition 
for a relevant and efficient engagement with NSA; 
▪ Be a tool that facilitates the identification of the programme, but also the ends of the European 
Cooperation Strategy. In effect, a good understanding of NSAs and, more concretely, civil society 
will allow the EC to think about the preferred mechanisms and instruments for the development of 
the sector in its different roles beyond the NSA support programme; 
▪ Deliver a qualitative and quantitative approach: 
 - Quantitative approach: (i) evolution of the association movement in the country ; (ii) presence of 
NSA in the different regions of the country ; (iii) presence of typological and thematic NSA (on 
a national and regional level if possible) 
      - Qualitative Approach: (i) identification of the stakes; (ii) the positioning of different typological 
actors at the heart of the socio-political fabric of the country ; (iii) the capacity building needs 
of different NSA typologies ; (iv) the legal and institutional framework which governs NSA. As 
well as classifying non state actors in all of their diversity, mappings must regularly include 
sections on the legislative environment for associations and citizens groups, the regulatory 
systems in place, the grounds for cooperation and the working relationship between the State 
and NSA, the possibility for citizens groups to receive grants or subsidies etc.  
▪ Adopt a guiding logic for the actor and respect  the spirit of the Cotonou Agreement; 
▪ Capitalise on the existing studies and sources (for fear of “reinventing the wheel”) and bearing 
new systemic analysis approaches developed by a number of donors such as as DfID (“Drivers for 
Change) or ASDI (“Power Analysis). While not strictly focused on NSAs or civil society, these 
analyses form an interesting point of departure for the comprehension of the processes and stakes 
that call to the development actors, including NSAs. In addition, considering the number of donors 
wishing to understand civil society, it might also be possible to undertake communal mapping 
studies.  
 
3.2.2. NSA involvement in the mapping exercise 
Concerning the involvement of NSA in the mapping exercise, several experiences have been 
undertaken across the ACP. In general, the choice to include NSA in the mapping has been 
linked to the particular situation in each country and, as such, advantages and disadvantages 
can be expected; a few of these are:  
Advantages Les contraintes 
▪ Shared analysis and choice 
▪ Better understanding of the general 
context 
▪ Better understanding of the stakes 
▪ Arbitrary choice of actors 
▪ Risk of distancing a number of key 
typologies and/or actors 
▪ Excluding grassroots NSA 
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▪ Better understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of NSA 
▪ Facilitation of contact with NSA 
▪ Logistical facilitation (e.g. workshops)   
 
▪ Including actors who turn out to be 
ineligible in the programme 
▪ Risk of causing confusion on the role of 
involved actors in this phase and their 
participation in the future programme 
▪ Creation of expectations that risk not 
remaining unachieved. 
 
 
In terms of possible options regarding the inclusion of NSA in the mapping phase, the 
following examples may be considered:  
 
 
Options regarding the involvement of NSA in the mapping exercise 
- The creation of a Task Force or Working Group charged with monitoring the process (from the 
preparation of the ToRs to the creation and validation of results), for example in Niger, Tanzania, 
Senegal etc.; 
- Creation of an informal group for consultation and verification (e.g. Mali, Chad etc.); 
- Workshops on a regional basis (Mauritania, Mali, Guinea, Uganda, Somalia, Zambia, Malawi, etc.); 
- A national review workshop (Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Zambia, Ethiopia, etc.); 
- A public restitution workshop (Senegal, CAR, etc.).  
 
 
 
The participative approach taken in Somalia merits elaboration: 
 
The participatory approach of the mapping study undertaken in Somalia within the 
framework of the Strengthening Somali Civil Society programme 
http://somali-civilsociety.org/home/ 
The ‘Strengthening Somali Civil Society’ project (implemented by Novib) was a new project in a new 
area of programming for Somaliland, South Central Zone and Puntland. In order to develop the 
programme consultatively and to enhance understanding and visibility of Somali civil society, Oxfam 
Novib undertook a ‘mapping’ of Somali civil society organizations. The purpose of this mapping 
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exercise was to understand better the nature of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Somalia and 
Somaliland and their links with Somali culture, tradition, history and language, links among 
themselves and with INGOs, UN and donor bodies, so as to strengthen their role in the development of 
Somali society and to inform the international community on the status of social change within civil 
society in Somalia and Somaliland. 
 
The mapping exercise entailed identifying, interviewing and recording civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and assessing their capacity, organisational structures, goals and mission, the relations among 
themselves and with international NGOs, United Nations and donor agencies, and examining core 
issues, such as human rights, peace and the tension between tradition and modernity. In order to 
undertake this, the technique of sampling was used, as it was not realistic to assess every Somali 
organisation. However it is felt that a representative sample from both Somalia and Somaliland was 
achieved. 
This activity proved to be an enormous undertaking. Oxfam Novib was and continues to be committed 
to using Somali skills and developing Somali capacity in activities as much as possible and also chose a 
participatory research methodology. A team of 21 Somali enumerators were identified by the lead 
consultant, Professor Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ‘Gandhi’, a respected Somali academic and peace 
activist. The team of enumerators were dispatched to all regions of Puntland, Somaliland and South 
Central Zone and in total, the enumerators interviewed nearly 500 organisations and this information 
from the questionnaires and focus group discussions was discussed and analysed in Nairobi. Oxfam 
Novib produced an analytical report; key findings were translated into Somali and the original team of 
enumerators took the translation back to the original informants for their comment. 
 
This information and the report were presented at a civil society symposium to civil society 
representatives. Substantial comments were made on both the report and the database of 
organisations, leading to a thorough revision and consultation process. The mapping report was then 
published.  
3.2.3. Methodological principles 
On the basis of methodological principles, which should influence the decision to undertake a 
mapping exercise, the following are noteworthy:  
 
Methodological principles 
Capitalisation on previous studies (secondary or indirect sources) 
- Official reports of the EC (HQ) and the ECD; 
- Official reports from other technical and financial partners in the country 
- Grey literature (universities, research centres, embassies, etc.) 
Quantitative analysis (secondary or indirect sources) 
- The Ministries and the concerned state services (as regards each typological NSA) ; 
- Official publications and statistics; 
- Grey literature and publications; 
Qualitative analysis (direct or primary sources) 
- The reports and official acts of NSA (statutes, reports, annual reports, balance sheets, brochures 
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etc.); 
- The leaders and directors of NSA; 
- The members of NSA; 
- The beneficiaries of NSA actions; 
- Qualified informants (or key persons). 
 
When it comes to qualitative analysis, recourse may be found in these tools; 
 
Qualitative analysis 
x The rapid diagnosis (based, for example, on a system of indicators of the life of an organisation 
which should analyse such aspects as the institutional dynamism and democratic management; the 
relevance of the mission and synergy with the action; the constitution of the structure; the 
plurality and transparency of financing; the transparency of financing; the transparency and 
accountability; the attitude of the programming and the planning; etc). 
x In depth analysis (interviews with leaders and directors; analysis of statutory texts and regulations; 
analysis of the written produce (reports, accounts etc.); interviews with the beneficiaries of NSA 
actions; interviews with qualified informants; analysis of the positioning of the organisation). 
x The focus groups (to debate over such issues as the social and political stakes and the mission of 
NSA; the strong and weak points of the organisation of NSA in their entirety; the forms of 
partnership with the public sector; social and political dialogue; agreement and collaboration with 
NSA; networking). 
 
 
3.3. Final thoughts as regards the mapping exercises under the 10th EDF 
It is essential to note that the mapping exercise under the 10th EDF requires a significant 
change in mentality. In essence, if, over the course of the 9th EDF, the exercise was 
fundamentally linked to the identification (in the majority of case) or the implementation (in 
cases where the mapping was not undertaken in the identification phase, as in Senegal, 
Somalia and the Dominican republic), or as a requirement of a re-launch in the framework of 
the implementation of the programme (as in DRC, Ethiopia and Surinam), over the course of 
the 10th EDF the exercise will, instead, have to be linked to the identification of a global NSA 
inclusion strategy in European cooperation (merging all modalities and instruments) and, in 
particular as regards political dialogue, bearing in mind the new aid modalities foreseen 
(notably budget and sector support etc.). This statement is further reinforced by the 
conclusions of the recently accomplished evaluation of EC aid through civil society 
organisations13.  
                                                 
13 Evaluation of EC AID delivery through civil society organisations. Final report. Service Contract for the Evaluation 
(sectoral and thematic) of European Commission Programmes and Policies in Third Countries, relating to Social and 
Human Development issues.Contrat number EVA/116-833. Drafted by  a consortium  composed of PARTICIP, Cideal, 
Channel Research and South Research 
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In other words, it is about evolving a sector vision as regards support to NSA with an integral 
vision, in which one asks one’s self about the position of NSA, in a cross cutting manner, across 
the entire sphere of European Cooperation (as much on a geographical basis as on a thematic 
one). The challenge is, thus, posed today in terms of mainstreaming the NSA theme into the 
ensemble of European cooperation, according to a governance approach14.  
To this end the experience, until now unique, brought by the initiative of the ECD in the Central 
African Republic must be noted; this consisted of the realisation of a mapping exercise focused 
not on the identification of a capacity building programme but, rather, to the formulation of a 
mid to long term global strategy for supporting NSA.   
In the same reflection upon the need to have a change of mentality under the 10th EDF, it 
must be mentioned that there is an opportunity to conduct exercises in sector mapping. This 
new approach, already tested by other donors with an established sector policy (in terms of 
health, education, rural development etc.), acquires significant importance to the extent that 
they exercise can provide precious indications for the implementation of a Community strategy 
contained in the CSP on the basis of sector priorities.  
 
4. THE INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATION, INTERNAL PROGRAMME GOVERNANCE 
INSTITUTIONS, THE ROLE AND PROFILE OF THE TA AND THE COOPERATION WITH 
DONOR ORGANISATIONS  
4.1. The management system: feasible options and cost analyses 
4.1.1. Analysis of management modalities 
In the majority of cases the Commission undertakes the financial implementation of 9th EDF 
resources allocated to NSA support programmes by means of decentralised management with 
the ACP States in accordance with the provisions set out in the ACP-EU Agreement and 
applying notably the breakdown of responsibilities provided for in Article 57 of the Agreement 
and Articles 34, 35 and 36 of Annex IV thereto; 
Nevertheless, in certain contexts, where no cooperation with the government exists 
(substituting the National Authorising Officer for a General Authorising Officer) or the arena of 
NSA is severely reduced, specific solutions, according to the circumstances in the country, are 
researched (e.g. Guinea Bissau, Somalia etc.).  
Besides, the new aid harmonisation agenda, in compliance with the Paris Declaration and the 
effervescence of the whole new set of common financing systems (basically pool funds and 
trust funds) in a fair few countries, also requires forethought on the question of the 
management modalities and the scope of participation of the National Authorising Officer and 
the State in general. Their participation is also variable, depending equally on the national 
situation and ranges from large-scale participation and full-fledged involvement (whereby the 
NAO guarantees the contracting of the programme and a Ministry or technical department 
takes charge of the management of the programme) to a small scale participation (whereby 
the NAO delegates programme management and contracting below a certain threshold). 
                                                                                                                                               
 
14 To deepen the role of NSAs and, in particular, that of Civil Society in governance, see “Handbook on promoting 
good governance in EC development and cooperation”; draft 2004 and the evaluation report “Thematic evaluation 
of the EC support to good governance” June 2006 
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The following table is based on an analysis of the 40 capacity building programmes undertaken 
by the team: 
 
 
As one can see, the “externalised direct labour operations” modality is the preferred option 
chosen out of the 40 programmes analysed, in 65% of cases, followed by the “direct labour 
operations” modality, in 15% of cases. The other modalities are far less common, pool 
fund/joint management was applied in 7,5% of the cases; externalised labour operations 
through an NGO (international or national, via a grant scheme) was applied in 5% of the cases; 
indirect centralised management was applied in 2,5% of cases; indirect centralised 
management through an NGOs in 2,5% of cases; and mixed systems, firstly externalised direct 
labour operations and then direct labour operations in 2,5% of cases. This was true in the 
case of the Vanuatu programme, where the management was initially confined to the national 
NGO platform (VANGO). Unfortunately this structure was not aligned with the vision of the 
programme and did not possess the necessary capacities to implement an EDF programme. A 
year after the start of the project, the decision to transfer management of the programme to 
the NAO was taken. 
 
 
Lessons learnt from the management structure adopted by the programme in Vanuatu  
Albeit being in line with the philosophy underpinning Cotonou agreement provisions as regards NSA, the 
foreseen management structure (with VANGO, the Vanuatu Association of NGO acting as the 
implementing agency) underplayed the fragility and limitations of NSA structures in Vanuatu. It was 
based on the presumption that the NGO partner had/would acquire the managerial and financial 
capacity and the determination to carry out the project. 
 
The reality proved different since VANGO saw itself as a beneficiary rather than the driving force of the 
project. Externalized management Labour Operations required management skills that VANGO was 
unable to provide. Besides, modalities and constraints inherent to this mode of operation imposed 
financial stress on an already fragile and barely solvent organization. 
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As a consequence, it was decided then, after consultation with the NSA partners and other stakeholders, 
to revert to Direct decentralized operations, implemented through the Department of Foreign 
Affairs/NAO Office and  with a National Coordinator (NC) directly employed by the NAO and 
authorized as the imprest administrator, but based within VANGO’s offices.  
 
VANGO is therefore no longer the implementing agency and is only indirectly involved in the project by 
participating in the Steering and Evaluation Committees.  
 
 
It is useful to highlight that the responsibility falls to the respective Delegations, on the basis 
of the results of the mapping study (or, failing that, the feasibility study), to consider the 
category into which the country falls and to examine and agree upon the approach to be taken 
with the NAO. The five different modalities, with an indication of their modus operandi, their 
strong points and their associated risks, as well as an indication of the relevance according to 
the national context, are elaborated below. 
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 CENTRALISED MANAGEMENT  DECENTRALISED MANAGEMENT 
MODALITIES Modality 1: Indirect 
Centralisation, by a 
private company    
(article 23.6 of annex IV 
of the Cotonou 
Agreement) 
Modality 2: Joint management 
with other Donors (pool fund 
system) and/or International 
Organisations15 
Modality 3: Indirect 
Centralisation by an 
NGO (through grant 
contracts) 
(article 23.6 of annex 
IV of the Cotonou 
Agreement) 
 Modality 4: Direct Labour 
Operation (with or without 
TA) 
Modality 5: Externalised direct labour 
operations (delegation to a private 
consulting company  or an NGO) 
OPERATION
AL 
DESCRIPTIO
N  
The rules regarding 
centralised 
management apply.  
The tasks liable to be 
entrusted by the 
European Commission, 
through contractual 
channels, to external 
private sector entities or 
organisations are 
technical or 
administrative tasks, 
preparatory or 
accessory, which require 
neither public support 
nor the exercise of 
discretionary powers. 
Technical assistance 
conducted outside of 
The EDF contributions to a 
communal fund with other 
donors constitute a different 
modus operandi as regards 
cooperation with NSA. 
The appropriate rules for 
managing these communal funds 
(or baskets) depend on the 
potential partner, if it will be an 
international organisation, for 
example the UN Organisations or 
the World Bank, with which 
agreements have been 
established, or, if it is to be an EU 
member State, to which the 
Cotonou Agreement accords a 
certain flexibility in the 
management modalities. 
 
The rules concerning 
centralised 
management apply.  
 
 
 The rules regarding direct 
labour operations apply. 
The programme is 
implemented directly 
through public departments 
of the ACP State concerned 
by means of the signature 
of a financing agreement 
between the EC and the 
NAO.  
Direct labour operations are 
implemented in the form of 
a programme of measures 
to be carried out and an 
estimate of their cost, 
referred to as the 
programme estimate. 
Each programme estimate 
has to be prepared by the 
In the case of externalised direct labour 
operations, the (recipient ACP State or 
States) entrusts tasks relating to the 
implementation of projects or 
programmes to public, semi-public or 
private bodies that are legally distinct 
from the ACP State concerned. 
The body concerned assumes 
responsibility for the management and 
implementation of the programme or 
project in place of the National 
Authorising Officer. Tasks so delegated 
may include the power to conclude 
contracts and manage contracts and the 
supervision of works on behalf of or for 
the account of the ACP State or States 
concerned 
Direct labour operations are implemented 
in the form of a programme of measures 
                                                 
15 This modality is analysed in greater depth in the chapter on cooperation and technical and financial partners (§2.24) within the current document.  
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the Delegation may be 
involved in the 
execution or 
management of the 
programme.  
 
imprest administrator and 
the accounting  officer  and 
shall then approved by the 
National Authorising Officer 
and the Head of Delegation 
before the activities it 
provides can  commence. 
A PMU may be established 
in a given Line Ministry, 
responsible for the 
implementation of the 
programme. 
 
 
 
to be carried out and an estimate of their 
cost, referred to as the programme 
estimate. 
Each programme is prepared by the third 
party organisation and shall then be 
approved by the National Authorising 
Officer and the Head of Delegation before 
the activities it provides can commence. 
 
Establishment of an autonomous PMU 
 
 
 
STRENGTHS This modality allows for 
a reinforcement of NSA 
in the contexts where 
there are pre or post 
conflict situations, or a 
systematic lack of will 
and/or capacity on the 
part of the NAO to 
engage with NSA 
Focalisation of a larger quantity 
of aid in a geographical or 
thematic area. 
Establishment of more 
ambitious and structured 
programmes, integrating several 
components (core funding, block 
grants, financing of project, 
actions targeting capacity 
building, information awareness, 
strategic dialogue, etc.). 
Reduction of transaction costs, 
flexibility in administration of 
funds for donor organisations 
This modality allows 
the reinforcement of 
NSA in the context 
which cooperation 
with the country is 
suspended due to 
political or other 
reasons and/or there 
exist pre or post 
conflict situations.   
  
 High engagement on the 
part of government in 
terms of the political 
dialogue with NSA and their 
capacity building. 
High degree of programme 
ownership by the NAO and 
the government, on the 
whole.  
 
This is the standard modality, as it allows 
(at least in principal) a balance to be 
found between engagement and 
ownership on the part of the 
government, and the competence, 
neutrality and lack of interference that 
must guide programme management. 
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(particularly as regards the 
constituent donors, delegating 
administration of their funds). 
Promotion of coordination and 
the harmonisation of donor 
policies and strategies, in 
respect to the Paris Declaration. 
Unification and simplification of 
the criteria and demands of 
monitoring, reporting/etc 
prescribed to beneficiary 
organisations.  
RISKS AND 
WEAKNESSE
S 
Absence of engagement 
on the part of the 
government and the 
lack of programme 
ownership on the side of 
the NAO. To mitigate 
this, it is recommended 
that the NAO participate 
in every possible way in 
all stages of the process, 
for example the NAO 
must be represented at 
the Steering Committee 
and could, equally, be 
represented as an 
observer of the 
evaluation committee of 
the call for proposals, or 
the selection of 
proactive capacity 
Little contact between the NSA 
and the constituent donors.  
Lack of interest on the part of 
NSA for the policies of 
constituent donors and their 
solicitations for dialogue on their 
strategies, consequently 
financing is not directly allocated 
by these donors. 
Limiting the control of 
constituent donors on the basis 
of the choice of themes and 
sectors to be financed. 
 
 
This modality is only 
possible if 
international NGOs 
embrace support to  
and through NSA on a 
reciprocal cooperation 
basis and of a 
partnership based on a 
vision of strategic 
processes over the mid 
to long term which 
focuses primarily on 
the capacity building 
of NSA. 
This requires a 
bypassing of both the 
subcontracting logic, in 
terms of relations with 
local actors, and the 
 This modality is only 
possible if there is no risk 
of interference or co-
option on the part of the 
government. 
In addition, for such a 
modality to function a solid 
civil society must be 
present; there must be a 
consolidated space for 
dialogue between the State 
and NSA; there must be 
confidence between the 
government and NSA and 
the government must have 
at its disposition the 
specific ability to provide 
capacity building support.  
In order for such a modality to work, there 
must be excellent cooperation with the 
NAO. 
If the grant contracts are signed in the 
framework of the work programmes (not 
like individual engagements), the 
organisation becomes responsible for the 
management and execution of the 
programme, and will be responsible for 
the finances also. This responsibility runs 
the risk of constraining the offices to 
protect themselves from risks, knowing 
that their role is not just “financing” the 
NSA.  
Several limitations to the management 
associated with work programmes can 
become constraints (WP limited to 12-18 
months; financial ceilings etc.). 
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building actions.  objective of “service 
delivery” to integrate 
governance questions.  
 
One risk is posed by the 
underestimation of the 
human resources required 
for programme 
implementation 
(considering that 
responsibility for 
programme managements 
is on the government side). 
The lack of familiarity with 
EDF procedures may also 
pose a risk, one which may 
provoke delays in the 
distribution of resources. To 
reduce this risk a prompt 
call for TA proposals, 
alongside the structure 
responsible for 
implementation of the 
programme, with the 
necessary competences for 
programme management 
according to the EDF 
procedures.  
This can occasionally be a costly modality. 
Everything hinges on the role of the TA: if 
this holds a guiding role and not just one 
of administrative management, the costs 
will be justified by the results the 
programme could achieve (e.g. a capacity 
building component managed directly by 
the contractor and not the WP). 
Difficulty finding companies that have 
technical and backstopping expertise in 
terms of NSA support. 
Difficulty interesting international NGOs 
with expertise in the field of support to 
civil society, seeing as they prefer grant 
contracts and are not used to (sometimes 
even refuse to) service contracts.  
 
IN WHICH 
CONTEXTS IS 
THE 
MODALITY 
APPROPRIAT
E ? 
Category III countries 
where the scope of 
association for NSA is 
strongly limited.  
  
Category I, II and III countries in 
which there is a good 
coordination between donor 
organisations and pool fund 
systems are in place.  
Category III countries 
in which cooperation 
with the country has 
been suspend for 
political or other 
reasons.  
 Category I countries in 
which there is active 
participation with NSA in 
the development processes, 
and there exists an 
organised civil society.  
Category I countries where there is a 
strong conflict at the heart of NSA or a 
lively political dialectic. The presence of a 
third party (the PMU) could, in this case, 
be a guarantee of impartiality and 
coherence with the policies of the country 
and the goals and strategies of community 
intervention (CSP) in the country. 
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Category II countries with a tradition of 
dialogue and limited or more or less 
limited participation. 
Category III countries where the room for 
association with NSA is limited. 
 
EXAMPLES  Ethiopia  
 
 
Seychelles and Kenya (with the 
UNDP), Sierra Leone (agreement 
with DFID) 
Somalia  Cape Verde, Vanuatu (after 
the Financing Agreement 
addendum), Papua New 
Guinea (with TA support), 
Djibouti, Jamaica, Malawi 
(with 200 days of TA), 
Tanzania (with TA as a 
support for the application 
and respect of EDF 
procedures).    
By a private company and the constitution 
of a PMU: Angola, Benin, Uganda, Mali, 
Tanzania, Dominican Republic, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Kenya. Mauritius, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Guinea 
Conakry (AISCHA et PACNOP), etc. 
By an NGO: Guinea Bissau (International 
NGO, cascade financing), Namibia 
(national platform: NANGOF). 
  
 
 
4.1.2. Cost Analysis 
As regards cost analysis, the exercise must be relativised as much in regard of the role of the 
available envelope as in terms of the system adopted on a case by case basis. As it stands, the 
analysis of available sums for the 40 programmes, when taken into consideration, vary 
considerably from country to country. The chart below shows the numbers relative to the sums 
allocated to analysed programmes. The average sum is €5.27 million.  
 
 
As one can see, there is a strong difference in terms of allocated funds and thus it is not possible 
to identify real trends. The amount destined for a programme does not follow a particular logic 
in terms of programming, nor are there experiences from which lessons can be drawn prior to 
the 10th EDF.  
In terms of chapters, it is important to pay special attention to the costs of the PMU, particularly 
in those programmes which will adopt the “externalised direct labour operations” approach. In 
essence, the costs of the PMU, under an externalised direct labour operations mode, run the 
risk of being significant for programmes with sums smaller than €3 million (e.g. Guinea, Benin 
etc.), while its existence is, without doubt, much less important to programmes with greater 
sums at their disposal. 
In reality, the question of costs must be subordinated, at a certain point (in this case between 
€3-4 million) to take account of 3 preconditions: 
• The national context;  
• The goals of the programme; 
• The necessary skills. 
True, if for a programme of €1-2 million the choice falls on a modality other than externalised 
direct labour operations, and this due to the incidental costs of a PMU, the consideration that 
must be made to choose one or other form of management modality must concern one of the 
three aspects above mentioned. 
The first aspect, that of the national context, obliges us to ask ourselves questions on the 
attitude of the government towards remaining impartial in the management of the Programme, 
above all in countries belonging to Category III and, in a few cases, even to Category II. Where 
the conditions are not met, the presence of a third party (the PMU) can mitigate a negative 
government attitude vis a vis NSA and, in particular, civil society. 
The second aspect, linked to the goals of the programme, requires consideration of the most 
appropriate organisational structure as regards costs. If the NSA support programme adopts a 
logic based on support to development initiatives led by NSA through a call for proposals 
scheme, it needs to be asked if it isn’t worth renouncing the role to the PMU, as its role would 
limit solely to administration.  By contrast, if the programme was based on a logic of providing 
support and mentoring to the actors instead of assuming a purely “project approach”, so the 
role of the PMU would become fundamental in terms of process facilitation. 
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Finally, in terms of technical skills, the NSA support programmes focused on more complex 
issues, for example the capacity building of NSA in a context of decentralisation and 
management of the public pace and/or focused on a rights-based approach  require a certain 
know-how which is often not available in the country. It is thus that the reliance on a PMU in 
the framework of the externalised direct labour operations mode can effectively satisfy this 
need in terms of very specific technical skills. 
While being an important factor, and occasionally limiting, for the implementation of an NSA 
support programme, the question of costs regarding certain management modalities must, 
therefore, be put into perspective with other basic factors for the success of this sort of 
programmes. 
 
4.2. The Steering Committee  
 
The question of a steering system for an NSA support programme concerns several fundamental 
aspects: its roles and prerogatives and the inclusion modalities of NSA.  
As regards the first, the experiences garnered by the NSA support programmes under the 9th 
EDF demonstrate a significant variation when it comes to interpreting the functions of a 
Steering and Monitoring Committee (SMC) 16 as well as a common trend. 
This variation among the SMCs is illustrated firstly by the frequency of their meetings, which 
can vary from 3 to 12 months, as has been noted from the in depth analysis of 16 programmes 
and, subsequently, by the different interpretations of their roles and prerogatives: from the 
simple validation of the work undertaken by the PMU (for example in Benin, the Dominican 
Republic17 and Uganda) to inclusion in every decision regarding the programme, including the 
selection of activities or, in some cases, even the approval of the support personnel to be 
recruited (DRC, Burkina Faso, etc.). 
As regards the communal trends, in the majority of programmes the SMC meeting is just a 
formal moment to rule on subjects that have already made it through the preliminary 
agreements between the programme, the NAO and the ECD. In other words, the discussions at 
the heart of the SMC are relatively limited by the fact that, in reality, the decisions have already 
been taken informally. 
If this trend could be seen in a positive light, as it bears witness to a continuing “tripartite” 
(Programme, ECD and NAO) exchange, in reality the Committee runs the risk of redundancy, 
both in terms of its role and prerogatives, but it risks, above all, of marginalising the 
contribution of all of the members of SMC except the NAO (usually, although there are 
exceptions, the ECD holds the status of a non-executive observer and the PMU only acts as a 
technical secretariat). 
In reality, in the majority of NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF the SMC is a decision 
making body that has never been valued and its role has often remained very much on paper, 
                                                 
16 By Steering and Monitoring Committee we refer to the programme institution, notwithstanding the varied 
terminology as regards different programmes and national contexts, in charge of general supervision and 
coordination of the programme, approval of work programmes and official reports,etc.  
17 The case of the Dominican Republic is noteworthy, as this “de facto” role of simple validation of the PMU’s outputs 
has garnered significant criticism on the part of CSOs directing the Steering Committee. They have even demanded a 
name change from Steering Committee to “Directing Committee” or “Consultation Committee”, in light of their 
incapacity to influence the programme decisions.  
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especially the fundamental ones of strategic programme orientation and monitoring. In 
summary, the SMC is, in general, not a place for progress monitoring of programmes, but more 
often a decision making body responsible for validation. 
Such a situation runs the risk of endangering the internal dialectics of the stakeholders as much 
as the institutional organisations. In effect, it is not rare to find situations where the Steering 
and Monitoring Committee does not meet at all, as well as cases where the Committee, in the 
form of its president (almost exclusively the NAO) passes a ruling on subject for which the PMU 
is responsible (in the cases of indirect decentralised management which represents the majority 
of management modalities for NSA support programmes) by virtue of the powers passed unto 
it. 
The roles and prerogatives, which should be in the hands of the Steering Committees, are the 
following: 
 
Roles and prerogatives of the Steering Committee 
 supervise and approve the global coordination and strategy of the programme;  
 verify and approve annual programming proposals  
 analyse and approve work programmes; 
 receive and approve the execution, technical and financial reports submitted by the PMU, 
presenting the achievements of the programme; 
 guarantee necessary judgements and make decisions on future reorientations. 
 
As regards the second aspect, that of the inclusion modalities of NSA in the programme SMCs, 
the analysis undertaken brings to light evidence that in only 7,5% of the programmes analysed 
where NSA not represented. 
 
 
Out of the various inclusion modalities there is a variety of options that were adopted by the 40 
programmes within the scope of the study. Certain programmes adopted complex formulas, 
proposing, alongside the SMC, a second committee composed entirely of NSA (as is the case 
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with the NSA Coordination Committee, a product of the NSA Task Force Group, in Tanzania, or 
the NSA Steering Committee in Uganda), with a consultative role, often in conflict with the roles 
of the PMU and SCM. The case of Tanzania is particularly illustrative of this paralyzing situation 
resulting from the confusion of roles and the regular confrontations between the PMU and the 
NSA Project Coordination Committee. 
 
Lessons learnt from the conflicting relationship  between the PMFU and the NSA Project 
Coordination Committee in Tanzania  
 
The relationship between the PMFU and the PCC has continued to be adversarial and even, at times, 
antagonistic. This has adversely affected the morale, and consequently the performance, of PMFU staff, 
with negative implications for the overall effectiveness of programme management. The underlying 
cause of this problem appears to be contested authority, with the PCC having been accorded 
‘ownership’ of the programme, while management responsibility is vested in the PMFU. As the 
designated ‘owners’, the PCC has felt entitled to adopt a more hands-on role in programme decision-
making and supervision than is implied in its designated role of providing guidance and advice. The 
result has been considerable tension between the two entities.  
 
The mid-term Evaluation team identified the problem and made a series of constructive 
recommendation, including, in the short run: 
▪ To reduce the frequency of PCC meetings,  
▪ To strengthen PCC transparency and accountability, via: (i) the redefinition of PCC’s mandate, 
reorientation of its responsibilities and alteration of its composition; (ii) Regular and formal 
reports on programme activities undertaken; (iii) Evidence of improved programme-related 
communication with constituency members. Additionally, the PCC should network with 
existing CSO networks. 
▪ To prohibit PCC members from being also PSC members, thus requiring PCC members to resign 
if appointed to the PSC to avoid conflicts of interest and allow for new blood within the PCC 
 
And in the long run, for new programmes in support of NSA: 
 
▪ Demarcate, articulate and formalise the allocation of authority from the start (particularly as 
regards the PMFU, PCC and PSC) and ensure each structure has clear governing rules (e.g. 
renewal of mandate by representative bodies) 
▪ Be realistic about the motivation of stakeholders  
 
As concluded by the Mid-term evaluation report, the effectiveness, coherence and confidence of 
programme management should greatly benefit from the implementation of these recommendations 
and the building of a more constructive, mutually supportive relationship between the PMFU and the 
PCC.  
 
 
In any case, independent of the chosen formula, the fundamental question is how to guarantee 
on the one hand the representation of members attending the Committee on behalf of NSA and 
on the other, to avoid situations that would create a conflict of interest. Experience shows that 
the most used formula in certain contexts is to include resource personnel from the world of 
NSA (without any operational inclusion in an organisation, bearing in mind the problems of 
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conflicts of interest that often arise during the selection of actors and beneficiary organisations 
and projects following the call for proposals) as opposed to NSA representatives. 
It is important to note that, in a fair few countries, the choice of NSA “representatives” for the 
Steering Committee has often paralysed the Committee itself, in light of the difficulties of 
identifying a solution acceptable for all of the stakeholders and, more importantly, the NSA (in 
DRC the NSA support Programme is still without a SMC 18 months after the initiation of the 
project). 
Concretely, the different options as regards the choice of NSA representatives to the SMC can 
be summarised as follows: 
- The cooption of representatives by the NAO or by the Government (especially in 
countries belonging to category III). This solution has the drawback that it will not 
necessarily be accepted by NSA. 
- The designation of representatives by NSA members. The adoption of this option 
requires, in general, a large amount of time and is viable in the context of limited 
conflict at the heart of the associative movement (for example in Mali, Ethiopia, 
Surinam, Tanzania, Uganda, DRC, Zimbabwe, Vanuatu).  
- The mixed formula, where representatives are co-opted, in part by the government and 
in part by the NSA (e.g. Dominican Republic). 
- The selection made by the PMU of the Programme, following a call for candidates (for 
example in Benin). In this case the candidates are individuals. The candidates should not 
have any operational role within the organisation. 
Finally, two other aspects need to be taken into account: the rotation of NSA within the SMC 
and the level of structuring. In effect, these two aspects need to be taken into account when the 
members are attending the Committee in the role of NSA representatives, and not as resource 
personnel from the world of NSA. 
As regards the rotation, several programmes planned the rotation of members to avoid creating 
a monopoly of certain NSA to the detriment of others (in Niger, for example). In reality this 
option could lead to non-viability to the extent that there would be an absence of capitalisation 
of experiences. To avoid this risk, some programmes opted for a mixed formula, that is to say a 
mix of permanent and rotating members (as in Burkina Faso for example, with 2 fixed members 
and 3 rotating members changing on an annual basis). 
When it comes to the level of intervention and structuring, the majority of programmes turned 
to third-tier organisations (or even the platform, sometimes created for the purpose of the 
programme, as in the case of Senegal or Tanzania), which were required, in principle, to be 
more representative than individual organisations. In reality, this option runs the risk of 
distancing itself from the grass roots organisations, which poses a problem in instances where 
the programme is specifically addressing this type of actor (as in the programmes of DRC, Niger 
or Vanuatu). To this end, it is important to highlight the fact that in certain countries (such as 
Niger) it was decided that there would be representation from the four levels of NSA 
organisations. 
While it may involve a different role, the members of the Selection Committees often happen 
to be the same as the Monitoring and Steering Committees, which could cause confusion with 
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the CSO beneficiaries. In reality, members of the Selection Committee should be independent 
experts and should have a technical role, while the Monitoring and Steering Committee should, 
instead, have a far more politically and generally oriented role as regards the programme 
strategies. 
In other words, Selection Committees should answer directly to the PMU or, in any case, to the 
entity charged with execution of the programme activities and not to a political entity and, this, 
in order to avoid interference in the awarding of CSO grants. 
As concerns NSA participation in Selection Committees, it is not a common occurrence in light of 
the fact that those who are members of NSAs could find themselves in a conflict of interest 
situation.        
 
4.3.  The role of actors involved  
 
An NSA support programme is a complex mechanism within which several actors intervene, 
each one with a precise set of roles and prerogatives.  
4.3.1. The role of NSA 
In each programme, NSA are both beneficiaries and actors. To this end it is fundamental that 
NSA are not considered a single unit, but a relatively heterogeneous entity. Tru, as much in their 
role as actors as in their role as beneficiaries, NSA must be considered according to a 
differentiated approach in terms of the ability to distinguish their different missions and 
vocations and, thereby, the different capacity building needs.  
This differentiation must, firstly, be done in terms of the typology of the actor and its 
appartenance to one of the distinctive NSA families (whether the actor belongs to civil society, 
the private sector or the economic or social partners). Following this, a differentiation must be 
applied based on the different structural levels: grass roots and first-tier organisations 
(organisations of limited geographical and thematic scope, often largely informal and financed 
by their members’ contributions); second-tier organisations (formally constituted actors that 
work for the benefit of the population and of its accompanying organisational forms on the first 
level), third-tier organisations (umbrella organisations: basically, coordinated groups, 
federations and networks) and fourth-tier organisations (platforms and consultation forums, 
which constitute real “groupings of umbrella organisations") 
Each of the three families and each of the four structural levels should play a different role 
within the programme. As such, capacity building activities and, more in general, programme 
activities need therefore to be set taking account of the values, mandates and particularities of 
each group of actors. In this framework, grassroots organisations have a vital role in the 
experience of local governance and in the creation and management of the public forum at a 
communal level; second-tier organisations have a key role in the support to grass-roots 
organisations and dynamics; third-tier organisations have specific thematic and sectoral skills in 
support of their constituencies; while fourth-tier organisations have a primordial role in terms 
of dialogue with the State as regards national policy. 
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4.3.2. The role of NAO and of governments 
The importance of the NAO is generally underestimated as regards the implementation of NSA 
support programmes. In effect the NAO must have a double role: on the one hand that of a 
programme supervisor, through the SMC, and on the other hand that of facilitation of dialogue 
between the NSAs and governmental agencies at the level of programme activities, in 
particular those that concern cooperation between the State and NSAs, in all dimensions. All in 
all, the programmes that do not confer a precise to the NAO (this should not be understood 
however as writing a “blank cheque” for the NAO and the government) run the risk of provoking 
an absence of engagement on the part of the government and a lack of ownership of the 
vocation and strategy of the programme. To reduce this it is advisable, even in cases where the 
programme management is centralised (as in Ethiopia), to include the NAO to the greatest 
possible extent in all stages of the process; for example the NAO must be represented in the 
SMC and could equally be represented as an observer of the committee in charge of the 
evaluation of the calls for proposals or the selection of proactive capacity building actions.  
4.3.3. The role of the ECD 
The inclusion strategies of NSA and, in particular, civil society presuppose that the Delegations 
of the European Commission take an active role and a very precise one at that to ensure that 
they have, at their disposal, the necessary intervention mechanisms and tools. In effect, while 
the layout concerning new actors requires a collective responsibility on the part of all the 
concerned parties, it is the mandate of the Delegations to play a proactive role, sometimes even 
an arbitrary one, which is adapted to and compatible with the complex reality in each country 
and, more specifically, of the NSAs. 
In this sense, bearing in mind the “Programming Guidelines Note N°6”, dated 09/03/2001, of 
the EC’s DG Development on the role of the Delegations, in terms of integrating new actors into 
development cooperation, their role can cover two aspects 
The first aspect concerns their role as “critical observers”, which in essence constitutes an 
assurance that the relevant and competent NSAs are identified and included in the new 
cooperation framework according to the principles of the Cotonou Agreement. In this 
framework, the eligibility of new actors is a key question which needs to allow the Delegations 
to orient themselves among those who claim to belong to civil society and, thereby, to make 
decisions on the basis of three levels of inclusion: a) Informing NSAs; b) Dialogue or consultation 
with NSAs in the definition and monitoring of cooperation policies and strategies; c) Inclusion in 
the implementation of Programmes. 
When it comes to the second aspect, it is up to the Delegations to fulfil their role as 
“facilitators”, as much in the sense of ensuring access to clear and transparent information as 
towards the contribution to the development and capacity building of NSAs. 
In order to guarantee these two basic roles and with the goal of respecting the impartiality and 
transparency of relations with all types of NSAs, it will be important for Delegations to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that they have the necessary human and technical resources, 
tools and working instruments, among others, at their disposal to ensure a short to midterm 
programming phase. 
In effect, this involves prioritising the creation of a culture of dialogue between NSAs and the 
government, and the concerned regional and international parties, including the ECD and the 
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member states, in order to ensure that the contribution of NSAs to the development process is 
more permanent. 
Unfortunately, as regards tools, it is very rare to find information initiatives for NSAs and CSOs. 
Even if there are communication tools available, such as a bulletin, a newsletter, or a website, 
the information useful to the inclusion of NSAs does not hit its mark. This is the general sense of 
the results that have emerged from the analysis of the 40 programmes and which have been 
displayed in the chart below regarding inclusion in the elaboration of the CSPs of the 10th EDF 
and/or in the information circulars pertaining to this type of fundamental exercise for the 
Community cooperation cycle. 
 
As can be seen, in 29% of cases, NSAs have not been included at all in the preparation of the 
CSP, nor are they included in a constant or satisfactory exchange of information on this 
exercise; a rather paradoxical result considering the role that these actors should be playing in 
the framework of the Cotonou Agreement. 
If one takes into account the consultation in the countries where this is active, only in 46% of 
cases is this consultation regular and structured, as indicated in the chart below.  
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This situation has, without a doubt, an effect on the success of NSA support programmes to the 
extent that the consultation exercise reinforces the attidue of NSAs to fulfil their roles as 
development actos (especially as regards their participation in the political dialogue and 
watchdog roles) and not just in terms of basic service deliverers. 
When it comes to the role of the ECD in these programmes, it is important that the facilitation 
process can accompany the TA in the implementation of the programme, especially in relation 
to the adaptation of procedures to the reality of the specific context. On the other hand, it is 
essential that the programme can support the ECD in its NSA inclusion strategy in the 
cooperation cycle (elaboration of a CSP, annual review, midterm review, sectoral consultations 
etc.). Therefore, the need is for a virtuous cycle to be istilled into the relations between the ECD 
and the programme. 
 
 
Consultation with NSAs for the 9th EDF EC Senegal Country Strategy Paper 18 
The whole process took 2 years. The EC Delegation worked with the government to develop a 
mechanism for involving NSAs in both the planning and identification phases. Five ‘young experts’ 
were recruited for five months to organise and co-ordinate the consultation process of the planning 
phase, and two were retained for two-year contracts to see the whole process through. 
                                                 
18 “The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, sector approaches and monitoring of policy 
implementation”. Draft January 2009. INTRAC on behalf of AIDCO/E/4.Commission Européenne 
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Planning phase:  in this phase, five technical working groups were set up to develop proposals around 
the following themes, identified by a Central Working Group: trade/transport; macro/budget support; 
social sectors; good governance; NSAs. Each working group was to have representatives the Delegation, 
the Government and NSAs, and would meet over a period of three months before reporting back to the 
Central Working Group. The next six months saw the refining of the analysis, ending with a feedback 
workshop for NSAs.  
Identification Phase: Seven Working Groups were set up to identify areas of work within the following 
areas: Good governance; Transportation; Hygiene; Budgetary support; Trade; Culture; NSAs. These 
groups met four or five times, concluding with three day workshop for each of the groups, (except for 
the Budget Support group) where a strategy for the particular area was developed with the assistance of 
a facilitator with experience in developing logical frameworks.   
It is interesting to note that the start of this process was being conducted at the same time as the PRSP 
consultation process.   
The Central Group co-ordinated the process. Six Dakar based NGOs were invited to be members of this 
group, including one which had regional cells around the country, and would be well set up to involve its 
constituency organisations.  However, this NGO did not disseminate information to its regional bodies, 
stating that it was lack of resources that prevented them doing this.  The NGOs organise two seminars 
on the Cotonou process for CSOs.   However, these initiatives were not followed up, and there were no 
moves to create any Platform Organisation, or other co-ordination body which could support and 
provide cohesion for CSOs involvement in the process.   
Other civil society organisations were involved in the Working Groups, although there was a high drop 
out rate over time.  It was clear that many of the NGOs were there because they were hoping for 
funding opportunities.    
 
 
4.3.4. The role of Programme Antennas, Regional Correspondence Agencies (RCA) and 
Intermediary Organisation (IO).  
Several programmes have resorted to the use of regional antennas, often called regional 
correspondence agencies or, simply correspondent agencies (CA), or intermediary organisations 
(IO). 
The role of these correspondent agencies is to represent the programme in all of its activities at 
a local level; ranging from the identification of local actors to the provision of support through 
mentoring and coaching and from the identification and even the selection of projects (through 
the bias, for instance, of a Regional Selection Committee) to their technical and financial 
monitoring. Their tasks are diverse and include the following: 
 
The role of Programme Antennas, Regional Correspondence Agencies (RCA) and 
Intermediary Organisations (IO) 
▪ Divulging information on existing opportunities (calls for proposals, calls to tender, access to 
financing etc.); 
▪ Assisting local actors wishing to submit a proposal in the preparation of it (both on the 
technical and financial side); 
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▪ Collecting the proposals to be sent to the entities and committees charged with the selection 
of actions and candidates; 
▪ Performing Secretariat duties for the meetings of the committees charged with the selection 
of actors and actions; 
▪ Networking; 
▪ Technical and financial monitoring of actions (such as support to the PMU personnel); 
▪ Targeted (mentoring and coaching) to the organisations in their areas of intervention and 
support to the PMU on the basis of an individual diagnostic in terms of capacity building; 
▪ Continued information of the PMU on the capacity building needs of CSOs in their 
intervention areas 
▪ Dissemination of information in terms of capitalisation of experiences; 
▪ Contribution to monitoring actions; 
▪ Assistance in terms of the implementation, especially as regards the administrative and 
accounting aspects; 
▪ Capitalisation of best practices and exchange of information.  
 
 
It is important to highlight the risk of transforming the cooperation between the Programme 
management Unit and the RCA/IOa into mere contractual relations, whereby RCA/IO act as 
outsourced providers to perform a number of administrative and technical tasks. Evidence 
shows how RCAs/IOs should not be seen simply as programme antennae but as support 
opportunities to the creation of focal points for civil society on a regional level, which enters 
perfectly into the mission of the majority of umbrella organisations operating on a regional 
scale. 
According to this approach, RCAs are not exclusively charged with secretarial tasks (for 
example the collection of grant requests) but, above all, are required to act in an active and 
proactive manner, even in terms of the preparation of different proposals and in direct 
assistance to the organisations requesting funds. 
In reality, the involvement of NSAs on the regional level of a programme in the form of RCAs/IOs 
does not satisfy an organisational necessity to obtain correspondents or low cost antennas, but 
rather a NSA support and capacity building logic. 
In light of this, with the RCAs/IOs the programme prioritises the creation of expertise and 
services not just for itself, but for all NSAs on the regional scale, as well as for the national 
technical and financial partners. RCAs/IOs, therefore, should be seen as centres of expertise and 
support, which can perform not only within the framework of the programme, but in all of the 
programmes of other TFPs. 
It is possible to identify some successful examples of this approach in a number of programmes 
like ARIANE in Mali, the Civil Society Capacity Building Programme in Uganda and the PAANE in 
Angola. 
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Lessons leant from the use of IO in the CSCBP in Uganda  
 
The CSCBP took an institutional mentoring approach using the PMU and Intermediary Organizations. As 
stated in the Assessment of Capacity building inputs by CSCBP, this approach had some pros and cons. 
 
Pros Cons 
IOs built relationship with Grantees through On-site assistance/training IOs were not “good” in all 
training areas and their performance was less optimum 
IOs shared hands-on experiences and practices IOs had other relationships with the grantees that 
created familiarity and or resurrected earlier differences….both of which undermined delivery of 
services. 
Cost effective way mentoring grantees who are geographically widely spread  CSCBP control 
over IOs work was unclear 
 Many IOs were too busy and not readily available 
 
As indicated before, IOs performed better when: 
 Were financially dependant  on the programme (the contract represents more than 10% of the IO 
total budget) 
 The mandate of the IO includes CB provision 
 Organised more grantees meetings 
 The key resources person was really dedicated to the programme (not performing too many other 
tasks) 
 
 
4.4. The role and profile of TA 
 
4.4.1. The role of TA 
The experience garnered from the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF have revealed a 
clear tendency that consist of the conception of TA tasks focused almost exclusively on 
administrative and accounting aspects, while the NSA support programmes must, in fact, adopt 
a different approach. In reality the TA of these new programmes must, first and foremost, hold 
the role of facilitation of social processes that are underway. This means that the TA team 
cannot simply limit itself to the simple administration of programme resources, but must stand 
up as a facilitating agent of the process and dynamics at the heart of the society by making 
available capacity building tools that can be used in respect of the different missions and 
vocations of NSAs.  
This facilitation task of TAs in the NSA support programmes is by definition linked to one of the 
characteristics of the Cotonou Agreement, namely the apprenticeship process that new 
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dimensions, in particular the political dimension, of Community cooperation must hold in terms 
of relations between different actors.  
It is useful to note that this catalysing and facilitating role of TA is aligned with the directions 
that must guide the provision of TA financed by the EC, according to the backbone strategy for 
technical cooperation. The table below gathers all of the main principles evinced under the 
strategy framework19: 
 
Main principles of Technical Cooperation 
1. Emphasis on capacity building – The primary objective of technical cooperation is to support 
national internal processes focusing on the promotion of capacity building at individual level, 
organisational level and country-wide levels. Where relevant, technical cooperation can be called upon 
to fulfil other roles, such as the provision of advice, support to implementation and facilitation or 
preparation of EC cooperation. 
2. Approach based on demand when technical cooperation is not provided by default – The provision 
of technical cooperation must depend on the demand and requirements of the partner country. The 
costs and options available must be transparent. Appropriate support and dialogue may be needed in 
order to allow a partner state to clearly formulate its request for technical cooperation.  
3. Adoption of a results-based approach – The conception of technical cooperation should ensure that 
inputs and activities of technical cooperation are linked to research products, which in turn provide 
results towards the goal of sustainable development. The necessary indicators can be determined 
beforehand to guarantee the monitoring and implementation of technical cooperation.  
4. Appropriation and management of the technical cooperation process on a national basis – The 
national appropriation by partner countries is a key principle that supports the structure of technical 
cooperation financed by the European Commission. In the identification phase of the implementation, 
partner countries are strongly included in the conception of the implementation modalities of projects 
and programmes supported by technical cooperation, including the services contracts of technical 
cooperation as well as the management, analysis and the ownership of the results of this technical 
cooperation. 
5. Taking into account the sectoral and national needs – Technical cooperation applies to an in depth 
comprehension of the political, socio-cultural and environmental context. It seeks to avoid standard 
approaches.   
6. Harmonisation and alignment of actions – Support to cooperation is strictly coordinated with the 
other donors and aligned upon the strategies and national programmes based, preferably, on the 
mechanisms that place resources at the disposal of all or to other harmonised approaches, much like 
delegated cooperation.  
7. Avoid resorting to the use of parallel project execution units and promote efficient project 
implementation modalities – It is strongly advisable to avoid relying on parallel project execution units 
                                                 
19« Backbone strategy on Reforming technical cooperation and project implementation units for external aid 
provided by the European Commission and related wok plan ». July 2008. European Commission.  
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and to prioritise efficient project implementation modalities clearly integrated and « indebted » to 
national structures.  
8. Bear different or untried options in mind as regards the provision of technical cooperation – The 
conception of technical cooperation support envisages alternatives to the use of international 
consultants on short and long term missions. These alternatives encompass the use of national and 
regional resources, twinning agreements and exchange of best practices transcending the classical 
approaches of training. 
 
 
4.4.2. The profile of TA  
The definition of the role brings us to the basic question of the profile of TA, which needs to be 
answered when the recruitment and selection process starts. In effect, the selection process to 
determine the TA in charge of NSA support programme management is a delicate step in the 
overall implementation. Despite the theoretical and methodological interest that these 
programmes may raise among European NGOs they have, until now, been absent. All in all, 
European NGOs can bring significant added value to the implementation of these programmes, 
for which the large European consultancies have, more often than not, an insufficient in-depth 
knowledge an understanding. 
One of the fundamental reasons for the marginalisation of NGOs are that the EDF procedures 
contain not only a direct fiscal responsibility on the part of the contractor that will carry out the 
TA within the programme, but also require a significant financial capacity and credit strength 
considering that the contractor must also provide bank guarantees to manage the resources of 
work programmes. 
Furthermore, European NGOs often prefer a grant contract to a service provision contract. 
Certain NGOs even refuse service contracts, which involve their automatic exclusion from the 
international calls for tenders for technical assistance under these programmes.  
It is thus the case that often the only contractors that could possibly implement these NSA 
support programmes are the large-scale European consultancies, which are able to satisfy the 
requirements and financial conditions necessary to be granted the bank guarantees. Yet these 
consultancies do not always have the necessary skills to implement an NSA support programme, 
since they often hold, for evident entrepreneurial and strategic reasons, a far more generalist 
approach. 
In order to master the potential risks linked to a lack of skills and to this propensity of 
interpreting their role as a general administrative management and accounting entity, in certain 
countries the ECD has opted for partnering between national and European cabinets (for 
example in Niger, Mali and the Dominican Republic) or for the promotion of partnering 
(international expert/national expert) as in the Comoros, which has the advantage of adding 
value to national expertise through the capacity building of NSAs. Nevertheless, the relation 
between international cabinets and national cabinets or institutions has not been exempt from 
difficulty, sometimes even incomprehensibility (such as in the Dominican Republic and Mali) by 
virtue of divergent vocations and logic, particularly when the national institution has a 
vocational, non profit goal. 
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The Technical Assistance partnering system adopted for the Decentralised Cooperation 
Programme (DCP) in the Comoros  
 
Observations/Justification 
• The International Technical Assistance (ITA) missions, demanded by the PMUs of projects merit, 
through expertise they bring as well as through the capacity of the PMU,  appropriation  of the 
conclusions and an implementation of the recommendations. 
• However, the projects have a limited life span and the development process must be included 
during their duration. Time is one of the factors in shortest supply and, as such, it is necessary 
to include these missions in the timeframe through permanent local expertise; or through 
resorting to universities (national experts ITA counterparts) that can, on the one hand, 
guarantee the monitoring of the mission and, on the other, promote the outputs of the 
missions in their lessons. The contribution of the national expert allows, other than a better 
understanding of the context, a significant time saving for the mission. 
• ITA missions are also worth the methods and tools that the expert implements: it is thus 
important that a transfer occurs and these joint missions are an excellent conduit for them. 
• It is also a way to ensure greater visibility of the programmes actions. 
How does the system work in practice ? 
• Short term ITA is included in the ITA contract. It is necessary to highlight the fact that this short 
term ITA contract, in the case of the DCP, was negotiated in retrospect, following the situation, 
which pointed to a lack of human resources that could be locally mobilised 
• The costs associated with the national expert are included in the PE (provisions, transport etc.) 
for the duration of the mission . 
Example:  
A- Training mission for local NGOs in the design of Communal Development Plans (CDP) and 
the conception of a practical guide.  
Step 1: research of bibliography and executive summary by the national expert; inventory of local 
experiences; pool on arrival of the ITA. 
Step 2: co-piloting of the field mission (visits, interviews etc.); the training workshop and the 
elaboration of the “practical guide” 
Step 3: Joint drafting of the analysis; end of the ITA mission 
B- Elaboration of CDPs 
The programme send on mission the trained NGOs to support communities in the elaboration of 
the CDPs and works on a contract with the national expert to ensure the monitoring of processes. 
 
And does it work ? 
Despite the lack of hindsight due to the recent creation of this system, it is already greatly appreciated 
by the partners, and the added value of this set-up is real in the anchorage of its missions to the field 
reality and in the duplication of tools or methods for knowledge transfer. 
In addition, whenever possible, the programme links young graduate Comorians, undertaking their first 
professional experience, to these missions.  
 
In other cases, the selection criteria of the evaluation grid for the choice of candidates was 
focused on devoting, for example, a strong value to the methodology and implementation 
strategy proposed (for example in Guinea, with between 30-50 points out of 100), sometimes 
resorting to external expertise – national or international – to assist the evaluation commission 
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to better understand and evaluate the technical aspects linked to the methodology (as, for 
example, in Niger). 
Other countries prioritised the experience of the expert (between 10 and 15 years) in the area 
of support to civil society and in the management of EDF projects. In reality, all of the countries 
have found themselves confronted with new problems regarding the implementation of 
programmes in new domains which have never been the subject of Community intervention 
and for which there is a total lack of references as regards prior experiences. It is thus important 
that the profile of experts is very specific but, at the same time, it must remain realistic, bearing 
in mind the novelty of this type of programmes. In this sense the criteria often needed for a 
head of mission with 15 years of experience in the implementation of NSA support programmes 
(as is the case in Burkina Faso), occasionally entirely under the EDF (in Mauritania, for example), 
can reveal an obstacle so great that it is practically impossible to fulfil the condition due to the 
fact that programmes only began under the 9th EDF. 
The experience of PASOC in Mauritania shows how the work of a TA can be prepared in an 
adequate manner through a preparatory phase of several months, managed by the team that 
undertook the mapping, over the course of which the basic documents and sensitisation 
activities have already been done. Of course this option runs the risk of not resolving the 
problem of a rift between the approach adopted and the activities carried out during the 
preparatory and the inception phases. 
In order to tackle these risks it would be opportune if a TA was assisted during the inception 
phase of a programme through a guidance that could consist of the support of a short term 
expert during the 3rd, 6th and 9th months of the life of a programme. This would allow to support 
the TA in the most delicate stages of the inception of a programme, that is: the drafting of an 
operational plan, the drafting of the start work plan and the formal launching of the 
programme: the drafting of the first work plan and the establishment of the required 
committees (SMCs and Selection Committees); and the launching and implementation of the 
first planned activities. 
In a general sense, the drafting of the ToRs (as from the forwcast phase) and the criteria of 
integrating competences, are key aspects of the selection phase of the TA. 
As regards the ToR, it is essential that they clearly contain the roles that the TA is supposed to 
take on, which should conform to the principles of the Cotonou Agreement in terms of support 
to NSAs (with a view to their capacity building). In this sense it is useful to define the role of a TA 
as “facilitation” of the process rather than execution of the administrative and accounting tasks. 
When it comes to the second aspect, it would be interesting to associate European NGOs to 
these programmes, since they would be able to provide significant experience in the field of 
support to the NSAs of the South. In reality, European NGOs can have an added value in various 
aspects of the operational life of a programme. In this sense one can affirm that their 
competences can perfectly complement those of the private companies, as shown in he table 
here-after: 
 
 
Table 3 : The added value of cooperation actors 
Added value of the cooperation actors 
 Private consulting 
companies 
EU NGOs 
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Financial Capacity X  
Responsibility to endorse an externalised direct labour 
operations mode 
X  
Knowledge and expertise in multi-stakeholder 
engagement 
 X 
Knowledge and expertise in provision of capacity 
building to NSA  
 X 
Technical competence of the personnel   X 
Mastery of social dynamics  X 
Knowledge of the country X X 
Knoweldge of EDF procedures X X ( ?) 
Ability to mobilise civil society experts  X 
North-South Networking  X 
  
Specifically concerning the capacity building process and activities, the role of the TA in an NSA 
support programme must be centred around:  
 
TA role in capacity building 
▪ Initiating reflexion within NSAs on their mission in relation to the local, regional and 
countrywide stakes 
▪ Prioritising self analysis within the organisation 
▪ Facilitating the capacity building needs identification exercise through organisational and 
institutional assessments 
▪ Providing support, where and when needed, for the organisation of a strategic planning 
exercise 
▪ Making the programme resources available (in expertise, equipment, and networking) 
▪ Accompaniment of the actor (not just the action) 
▪ Ensuring the monitoring and evaluation of the results of the support provided by the 
programme. 
 
Finally, there is one last aspect that needs to be noted, one that is strictly related to the role of 
TA: the role of backstopping. Although it was not foreseen in the majority of the 40 
programmes analysed, this role has a primordial importance as regards the goals of efficiency of 
the TA and, in general, the success of the programme.  
Indeed, the complexity of NSA support programmes includes a series of skills that are not easily 
found in the two or three experts that work within the PMU.  Other than the question of skills, 
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these experts, due to the complexity of the context and EDF procedures, rarely have the 
capacity to distance and detach themselves from the daily problems and, as such, determine 
whether or not the intervention of the programme is relevant. 
The role of backstopping could therefore prove itself to be of fundamental importance to 
supporting the onsite personnel on the condition that a clear distinction is drawn between the 
two types of backstopping: administrative backstopping and technical backstopping. If the 
first type of backstopping, involving a support to the central administration of the contractor in 
all that concerns adherence to the procedures and contractual obligations, is fairly common, the 
second type of backstopping is relatively rare. 
In reality, a programme cannot expect a midterm review to adjust its strategy or to reorient it. It 
is necessary that constant technical support is provided from the headquarters and that, at the 
same time, best practices or solutions brought in by other programmes in the same sub region 
or elsewhere, are explored and eventually adapted to the context of the programme.  
It must be noted that, up until now, the subject has been characterised by a certain 
improvisation and the different contractors have proceeded in a very scattered way: while 
some have invested in this basic backstopping function (often required due to the gravity and 
complexity of the administrative and financial problems), others have judged this role to have 
been omitted in the ToR and, as such, considered it to be pointless or even and extra burden to 
their formal requirements. 
In reality, the question of the role of backstopping must be settled in a far more formal manner 
and needs to be institutionalised from the outset of the programme identification phase and, 
clearly, as a fundamental aspect of the TA selection process. In this sense the ToRs must, on 
the one hand, foresee the need to provide the profiles responsible for backstopping and, on the 
other, this role must be recognised in the budget in terms of person/days allocated (as much in 
Europe as on the ground).  
It must be noted that, to this effect, the 40 programmes registered one single case (Burkina 
Faso) where the role of technical and administrative backstopping was recognised as much on 
the level of operational mechanisms of the programme as it was in terms of resources allocated 
(54 person/days on site). It is interesting to reveal that the offer of the winning consortium had 
envisaged, at its own cost, double the days initially allocated by the Contracting Authority for 
field visits. 
Yet, this role can prove fundamentally useful to the success of a programme, as is shown in the 
case of the ARIANE programme in Mali. 
 
The reorientation of the ARIANE programme through backstopping missions 
In September 2007, the contractor in charge of the execution of the ARIANE programme in Mali, in 
cooperation with the services of the NAO and the ECD, bearing in mind the difficulties encountered 
by the programme during the first 18 months of its existence, decided to call upon, at its own 
costs, an external consultant in support of African civil society capacity building who, among 
other things, indentified the programme in 2004 through a mapping study on Malian civil society. 
The ARIANE programme, in September 2007, could count on some significant strengths, as well as 
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some problems that demanded a strategic reflexion and a reorientation of the choices made in 
terms of approach, as well as intervention modalities. 
 
Among the strengths that can be noted are the significant mobilisation of civil society 
organisations as of the first phase of the programme and, in particular, in the launch of the first call 
for proposals and the establishment of tools and procedures for the selection of activities to be 
funded. 
As regards problems, the institutional spokespersons of the programme (in a first instance the ECD) 
had highlighted several weaknesses, notably the information and communication strategy of the 
programme which was of particular importance bearing in mind the solicitations and needs 
expressed during the ARIANE participative identification exercise (through regional workshops and 
the national synthesising workshop). 
As for the programme team, it had been noticed early on, after a few months, that there was a 
problem with the conception and allocation of resources relating to the “capacity building” 
component of Malian civil society. In this sense a reflexion document proposing different scenarios 
was drafted with the aim of identifying solutions on the strategic level (in terms of the role  that 
the component should have within the programme) as well as on the financial level. 
 
The drafting of the second work programme (for the two components: “support to development 
initiatives” and “capacity building”), the launch of the second call for proposals, as well as the need 
for a clear and efficient information communication strategy, in essence sped up the internal 
programme reflexion. It was this reflexion, initiated within the programme that was the point of 
departure for the backstopping mission of 2007. 
 
It is thus that the mission, however short (barely 7 days), allowed for the detection of a series of 
risks that became the object of an in depth analysis in light of a strategic reorientation of ARIANE, 
which consisted of: 
- Accentuating the capacity building character of the programme while avoiding the adoption 
of the pre-Cotonou era micromanagement logic; 
- Focusing on the guidance of actors as opposed to the execution of activities; 
- Researching, by preference, the contextual link on the bases of the stakes that Malian civil 
society face; a fundamental contribution to the definition of pertinence criteria to adopt for 
the selection of actors and their proposals; 
- Adopting a “make-do” approach over a “do” approach, something which involves 
acknowledgement of the civil society dynamics, as well as the different vocations of CSOs; 
- Inciting RCAs to act in an active and proactive manner , even during the establishment of 
different files and in direct assistance to the applicants and not merely considering their role as 
that of a simple secretariat (for example the collection of grant applications); 
- Focusing the activities of the ARIANE TA, notably the standard administrative tasks, on the 
facilitation of social process underway within Malian civil society and capacity building 
through the guidance of actors; 
- Increasing the relevance of funded grants, differentiating between call for proposals on the 
basis of organisational levels with Malian CSOs and revising the maximum grant envelopes 
down; 
- Increasing the gamut of possible activities in terms of capacity building all while avoiding 
limiting one’s self to training activities for EDF procedures; 
- Placing the programme resources at the disposition of the cooperation process between civil 
society and the State; 
- Making a clear distinction between Programme visibility activities and information 
communication activities; 
- Searching, above all, for a positive synergy between the activities of other technical and 
financial partners present in the country in the area of civil society. 
Following this backstopping and strategic reorientation mission, the different measures suggested 
were effectively adopted and the programme was able to resolve its difficulties.  
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4.5. The role of international NGO (INGO) 
From the analysis of the 40 NSAs support programmes, the following table has been produced: 
 
 
As it can be seen, 63% of the programmes do not involve International Non Governmental 
Organisations (INGOs) and only 27% give a role to these organisations, either as beneficiaries or 
as partners and local actors. For 10% of the programmes, there is no information available. Two 
countries (Guinea Bissau and Somalia) must be added to these results, as evoked in the chapter 
on management modalities and, later on, regarding technical assistance, where INGOs have a 
heightened role in the management of programmes. 
These results, which bear witness to the feeble participation of INGOs, not only on the level of 
TA but also as partners on NSA support programmes and, in particular, civil society support 
programmes, contrast strongly with the present and dynamism of INGOs in a fair amount of 
ACP countries. 
In effect, European and International NGOs have a historically significant role in the emergence 
and support of CSOs in ACP countries, notably in the domain of development and the 
promotion of human rights. However, these important actors in the world of cooperation and 
development have, lately, seen financial difficulties due to a considerable decrease in public aid 
to worldwide development as well as changes brought upon the aid structure (opening funding 
to actors other than NGOs; decentralisation of grant lines; etc.). 
It is thus that some European and International NGOs have started to examine alternative ways 
to obtain funds, placing themselves directly in the ACP countries for the execution of donor 
programmes and projects; either in direct collaboration with local actors (often in the form of 
subcontractors), or in a competitive manner alongside national actors. At the other extreme, an 
increasing number of INGOs are progressively engaged in strengthening local actors and 
through the provision of capacity building. 
 
 Working document for the restitution seminar 1-3 April 2009 
 
88 
 
 
On the role of INGOs providing support to local CSO 
Key lessons learnt as proposed in the guidelines developed by the partners supporting the Civil 
Society Support net 
http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil_society_-_guidelines_october_07_final.pdf 
 
▪ International NGOs have been an important channel of support to CSOs for many years, acting 
as intermediaries for development partners. Different types of northern NGOs such as faith 
based and human rights organisations or solidarity movements, support sister organisations. 
They use their own experiences from their development processes as a source for capacity 
exchange and added value. Development INGOs that come from a tradition of charity 
organisations often have a sizeable capacity for mobilizing poor communities and vulnerable 
groups as well as supporting smaller, weaker and more rural based CSOs. 
▪ The INGOs play the role of both partner and donor - a potentially difficult position due to the 
powers invested in the latter. They can have great freedom from development partners, with 
substantial budgets in long-term funding arrangements to suit the diverse character of civil 
society. There is however, a growing concern among national NGOs that the INGOs are 
competing unfairly for resources, and may undermine the growth of an independent civil 
society. 
▪ Development partners need to show an interest in understanding better if and how the INGOs 
complement their strategies, and what value they are adding, apart from funding local 
organisations. INGOs are therefore encouraged to be more transparent in line with the general 
strategy of civil society support in Tanzania. 
▪ The work and contribution of INGOs needs to be an integral part of the overall picture of 
support to civil society, and therefore seen in the same light as support given by development 
partners. This is particularly important in the current culture which demands transparency and 
coordination. The principles of the Paris Agenda should also be followed. 
 
 
Whatever the cause, the global trend among INGOs seems to be that of enlarging and 
entrenching the inclusion of local CSOs in their policies and programmes, with the exception of 
humanitarian NGOs, where the interventions are often characterised by an overly 
“interventionist” approach as regards local partners. By the same token, the approaches and 
practices of partners in terms of civic engagement vary considerably. 
Three categories of factors (i. Underlying visions; ii. Motivations and; iii. Objective and extent of 
relations) are necessary to understand this diversity: 
 
4.5.1. The underlying view on civil society 
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In terms of underlying views on civil society, it is possible to distinguish two conceptions that 
are almost entirely at odds with one another. They nevertheless need to remain nuanced, as 
certain partners can take a mixed approach: 
 An instrumental vision of NSAs and, notably, of civil society, which considers the actors as 
providers of basic services to local populations (in the fields of health, education, water, 
security, food etc.) while complimenting the national development policies, led by the 
government and supported by the community of donors. In this framework, CSOs are 
fundamentally seen as subcontractors for the provision of a number of social and 
productive services, thus replacing the capacity-lacking State; 
 A concept of civil society as an autonomous development entity, with its own agenda, 
which can integrate service provision roles, in line with the existing institutional systems and 
structures, with governance functions in the realm of civic education, social mobilisation 
and watchdog mechanisms, aimed to promote the establishment of a culture of justice, the 
emergency of a citizenry and a greater degree of transparency and accountability in the 
governance institutions regarding its citizenship. 
 
4.5.2. The motivations 
In terms of motivations, engagement with national CSOs can be summarily grouped into three 
categories: 
• Resorting to CSOs to implement activities or components of a project or programme. 
In this framework, the intervention strategy and modalities are unilaterally defined by 
the INGOs, the CSOs relegated to the role of contractors for which they foresee some 
financing. It is, in essence, a contractual relation which emanates from an instrumental 
vision of civil society as mentioned above, where often the CSOs are selected based on 
their skills and their price, through a call for proposals or call to tender mechanism; 
 
• Providing grants and other forms of financial support to CSOs to allow them to 
implement their own initiatives. In this scenario, INGOs act as classical donor 
organisations, supporting individual projects, often without a strategic or global vision; 
 
• Supporting CSOs in a reciprocal cooperation and partnering logic based on a mid-to-
long term strategy that hinges fundamentally on the capacity building of CSOs. 
 
The following diagram illustrates these three relation modalities. 
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Figure 3: Relation modalities between partners (INGOs) and CSOs 
 
 
4.5.3. The objective and scope of relations 
In terms of the scope of the relationship, the initiatives to involve and engage with local CSOs 
can be classified into three main categories:  
▪ Ad hoc practical relationships, in which CSOs act as sub-contractors for the delivery of 
services and/or receive ad hoc funds for the execution of their own initiatives; 
▪ Operational partnerships, which include a degree of skills transfer on the side of partners as 
a complement to the activity; 
▪ Strategic associations and partnerships, in which partners provide technical assistance and 
advice in order to build the capacity of CSOs to stimulate a constructive engagement of 
CSOs with the government, themselves and/or with other key actors. In order to do this, 
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INGOs place specific funds and resources at the disposal of CSOs aimed, first and foremost, 
at building capacity. Several modus operandi are adopted: 
- Technical assistance through the provision (on a mid to long term basis) of 
human resources (volunteers or technical assistants), or financial resources 
destined for the recruitment of local expertise; 
- Institutional support in terms of financial resources, with a view towards 
contributing to the role of local organisations; 
- Grants for financing micro-initiatives formulated by CSOs in order to allow for 
an acquisition of professional experience in the management of projects; 
- Institutional mentoring of local organisations through the elaboration of 
institutional diagnostics, trainings, consultative support for actions etc. 
 
 
About the partnering work between INGO and local CSO in Somalia 
 
How INGOs interact with Somali CSO partners is largely determined by the ECSU strategy. Indeed, the 
EC insists on a partnership approach between INGOs and CSOs and does so for two reasons: 
 
▪ Somali CSOs are embedded in society and thus far better placed to reach out to the local 
population; 
  
▪ A partnership approach, moreover, can be an effective way of strengthening the local CSO 
‘biotope’.  
 
Most international CSOs therefore work with local partners and many of them clearly invest a lot in 
capacity development of their counterparts. The work of InterPeace is exemplary in this regard, and 
their three regional partners are now considered to be among the best CSOs in Somalia.  
 
Certain local service delivery CSOs, however, complained that they are still viewed as mere 
subcontractors, executing activities but not necessarily benefiting from capacity development.  
 
Bearing in mind the novelty of the EC intervention in the themes linked to the support of NSAs 
and, in particular, to civil society, the capitalisation of experiences on the part of other technical 
and financial partners, notably INGOs for which the accompaniment and support of CSOs 
follows a reciprocal cooperation and partnering logic, can play a fundamental role in the 
implementation of the new programmes under the 10th EDF programmes. 
To this end, coordination on the level of different stakeholders, and working in cooperation with 
INGOs established in the country that share the same vision on building the capacity of CSOs, 
represents an efficient way to: i) capitalise on the experiences underway or already completed 
and; ii) creates synergies to the benefit of CSOs and their reinforcement. It is thus a proven 
necessity, for the new programmes to take INGOs into account and bring them on board as 
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technical and/or financial partners, when and where they have been established in the country. 
On the basis of a critical evaluation of their visions, approaches and modus operandi, as 
described above, partnering agreements should, when appropriate, be established within the 
framework of the programme. 
 
4.6. Cooperation with donor organisations and the new common funding systems 
(pool funding)  
4.6.1. Cooperation with donor organisations 
From the analysis of the 40 NSA support programmes, it is clear that only a minority of 
programmes adopted a proactive approach, supported and institutionalised in terms of 
cooperation with other donor organisations, which surpassed the implementation of a few ad-
hoc actions and holding regular cooperation meetings.  
On the one hand, as evinced in the chapter on management modalities, only the programmes in 
the Seychelles (with UNDP), in Kenya (also with UNDP) and in Sierra Leone (with DFID) foresee 
joint and/or delegated implementation arrangements20. Other programmes, such as those in 
Lesotho, Uganda or Angola, have envisaged a mode of cooperation with other donors which 
surpasses the anecdotal and ad hoc level, to become more institutionalised and regular, without 
arriving, notwithstanding the effort, at the formulation of a strategic collaboration. Finally, in 
the majority of cases, cooperation has been limited to the attendance of regular meetings with 
other technical and financial partners active in the support of NSAs and to a number of 
improvised exchanges for the coordination of particular initiatives (from the moment that an 
organisation supported by the programme is also financed by other donors; for initiatives 
involving the whole sector, such as the support for drafting deontological codes for the sector, 
support for the drafting of legal texts concerning CSOs; etc.). It is useful to mention that 
coordination with other partners often depends on the will and the capacity of the Programme 
Manager, without omitting, as far as is possible, the importance of the general country 
framework for institutional cooperation, inspired by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. 
 
The Civil Society Support Net in Tanzania 
http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/ 
Objectives and contents of the website: 
The website was created by a number of development partners (DPs) in Tanzania to share information 
on their support to civil society. It contains a database on development partners’ support to civil society 
(both to service delivery as well as advocacy work), background information on this joint initiative, and 
details of the development partners contributing to the website. The database covers three types of 
information: 
▪ an introduction of the individual development partners, their work in Tanzania, and their approach 
to supporting civil society  
▪ information on ongoing projects, and other types of support  
                                                 
20 It must be noted that such arrangements were not possible before 2006 
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▪ information on grant / support facilities available to civil society organisations.  
The creation of a joint database on civil society support aims at creating more transparency and allowing 
better co-ordination amongst development partners, while at the same time making it easier for civil 
society organisations to identify potential partners. This initiative is a component of the Guidelines on 
Development Partners’ Support to Civil Society. These Guidelines were endorsed by the main 
coordinating Development Partners’ Group in June 2007 as a framework to guide DPs in their planning 
and provision of support to civil society.  
Both the Website and Database were launched by the EC and CIDA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on 11 
April 2008. 
Background and Gist of the ‘Development Partners’ Guidelines for Support to Civil Society’, which 
gave rise to the website and database: 
 A number of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Tanzania approached development partners in 2006 
and asked that guidelines and/or a common framework be written to help coordinate and make more 
transparent development partners’ (DPs) support to CSOs engaging in advocacy and policy work. They 
felt that whilst having put a tremendous effort into coordinating their support to, and relations with 
government under the Joint Assistance Strategy, development partners tended to be more fragmented 
in their approach to supporting civil society, uncoordinated, short-sighted and often lacking a clear 
strategic focus. 
 The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) led the process of drawing up such guidelines 
in collaboration with other development partners. Consultations with civil society organisations were 
key throughout the process. Their combined efforts define a common framework for support to civil 
society organisations working mainly in advocacy and engaging in policy processes. The underlying 
guidelines which depict this common framework follow principles similar to those of the Paris 
Declaration. The aim is to improve development partner co-ordination and strategic focus, and 
ultimately to strengthen the demand side of accountability, and thus make a greater, and more 
sustainable impact on development in Tanzania. 
http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil_society_-_guidelines_october_07_final.pdf 
 
 
 
4.6.2. New common funding systems (pool funding) 
Changes to this effect are already occurring and one can hope that the collaboration with other 
donors, notably the member states as well as international organisations, will see an increase 
under the 10th EDF. In effect, from the moment that donors prioritise an increased harmony, in 
line with the Paris Declaration, they are contributing to the emergence of new common 
financing systems, conceived to to enable more secure funding arrangements which are 
independent of day to day management by donors21. This is the case, for example, of:  
• The “Foundation for Civil Society” in Tanzania 
• The “Independent Development Fund” in Uganda 
• The “Civil Society Support Programme” in Ethiopia (in preparation) 
• The “Civil Society Support Mechanism” in Mozambique. 
 
                                                 
21 “The participation of NSAs in poverty reduction strategies, sector approaches and monitoring of policy 
implementation”. Draft January 2009. AIDCO/E/4. European Commission. 
 
 Working document for the restitution seminar 1-3 April 2009 
 
94 
 
Let us take a close look at tow of these common financing arrangements: 
 
The Foundation for Civil Society” in Tanzania  
www.thefoundation-tz.org 
 
The Foundation for Civil Society is a Tanzanian non-profit company, designed and funded by a group of 
like-minded development partners, and governed by an independent Board. It was previously known as 
the Civil Society Program (CSP). The Foundation was registered in September 2002 and started 
operations in January 2003. 
Vision 
To become a sustainable model of excellence that contributes to the development of a vibrant, effective 
and innovative civil society sector that enables citizens to engage in the democratic process, promote 
human rights and contribute to poverty reduction and a better quality of life for all Tanzanians.  
 
Mission 
To provide grants and other capacity building support to civil society organisations to enable 
economically disadvantaged and vulnerable citizens to: 
▪ Access information and understand policies, laws and their rights  
▪ Engage effectively in policy formulation and monitoring on poverty reduction  
▪ Contribute to social development and to constructively hold the government and private sectors 
to account. 
 
What is the aim of the Foundation? 
The Foundation aims to establish an intermediary support mechanism for civil society organisations in 
Tanzania which will enable effective engagement in poverty reduction efforts as set out in the 
Government of Tanzania policies: Vision 2025, the Tanzania Assistance Strategy, and the National 
Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).The Foundation is one of the largest support 
mechanisms for civil society in Tanzania, and is committed to delivering grant aid and supporting 
capacity-building initiatives as a means of strengthening effective engagement in poverty reduction.  
 
What is the Structure of the Foundation? 
The Foundation for Civil Society is operated by the Secretariat and governed by an independent Board 
and Members.  
The secretariat which is located in Dar es salaam, is responsible for day-to-day activities of the 
Foundation. It comprises three departments; Grants Department, Development Department and 
Administration & Finance Department. 
 
Grants Department 
The Grants department is primarily responsible for issues regarding grants. It is responsible for grants 
information dissemination through information sessions, grants application processing and contract 
management of the projects. The department is implementing these activities through site visits, 
information sessions in the regions and reports analysis.  
 
Development Department 
The Development Department has the overall responsibility of developing and monitoring the 
Foundation’s policies and procedures. It is a resource centre for the organisation. Specifically, the 
department’s role is to make sure that the intended outputs and impacts of the Foundation’s services 
are realised effectively through impact assessments, grantees auditing, information gathering and 
dissemination, enhancing partnership and networks, conducting participatory research on CSOs, 
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capacity development for CSOs and public engagement through public policy dialogues. 
 
Administration and Finance Department 
The Administration and Finance department is responsible for ensuring that the organisation is 
providing quality services by managing recurrent expenses and maximising value for money within the 
allocated budget. It has the responsibility to prepare financial reports and ensure sources of funds. The 
administration and finance department is also charged with the role of updating human resource 
systems and developing staff related policies. 
. 
 
 
The Civil Society Support Mechanism (CSSM) (Mozambique) 
 
The Civil Society Support Mechanism (CSSM) is in the process of being established by DFID and Irish 
Aid. It aims to improve governance and accountability for ordinary Mozambican citizens through 
strengthening and diversifying the engagement of civil society organisations with monitoring and 
advocacy on governance. Over time, the expected outcome of the proposed intervention will be more 
effective and accountable operation of the key institutions of governance.  
The primary target groups of CSSM are civil society organisations that have an existing focus on areas of 
governance or are in a position to respond to opportunities to engage in governance issues when they 
arise such as in the case of elections or the revision of the PRSP. 
A combination of support through capacity development, funding and improved access to information 
will be provided through an independently managed mechanism. The main function of this professional 
management body is “to facilitate, catalyse, support civil society activity and capacity development in 
the areas of economic and political governance; not become a civil society organisation in its own right.  
The Management Agent appointed to implement CSSM will be responsible for the internal financial 
management and will be expected to provide Irish Aid and DFID, with quarterly and annual financial 
reports in an agreed format. Irish Aid and DFID will jointly be responsible for ensuring one annual 
external audit of CSSM and have the right to carry out other joint audits at any time.  
Other key structures include a Management Board that will be responsible for overall policy and 
strategic development of CSSM, including overseeing financial, policy and administrative directions. 
Members of the Board will be drawn from donors, civil society and people independent from, but with 
an understanding of, government. The Board may draw periodically upon an expanded technical group 
of individuals who can provide strategic and policy updates and analysis. 
In order for CSOs to be eligible for a grant, proposals will need to include an outline of the governance 
intervention, a monitoring and evaluation plan for the CSO and a capacity development plan for the 
CSO. Where possible, CSOs’ financial and reporting systems will be used. This may put an extra burden 
on the Managing Agent who will have to deal with a range of systems, but it will avoid the scenario of 
overly stringent reporting systems being imposed on grantees. As a result, in the first instance finance 
will only go to strong organizations with the capacity to develop the necessary documents. Weaker 
organizations will be able to engage through standard packages of training (sub-contracted to existing 
CSOs) and exchange visits. CSOs will be responsible for evaluating themselves, in order to shift from the 
idea of evaluation carried out by donors for donors, as CSOs never see the results. Ultimately it is trying 
to shift the balance of where the responsibility for a grant lies. 
Capacity development is a key focus area for the CSSM. Provision of capacity development will not be 
restricted to civil society organisations that receive grants but will be open to all interested and 
appropriate CSOs engaged with governance in various locations. 
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It is too early to assess these types of mechanisms, the reason being that their genesis is too 
recent. Nevertheless, it is possible to describe a number of advantages, as well as risks and 
constraints, some still in the realm of possibility, from observing them. 
In terms of the advantages of such a common financing system, one can note:  
 
Advantages of a common financing system 
▪ The system entails a reduction in transaction costs and a larger flexibility in the 
administration of donor funds (particularly the constituent donors, delegating administration 
of their funds) and promotes a greater degree of efficiency in the use of funds. 
▪ The system promotes a greater coordination and harmonisation of the policies and 
strategies of donors, in accordance with the Paris Agenda. 
▪ The system unifies and simplifies the criteria and requirements for 
monitoring/reporting/etc. prescribed to beneficiary organisations, which allows NSAs to 
devote more time to the programme and the consecutive realisation of the anticipated results.
▪ The system has the potential to allow the establishment of more ambitious and structured 
programmes, integrating various components (“core funding”, “block grants”, project 
financing, targeted capacity building actions, information activities, strategic dialogue etc.). 
▪ Generally, transparent structures for the management of funds, as well as performances 
systems for technical and administrative monitoring are established. 
▪ The system heightens the predictability of NSA resources and allows for strategic 
associations in the long term with other organisations. 
▪ The donors have the potential to shift focus onto strategic dialogue and political dialogue 
with NSA, as the administrative tasks linked to monitoring will have been delegated. 
▪ The system facilitates the reduction of the duplication phenomenon/overlap of financing, 
activities, etc.  
▪ In general, the absorption capacity of individual NSAs is reduced; a limitation that the pool 
financing system can help bypass. 
▪ It is very probable that donors are in a position to donate more important funds to the support 
of NSAs, as both the leading donor organisation and the constituent donor organisations will 
benefit from economies of scale. 
 
In terms of the constraints and risks associated with common financing systems, one can note: 
 
Constraints and risks associated with common financing systems 
▪ Small NSAs (especially small CSOs) will not have the capacity to compete with larger 
organisations, well established and more stable. If the system does not integrate a targeted 
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approach (in terms of financing windows, eligibility criteria and distinct selections etc.) by 
category and type of actor (e.g. according to the level of NSA intervention, the dimension of 
the organisation, influence etc.) it is very likely that it will end up by favouring large urban 
organisations, well established and recognised, to the detriment of smaller organisations, 
informal and/or distanced from the capital and/or ignorant of donor procedures. 
▪ The existence of one sole source of financing, which focuses all of the donor support, runs the 
risk of an over dependence, particularly for the poor organisations, which do not have 
relations with technical or financial partners (notably INGOs), political and strategic changes 
engendered by the donors and/or the government. 
▪ NSAs fear that donor harmonisation will lead to a reduction in financing for support to NSAs. 
▪ The system brings with it the risk of a reduced contact between NSAs and constituent donors 
and their demands for dialogue on their strategies, as the financing is not directly doled out 
by these donors. 
▪ The system limits the control of constituent donors on the choice of sectors and themes that 
can be financed.  
▪ Some donors, such as USAID and JICA are opposed to this system and stake the claim that it 
does not allow for “every dollar to be donated to a specific activity”. 
 
5. CAPACITY BUILDING: DEFINITION, APPROACHES AND MODUS OPERANDI 
5.1. The programme components and the approaches and tools deployed for 
capacity building 
As mentioned in the chapter on the goals of programmes, as regards the main principles, NSA 
support programmes often appear to be vast and complex endeavours with regard to the 
nature of the objectives sought, which seek profound changes across a plethora of domains. It is 
thus common that NSA support programmes integrate several components that stretch from 
the capacity building of individual organisations and their representatives to the relationship 
aspects of networking and to questions of political dialogue with the State in its different 
dimensions. 
This multi dimensional nature of programmes conforms precisely, as highlighted in the 
introductory chapter of the study,  with the systemic nature of capacity building. In effect the 
reinforcement (better than building) of capacities, conceived as a process that focuses on 
facilitating the consolidation, in conjunction with the actors, of their capacities to allow them to 
evolve and adapt to the new contextual needs in order to fulfil their role within a partnering 
scheme or model, has a multi dimensional manner, in the sense that it focuses on three 
dimensions: 
• The dimension of reinforcing individual skills where the questions linked to strategic 
leadership are also handled; 
• The dimension of the organisation, with specific attention paid to the aspects of 
identity, as well as the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness; 
• The dimension of reinforcement of relations and of the context where the vital 
questions are those of the development of skills and capacities for collaboration with 
other actors and the elaboration of a legal and institutional framework adapted to the 
needs of organisations and the demands in terms of participation in management of 
public policy. The environment is thereby conceived not only as a conditioning factor (in 
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a positive or negative manner) for the institutional reinforcement of actors, but also as 
an element that one can aspire to transform. 
 
The figure below illustrates this. 
Figure 4 : A reminder of the capacity building dimensions 
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Elements of capacity
…Capacity building encompasses institutional development but goes beyond individual organisations
and institutions to broader systems, groups of organisations and networks. It addresses complex 
multi-faceted problems requiring the participation of various actors, organisations and institutions 
(Qualman and Morgan, 1996).
What is capacity building (iii)?
 
A second observation regarding capacity building is that of its necessary adaptation to the 
existing contexts. In other words, there is no “magic formula” or “blue print” for capacity 
building. The different current approaches are the product of a plethora of strategies, methods 
and resources focused on changing mentalities such as the development of certain technical 
skills and the exchange of knowledge and skills. 
It is thus that the instruments are significantly diversified and comprise, among others: 
training, access to and dissemination of information, exchange fora, facilitation and guidance, 
consultative support, tutoring and twinning systems, inter organisational collaboration and 
networking, feedback and capitalisation of experiences, tested institutional approaches, etc. 
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About capacity building 
Key lessons learnt as proposed in the guidelines developed by the partners supporting the Civil 
Society Support net 
http://www.civilsocietysupport.net/doc/civil_society_-_guidelines_october_07_final.pdf 
 
There has been a widespread, vivid discussion on capacity development for a number of years. 
Different development agencies define capacity in different ways. However there are some basic 
principles that are accepted by the majority: 
 
▪ Capacity development is about enhancing learning rather than transferring knowledge, and 
puts a great emphasis on ownership. 
▪ The starting point for capacity development is building on what already exists. 
▪ Good capacity development aims at sustainable learning and accepts that there are no 
blueprint solutions. Each capacity development initiative must be seen in its own context and 
specifically designed for individual needs. 
In terms of support for capacity building, a number of requirements can be drawn from the principles 
above: 
• Any initiative must be based on an analysis of the present situation. People working in the 
organisation need to be involved. They are responsible for their own change and must therefore 
express their own needs. The capacity development must be demand driven. 
• The objectives and methods will and should vary depending on which level, individual, 
organizational, relational or enabling environment is addressed. 
• Quality capacity development is not about sending in technical assistance, it is about unleashing 
the potential capacity that already exists. 
 
The following table gathers some of the most used instruments, all the while putting them into 
context as much with the objectives sought as with the capacity building dimensions. 
Table4 : Capacity Building instruments in relation to objectives and dimensions 
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Capacity Building 
Dimension 
Objectives of the capacity 
building 
 
Instrument examples and methods 
Improving the leadership of NSAs.   Trainings on leadership development; 
 Consultative support/technical assistance in strategic planning of organisations; 
 Consultative support/technical assistance for the clarification of roles in the steering and administration/management of 
organisations; 
 Etc. 
 
 
 
Individual 
Dimension  
Creation or improvement of the 
formulation, management and 
monitoring capacities for 
cooperation programmes and 
projects  
 Consultative support/technical assistance/guidance of organisations (by a partner organisation – mentoring and coaching  
systems-, a specialised cabinet etc.) in the formulation and implementation of programmes; 
 Trainings on project management; 
 Internships/exchange programmes/”twinnings” within the partner organisations; 
 Short term missions by technicians of a partner organisation; 
 Financial means for project prospection; 
 Training to recycle and specialize employees;  
 Support to the implementation of concrete projects responding to the needs of the populations; 
 Etc. 
Improvement of the analytical 
capacities in terms of public policy 
 Support to the organisation of local, regional or national workshops and seminars; 
 Trainings on public policy analysis and donor cooperation strategies and programmes; 
 Promotion of dialogue fora with donor organisations; 
 Etc. 
Improvement of the lobbying and 
negotiation capacities of NSAs 
 Support to the organisation of local, regional or national workshops and seminars ; 
 Trainings on public policy analysis and donor cooperation strategies and programmes; 
 Trainings on negotiation and advocacy (lobbying) techniques 
 Networking and support/consultation on the part of partners specialised in the domain of advocacy (lobbying; 
 Diffusion of best practices; 
 Etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
Dimension  
Improving the management and 
administration capacities of 
organisations according to 
transparency criteria 
 
 Consultative support/technical assistance/guidance of organisations (by a partner organisation – mentoring and coaching  
systems-, a specialised cabinet etc.); 
 Financing organisational and institutional assessments; 
 Short term missions by technicians of a partner organisation; 
 Organisation and financing of national and international exchanges; 
 Implementation of systems and procedures within the organisation; 
 Trainings on accounting, financial management etc.; 
 Etc. 
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Improving the degree of 
specialisation of organisations and 
coherence of the mission and 
actions. 
 
 Consultative support/technical assistance/guidance of organisations (by a partner organisation – mentoring and coaching  
systems-, a specialised cabinet etc.); 
 Financing organisational and institutional assessments and strategic planning exercises and/or organisational repositioning; 
 Financing and/or organisation of assessments aiming to identify and listing existing capacities within the NSA;  
 Short term missions by technicians of a partner organisation; 
 Organisation and financing of national exchanges; 
 Etc. 
Reinforcing the institutional and 
financial stability of NSA 
organisations 
 Financing organisational and institutional assessments and strategic planning exercises and/or organisational repositioning; 
 Implementation of systems and procedures within the organisation; 
 Financial means for project prospection; 
 Training to recycle and specialize employees;  
 Support to the implementation of concrete projects responding to the needs of the populations; 
 Etc. 
Enhancement of the 
representativeness and legitimacy of 
umbrella organisations (3rd and 4th 
tier organisations) 
 
 Organisation and financing of national and international exchanges; 
 Promotion of dialogue fora (with donor organisations) on sector policies; 
 Action-Research activities on experiences of cooperation and coordination within the region/international level; 
 Financial support for the capitalisation of local and national coordination experiences; 
 Support and core funding for the establishment of umbrella entities; 
 Support/consultation/guidance for the improvement of accountability systems within umbrella organisations 
 Etc. 
Improvement of access to 
information. 
  
 Creation of a bulletin (paper and/or electronic); 
 Establishment of a web site “portal” for the totality of NSAs organisations; 
 Organisation  of regular meetings; 
 Networking between NSAs (local, regional, national and international level, South-South, North-South); 
 Integration of organisations into the thematic and/or regional, national or international networks; 
 Etc. 
Improvement of the coordination of 
NSA organisations 
 
 Organisation and financing of national and international exchanges; 
 Promotion of dialogue fora (with donor organisations) on sector policies; 
 Action-Research activities on experiences of cooperation and coordination within the region/international level; 
 Support and core funding for the establishment of umbrella entities; 
 Support to the draft of a deontological code; 
 Etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relational and 
Institutional 
Dimension  
Improvement of the legal and 
regulatory framework of NSAs on 
different national levels 
 Support and funding for drafting of legal texts; administrative provisions regarding registration of NSA, etc; 
 Promotion of exchanges with the government (line ministries and departments in charge of relations with non state actors); 
 Support and TA to government departments in charge of NSA relations 
 Etc. 
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5.2. Approaches deployed by the programmes for the prioritisation of NSA access to 
capacity building activities 
 
Four main approaches were identified within the programmes analysed. They can be placed 
on a continuum, going from a purely reactive approach, based on the call for proposals tool to 
a programmatic and proactive approach, based on the elaboration of a capacity building plan, 
starting from a strategic analysis, as the figure below shows. 
Figure 5: The four approaches adopted by the programmes for capacity building 
 
 
Approach 1: Call for 
proposals 
 
Approach 2: Calls for 
proposals and ad hoc 
training 
 
Approach 3: Mixed 
Process : calls for 
proposals and capacity 
building plan 
 
Approach 4: Capacity 
building plan 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of approaches deployed in the 40 programmes produces the following results: 
 
 
In total, 85% of programmes analysed rest on a fundamentally reactive approach, where the 
call for proposals constitutes a prioritised mechanism, sometimes the only mechanism, to 
provide capacity building to NSAs; their role being thus comparable to that of a thematic 
programme (such as the “Non State Actors and Local Authorities” programme). Only 15% of 
programmes relied exclusively on a capacity building plan based on the analysis of demands, 
while 42% of programmes sought a mixed approach, which combines the calls for proposals 
with a programming process in terms of capacity building. This is the case, for instance, of the 
NSA support programmes in Uganda and Dominican republic as briefly presented below: 
Continuum in terms of the degree of proactivity and the programmatic vision of 
approaches 
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A number of innovative features of the mixed approach used in the CSCBP in Uganda 
The programme combined a “learning by doing” approach (by giving grants for implementation of 
service delivery and advocacy projects) with tailor-made institutional mentoring by IOs and general 
training, peer education and networking and socialising initiatives promoted by the PMU with the 
support of external expertises. The grant system acted both as an incentive and direct input into the 
CSO work, with demonstrable effects: 
▪ Giving grants as a way of putting into practice the knowledge through the implementation of 
the projects granted.  
▪ Giving grants + CB as a way of building trust: CB based on a strategic partnership that the grant 
scheme created (according to the PMU Manager, more than 80% of the grantees understood 
that they were not only being given funds, as with other donors)  
Equally important was the top-down support provided by the PMU and the IOs (based on a thorough 
OCA). This integrated model provided a useful and effective capacity building model, allowing a more 
programmatic and strategic view of the CBP and allowing the programme to be more proactive and not 
only demand-driven. 
In addition to that, the programme also included a promotion Fund, intended to reach groups and CSO’s 
that were not enough qualified for the grants. The programme identified 15 of those groups and a 
specific IO was assigned to work with them to provide basic CB (direct funding).  
Here-after are presented a number of innovative tools and mechanisms used by the programme: 
 
Peer education mechanism:  Ten competent accountants were selected given training to agree on the 
methodology and also to groom them in training adults. The trained accountants were placed for 3 to 4 
days in other grantee organizations to train their accountants. 
 
Pros Cons 
Team building and collaboration between and among grantee personnel Concept was not 
marketed well…it required  to be appreciated by both the trainer and trainee if it were to be successful 
Training for accountants engaged to become Trainers Tended to duplicate the IOs assignment 
 Some of the Grantees felt not in need of training  
 
Field visits to the grantees before disbursement of funds: Such visits allowed to detect NGO that had 
given fake information and were removed from the programme and, at the same time, to gather 
information on the level of capacity of the grantees and the common capacity gaps in order to draft a 
training strategy 
Presentation of the projects in their communities: Grantees had to present their projects in the 
communities they were going to work in before receiving the funds. This enhanced more accountability 
from the part of CSOs and allowed them to gained credibility among communities, local authorities and 
other partners. 
Best Practice Awards : they were aimed at all CSO, not only grantees and nominated by people; they 
enhanced visibility of the programme (TV documentary, reports at the newspapers…); and were a tool 
for dissemination of good practices (grantees visit awarded organisations). One major criterion for 
selection of the Best Practice Award winner was the degree of creativity,  innovation and possibility of 
adapting or replicating the practice in other places. 
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Best grantee Award: the CSP in Uganda gave some awards for outstanding CSO in different categories. 
One of them was aimed at recognising the work of grantees by selecting the one with better 
performance. The selection process had two phases: the 1st phase was undertaken by the PMU which 
pre-selected 17 grantees among 49 and the 2nd phase was undertaken by 5 teams consisting of a 
member from the CSSC, a Key Resource Person from an Intermediary Organisation and a staff from the 
PMU. The teams administered a questionnaire developed by the PMU in consultation to the grantees to 
assess them, focusing on 6 areas: Planning and Budgeting / Reporting / Financial Management and 
accountability / Leadership and Governance / Organisational Capacity Building / Resource Mobilisation. 
Each team member scored independently.  
The award system helped: (i) to give recognition to the grantees; (ii) to enhance visibility for the 
programme; (iii) to gather information on the grantees progresses and; (iv) to gather specific 
information on their accountability and reporting systems and other aspects, helping to identify gaps 
that could be addressed later on by the programme. The exercise was a wake-up call to all grantees to 
strengthen their record keeping, management and documentation system 
Other general CB activities to all Ugandan CSOs implemented by PMU: 
▪ Study tours to visit some of the projects funded by the rest of grantees. Grantees with a best 
practice in an specific area received visits from other grantees working in the same field. 
▪ General training activities on issues such as PRMT (Participatory Resource Monitoring Tool) 
▪ 2 CSO Leaders Retreat were developed, bringing together 29 representatives from national and 
international organisations working at different levels. The retreats provided an opportunity for 
the CSO leaders to reflect on recent developments in the country and their impact on the 
sector and the collective voice and action 
▪ Publication of bulletin “In Focus” periodically to disseminate achievements of the programme 
among CSOs and other stakeholders. 
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Some innovative elements of the mixed system adopted by the PRMT in the Dominican 
Republic 
 
▪ Balance in the approach between a reactive strategy (implemented through the FONDESIN 
(Funds for support of CSO initiatives, to support the initiatives coming directly from CSOs) and a 
proactive strategy (through the initiatives proposed directly by the PRMT in response to the 
diagnostic elaborated and the priorities identified, not necessarily undertaken by the CSOs 
themselves but in the form of propositions submitted to FONDESIN). 
▪ Differentiation between the lines for calls for proposals – with separate budgets, possibly 
addressed to differentiated groups of CSOs (on the distinct levels of institutionalisation and 
intervention). 
▪ Mechanism for the promotion of CSO association (forming consortiums) in a way that 
integrates the weakest organisations in terms of quality partners and/or end beneficiaries of 
the different grant projects so as to avoid their exclusion under the strict eligibility and 
selection criteria imposed by EDF rules in the tender process. In this sense the PRMT would 
seem to have succeeded in finding a “pivot” in the FONDESIN mechanism to guarantee on the 
on hand the minimalistic technical capacities with strong and capable organisations and, on the 
other, with the need to reach the weakest CSOs and those most in need of capacity building. 
▪ A guided CSO system, through the implementation of limited expertise, financed by the 
programme, to assist organisations in the preparation of their projects in light of the call for 
proposals. 
 
Below is an analysis of the 2 extremes of the continuum (“Call for proposals” approach vs. the 
approach based on a capacity building programming plan), with an indication of their 
strengths, weakness and associated risks. 
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 Call for Proposals Approach Capacity Building Plan 
STRENGTHS  
▪ A competitive system adapted to EDF procedures that guarantees objectivity and 
transparency in the award of financial support to NSA. 
▪ It prioritises the proposition capacity of organisations and, in principle, their 
excellence. However, this system is only efficient if the organisation has a minimum 
of capacity (technical and administrative) and masters the necessary procedures;  
▪ Approach adapted to the provision of support through NSA  to: 
- Provide civic education and encourage citizens to claim their rights,  
- organisations who monitor government performance, and demand 
that obligations and commitments towards all citizens are fulfilled o 
- local development initiatives 
- Etc 
In this case, as in the framework of a Thematic Programme, the approach is solely 
guided by the “demand”, the ultimate goal being to support NSA through the work 
they do.  
 
▪ The notion of a “programme” that integrates a plethora of diverse and 
complementary actions, aiming to reinforce the organisations and existing 
support systems in the framework of long term objectives, relying on the 
orientation of national poverty reduction strategies; 
▪ The existence of a coherent strategic intervention plan that is adapted to the 
context and the priorities in terms of capacity building; 
▪ The possibility of implanting a progressive process with a gradual autonomy of 
organisations; 
▪ The possibility to implant an iterative process bearing in mind technical 
capacities and dialogue with NSAs wherein the capacity building should follow 
flexible steps that are linked as much to the general political context as to the 
internal dynamics of NSAs; 
▪ The existence of a central cell that acts as much as an information relay of 
NSAs and contacts as an area of capitalisation and interface; 
▪ The possibility to gather a national and international pool of expertise across a 
variety of disciplines according to the needs of the programme; 
▪ The possibility of dedicating the necessary time to experiment in depth with 
new dialogue and inter actor partnering modalities, with a view towards the 
promotion of a sort of collective apprenticeship; 
WEAKNESSES 
AND 
ASSOCIATED 
RISKS 
▪ The “call for proposals” approach, despite its global predisposition, ends by 
prioritising organisations which are solidly established and/or already supported 
and/or have strong experience in the drafting of projects, to the detriment of 
organisations deprived of such support and experience, despite the relevance of the 
organisations and projects presented. The more a selective approach is need, 
bearing in mind the limited means and the existence of a plethora of organisations, 
some very rarely operational, the more an excessive, even restrictive selection risks 
mitigating the impact of the programmes in terms of the number of organisations 
assisted; 
▪ In the absence of a defined strategic plan, the call for proposals approach results in 
the dissipation of isolated, poorly coordinated initiatives and/or an excessive 
concentration on certain themes (notably training to the detriment of other lesser 
▪ If the capacity building plan is not elaborated on the basis of a good 
participative diagnostic, shared by NSAs, and if it is not implemented in 
cooperation with and with the competition of beneficiary organisations, it 
runs the risk of being seen as an external imposition, disconnected from the 
local reality; 
▪ The management of such a plan is more complex than the management of a 
call for proposals and, as such, requires specific skills. In effect, the 
development and implementation of such a plan requires very strong skills on 
the part of the PMU in terms of institutional development, monitoring and 
evaluation, as well as the EDF procedures. By contrast, its implementation also 
relies on the good selection of actors and actions that follow; 
▪ It is often a costly modality. Much hinges on the role of the TA, if it has an 
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known tools) and/or certain geographic regions (notably the capital); 
▪ There are a great number of organisations who are not able to correctly identify 
and precise their demand in terms of capacity building let alone meet the formal 
requirements in terms of project formulation, as directed by the call for proposals. 
Some of these organisations, having succeeded in presenting an acceptable and 
financeable then find problems when it is time to implement the capacity building 
project, bearing in mind the complex needs in terms of technical and financial 
monitoring; 
▪ In terms of the length of project, 12 to 18 months is normally too short a period for 
the implementation of initiatives in the field of capacity building to ensure that 
they have a real impact; 
▪ If there is no differentiation strategy (for families of actors and/or by structural 
level), organisations with a very different vocation and, thus, distinct approaches will 
find themselves “in the same basket” and this despite their various skills and degree 
of institutionalisation; 
▪ In order that the system might perform there needs to be a consolidate “offer” in 
terms of capacity building, an aspect often neglected; 
▪ Calls for proposals often exclude INGOs that partner with local actors, even though 
these have the vocation of “guiding local actors”. In the context where the national 
offer in terms of capacity building is not consolidate, this exclusion will always pose 
problems; 
▪ Capitalisation and Innovation are rarely taken into account; 
▪ NSAs, to obtain funding, often call upon consultancies (that work on the logic of 
“the market”) to prepare their dossiers without there being an appropriation in 
terms of the proposed action. The priority, thus, lies on the level of access to 
financing and not at the level of appropriateness of the action and institutional 
development of the actor. 
▪ Other additional constraints to the participation of NSAs in the call for proposals 
linked to the eligibility criteria and the needs of formulation and presentation of 
request for grants are: 
- PADOR registration requirements.  
 
- The mobilisation of the counterbalance for the sum of the project, due to the 
accompanying role and not just an administrative management role, then the 
costs are justified by the results that the programme could attain (e.g. a 
component reinforcing the capacities directly managed under the service 
contract and not via the WP); 
▪ Some limits to the management associated with the WP can become 
constraints (length of work programme 12-18 months; financial ceilings, etc.) 
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weak financial capacity of the majority of NSAs; 
- Collecting all of the necessary data for the formulation of actions, notably those 
related to the creation of the action profile; 
- The lack of expertise within the leading teams in the majority of NSAs is a factor 
that limits internal development of the formulation of the project; 
- The lack of financing to rely on outside expertise to assist the heads of an 
organisation in the preparation of a dossier; 
- General ignorance of EC procedures, as well as poor knowledge of the use of 
and difficult access to internet; 
- Tendency to make a proposition corresponding to the maximum budget 
allocated, even if the organisations do not have either the absorption capacity 
of the management capacity; 
- A significant section of NSAs (especially grassroots organisations) do not have a 
bank account and, as a result, cannot provide bank details. Matching the 
financial needs to open a bank account is not possible for a large amount of 
NSAs, particularly the grassroots organisations. 
 
Of course, in the light of the above analysis, one must ask if the call for proposals is the tool best 
suited to the implementation of capacity building activities. The experiences of the 9th EDF 
showed how the adoption of such a tool but, above all, the approach and underlying logic, often 
include the distortion of the programme, and risks ending in the dissipation of isolated and 
poorly coordinated initiatives, according to the logic true of the micro-realisations programmes 
from the “time before Cotonou” and/or thematic programmes that prioritise individual projects. 
It is equally true that recent experiences have shown, for example under the ARIANE 
programme in Mali (following its strategic reorientation), the CSSP programme in Uganda 
(based on a mixed approach) and in Ethiopia (based on a confirmed will to place projects in a 
larger programming context), that the call for proposals may be adapted to the needs of 
capacity building of NSAs on the condition that they are considered as a tool and not an end in 
themselves.  
 
5.3. Concrete experiences and lessons learnt from the adoption of the capacity 
building plan 
 
As concerns the experimentation of the “capacity building plan” some programmes have started 
to adopt it. These are, primarily, the programmes of Angola and Mali, whereas the programmes 
in Niger, Guinea and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the activities linked to this tool have 
only just been launched. At this point in time, therefore, we have only limited information for 
the programmes mentioned. 
The first results linked to the programmes in Angola and Mali can still provide precious 
information on the basis of the trends that have emerged several months after the application 
of this capacity building modality. In general, the adoption of a “capacity building plan” has 
been hailed positively by the NSAs as, firstly, it is adapted to their needs in the sense of an 
optimised targeting of their needs in terms of capacity building and, secondly, it involves far less 
competition. 
The experience has shown, across the board, that at least 5 conditions need to be present in 
order for the tool to be effective. 
• The first condition is that such a tool needs an in depth knowledge of the NSAs and 
their context, as well as their capacity building needs and the stakes they raise. This 
presupposes the availability of a series of up to date information on NSAs, which is 
linked to the second condition. 
• In effect, the availability of this information cannot be left to chance, but must be the 
result of an intensive activity focused on understanding the reality of the social 
dynamics that characterise the NSAs of any given country. This of course requires a 
significant investment in personnel and a system that is often difficult to implement, 
consisting of reliance on non state actors at the regional level with a role of 
correspondent to the programme. In Angola and Mali, without a significant personnel 
investment on the part of the PMU, the two programmes were effectively forced to 
resort to organisations active on a regional level that guaranteed an in depth knowledge 
of the dynamics of NSAs and, above all, their capacity building needs. 
• The third condition required for the capacity building plan to work is represented by, on 
the one hand, a strong attitude on the part of the PMU to communication and ensure 
comprehension of the novelty of the tool and the difference with the call for 
proposals and, on the other, to explain the need for a proactive role within the PMU 
in the definition of the annual priorities in terms of capacity building. 
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• As regards the fourth condition, it is necessary that the PMU has not only a programme 
management and human resources management role, but also one for guiding the 
dynamism and the actors. 
• Finally, the fifth requires the PMU to have the necessary technical skills to work with 
the capacity building plan tool. These skills can, obviously, be available both at the 
international and national short term level upon which the PMU may rely. However, for 
that to happen the adequate resources must be foreseen. 
 
5.4. Concrete experiences and lesson learnt from the adaptation of the ”Call for 
proposals” mechanism 
 
As affirmed in the previous paragraph, the “call for proposals” tool must, above all, be adapted 
as much to the context as to the nature of the capacity building programmes under the 9th EDF. 
In essence, one must, on the one hand, ensure that the call for proposals does not adopt the 
logic of the micromanagement programmes from the pre-Cotonou days and, on the other, that 
the competition is open to all types and levels of structures among the collective actors. 
One example of a successful adaptation was recently undertaken by the ARIANE programme in 
Mali, through a better definition of the guidelines (on the level of eligible themes) and a focus 
on the call for proposals on the basis of the beneficiary. It is thus that call for proposals 3 was 
addressed solely to grass roots organisations and intermediary and guiding organisations, even 
though call for proposals  4, launched at the same time as 3, had, as potential beneficiaries, 
umbrella organisations alone (www.ariane-ml.org). 
Another example of the adaptation of the tool to proposals to avoid the risk of the 
“micromanagement” effect is linked to the PASOC experience in Niger. In effect, the programme 
was able to define the grant through the theme of capacity building. In this sense, the funded 
action is not only defined as an instrument for guiding the actor through the capacity building 
process, but is equally able to resort to physical investments on the condition that they do not 
surpass 20% of eligible costs. 
Of course the role of these guidelines in the adaptation of the call for proposals for the 
achievement of capacity building actions becomes primordial as this document can orient the 
possible beneficiaries in the conception thereof. Again the PASOC programme in Niger 
illustrates, in a very pertinent and efficient way, the problems of physical achievements, as 
mentioned below. 
 
Two pertinent examples of the guiding lines of the CP in Niger 
 
 
The development of a green space contributes to the achievement of the duty to the environment but is 
not, in itself, an activity for the promotion of this duty. By contrast, undertaking sensitization and 
awareness raising activities are eligible. Thus, the development of a green space, conceived as a 
sensitization and pedagogical tool for information and awareness arising on the duty to the 
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environment is eligible. 
A street cleaning activity, taken on its own, is not in itself a civic education activity and thus, is ineligible. 
It becomes however eligible when it is the conceived as a starting point, or is even the result of IEC   
activities around the benefits of an improved lifestyle and the need for each citizen to contribute to it. 
This action can also include lobbying activities towards the authorities for public action on waste 
collection and treatment. 
 
5.4.1. The question of grassroots organisations 
The question of grassroots organisations deserves elaboration, as the problem these 
organisations face with the “Call for Proposals” mechanism is twofold: 
▪ One the one hand, the problem involves access to the programme’s information and 
resources about the call for proposals; in other words, do the grassroots organisations 
have access to the information and are they, moreover, able to prepare their proposals 
according to the standards dictated by EC? 
▪ On the other hand, there is the problem of the will and availability of private 
companies (in case of externalised direct labour operations), or Contract and Finance  
services within the Delegations and National Authorising Officers ECD/NAO (in the 
case of direct labour operations or even externalised direct labour operations whereby 
grant contracts are signed as specific commitments, thus falling outside the 
Programme-Estimates) to take on the risk (notably as concerns private companies) 
and/or manage these micro-grants considering the burden of work that this entails. 
As regards the first question (access to information and the capacity to draft these proposals 
according to the criteria), the experience led under these programmes shows that if there is not 
an adaptation in the CP tool (which would involve an infringement of the procedures and 
standard forms) it is very likely that this organisations will, without a doubt, face exclusion. In 
order to lessen this, certain programmes, such as those in Mali, Niger and Guinea, have put in 
place call for proposal systems adapted to the idiosyncrasy of the grassroots organisations. 
  
 
The question of the eligibility of the Niger grassroots organisations  
In Niger we attempted to resolve the question of eligibility as regards grassroots organisations that do 
not have, at their disposal, statutes or official papers (for example the receipt of their registration with 
the local authorities). In essence, the question for these grassroots organisations is the weakness of 
their legal status, often nonexistent on a formal level, even if the organisation is made up a dozen 
members and has been doing business for quite some time. 
The solution identified in Niger was that of demanding organisations as yet deprived of statutes and 
receipts for a simple statement of existence written out by the mayor. As concerns the bank account, it 
is satisfactory that two members of the organisation open a bank account in their name into which the 
funds from the grant can be paid. 
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A second possibility, also used by several programmes, is to limit the sums to grants of €10,000, 
which allows a bypass of the standard call for proposal procedures, even resorting to a 
simplified competitive procedure for the granting of funds. The example of Promotion Funds in 
the framework of the programme in Uganda, or the funds for supporting local initiatives in 
terms of social entrepreneurship in the framework of the programme in Zambia represent 
examples of this eventuality. 
As concerns the second question; namely the will and ability, within the Consultancies as well as 
the Delegations and NAO services, to take on the risks and workload for management of these 
micro-grants, a solution could be that of regrouping the projects through the bias of a cascading 
financing system (“Block Grants”), a mechanism that has already been tested by other donors 
and technical partners22. Unfortunately this formula remains underdeveloped in the framework 
of European cooperation, and strict limits exist in terms of the sums allowed (with a maximum 
of €100,000 allowed per grant and a maximum of €10,000 per delegated grant). 
 
 
The Block Grant system.  
The experience acquired by a number of donors 
Lately, some technical and financial partners, including donor organisations from countries such as 
Sweden or Norway, have experimented with a new approach, block grant financing, which aims to 
reach grassroots organisations indirectly, through the financing of intermediary organisations. It is 
these intermediary organisations which in turn finance, with the funds received, a certain number of 
organisations as sub beneficiaries. 
Once more, as mentioned in relation to the common financing mechanism (pool funding), in light of the 
recent genesis of this modality in terms of capacity building, it is premature to assess their relevance, 
efficiency and impact. The experiences are still relatively limited and, to the present day, one single 
evaluation (to our knowledge) of this modality was carried by SIDA (Swedish International 
Development Agency), in the framework of its Civil Society Support Programme in Ethiopia. The 
programme, conceived as a pilot programme, financed nine umbrella organisations, which in turn 
financed grassroots organisations (a total of 155) established around the more vulnerable groups in 
Ethiopia (street children orphans and vulnerable children, the sick infected with AIDS, victims of 
dangerous traditional practices etc.). 
According to the evaluation the programme was a success, as much in terms of results acquired on the 
ground as from the point of view of the block grant financing modality and the relation between 
umbrella organisations (acting with the double role of financiers and guides) and the beneficiary 
grassroots organisations (their propositions having been selected from a call for proposals). 
In terms of the first result, it is clear that this modality allows access to grassroots actors who would, 
otherwise, be distanced, even neglected, the reasons being either their isolation and lack of 
information on the financing possibilities, often accessible in the capital, or their lack of skills for the 
preparation of solid proposals, acceptable from the point of view of the donor procedures, or lastly 
because of the reduced nature of their projects, often underneath the financial floors of fixed by donor 
                                                 
22 It is already a consolidated modality in terms of the fight against AIDS (this is the approach of UNAIDS, for example, 
for the financing of micro-projects emanating from civil society through the provision of block grants to a number of 
umbrella organisations) and for INGO  financing micro-projects 
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organisations. 
In terms of the second result (that of the relationship between umbrella organisations and the 
grassroots organisations benefiting from block grant financing), we are somewhat more reserved on 
the pertinence, efficiency and potential impact of this modality, bearing in mind the associated risks. 
On the one hand the disbursement of funds to these umbrella organisations for their ultimate 
distribution entails the risk of transforming these organisations into donor organisations, all the while 
distancing them from their vocations and primary mandates. On the other hand, the conflicts can 
appear due the fact that only the member organisations of the umbrella organisation are eligible for 
financing, which represents a form of discrimination vis-a-vis capable and eligible organisations which 
do not belong to the umbrella organisations. The criteria for access to funding, as well as the selection 
procedures, therefore become a fundamental aspect that necessitates prior reflexion. Thirdly, such a 
mechanism can accentuate competition between the organisations, to the detriment of their 
cooperation. Lastly, when efficient accountability mechanisms (notably of the umbrella organisations 
towards its constituency) are absent, there is a risk of falling into a clientele logic, thereby transforming 
relations between the umbrella organisation and its members into a quest for financing, thus inverting 
accountability relationships and distorting bases for legitimacy.   
 
 
A final solution to answer this second question is that of counting indirectly on grassroots 
organizations, through national and international organizations with a mandate and mission to 
support grassroots capacity building. In this scenario well established organizations, 
experienced in guiding grassroots organisations (in this sense referring to NGOs or other 
national CSOs with a guiding vocation, with the committees and federative organizations 
integrating capacity building into their mission as well as international NGOs considered as 
important vectors for the support of grassroots organizations) propose, in cooperation with the 
grassroots organizations, capacity building programmes, for which they would become 
responsible and which they would manage. Differing from the cascading financing system 
(which involves a system for delegated financing), in this scenario the organizations work as 
much as intermediaries managing, on behalf of the grassroots organizations with these 
organizations as beneficiaries, the capacity building initiatives. 
5.4.2. Some operational conclusions on the use of the call for proposals tool 
Finally, and by way of a conclusion, hereafter a series of lessons learned on the call for 
proposals tool are presented, elaborated by the Ethiopian Civil Society Support Programme, 
which could well serve for an adaptation of the tool on the basis of the definition of 
management and the parameters as much as on the procedure (restricted vs open call, scope of 
the grants, length of project, eligibility of NGOs, workload etc.) 
  
 
Lessons learnt from the use of the CfP mechanism in the CSF in Ethiopia
23
 
 
                                                 
23 Drafted on the basis of the matrix « CfP parameters final » elaborated by the CSF PMU in Ethiopia.  
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Restricted vs 
open CfP (1 
or 2 phases) 
• Restricted CfP (2 phases) has advantage that less work for applicants and evaluation committee. 
Full proposals only need to be drafted by and assessed for short-listed applicants. Disadvantage is 
time frame. It is unrealistic to finalise a restricted CfP (from launching to award of contracts) in 
less than 9 months.    
Regional 
alllocations 
• An open CfP without regional ear-marking probably results in many CSOs investing much in full 
proposals with only limited funding available. This could give rise to serious criticism, e.g. if grant 
size was same as previously and only 5 to 10 projects were awarded following an open, 
nationwide CfP. If funds were ear-marked for a limited number of regions only and/or only 
national projects, open CfP could be implemented, though it may still not be preferable. 
 
• Principles of the large CfPs so far: 2006: No regional earmarking; best overall projects won. 2007: 
Targeted lots to address under-served regions & objectives. 2008: Regional lots. For CfP 2009: 
Only 1.3 MEURo, thus regional lots (of same size) only possible for 1 project @ 100 
KEURO/region.  
 
• Disadvantages of regional allocations: Spreading resources too thinly; lower capacity in some 
regions means lower quality projects are funded; regionalisation may disincentive networking 
across regions; difficulty in justifying size of regional envelops. Advantages: CSF displaying 
coverage in all regions.  
  
Wider/Narro
wer 
objectives 
• The wider the objectives, the less advisable it would seem to have an open CfP since number of 
proposals would presumably be higher and thus more CSOs would invest much resources in vain. 
Narrowing down the objectives potentially reduces the number of applicants, thus making an 
open CfP more feasible, if at all considered. 
• The CfP can be targeted/earmarked regionally, as well as in terms of sectoral objectives. A 
regional targeting (if less than all regions were targeted) would be a narrowing of objectives. A 
different scenario would be to limit the number of eligible regions but allow for wide objectives in 
terms of sub-sectors.  
• Financing Agreement is broad frame; authority with PSC to phrase objectives for each CfP. 
Wide/open objectives allow submission of diversity of applications but results in dispersed 
mosaic of projects. The narrower the objectives, the more coherent the portfolio, but with other 
areas under-served. New legislative environment might influence decision, i.e. support for 
adaptation to CSO law, or support to specific intervention areas (which might be conceived as 
legal in the CSF framework but might be difficult to fund under other programmes). PSC could 
also prioritise activity areas by analysing the focuses of previous CSF projects and by taking into 
account current topical NSA needs. E.g., apart from support to PANE/CTF, no actions aimed at 
producing expected results of improved coordination and networking amongst NSA supported so 
far. Also, despite relevance, no direct actions/projects for conflict transformation supported. PSC 
could narrow CfP to these themes and also earmark selected regions. 
Project 
duration 
• It takes longer to implement a restricted CfP process, since it involves one additional round of 
evaluation, drafting of evaluation report, notification of applicants etc. Thus, the longer the CfP 
process, the shorter the period of implementation becomes, if grants are to finalise and be closed 
by a certain date, e.g. the end date of the TAU contract. 
• CSF experience that projects/organisations in peripheral and emerging regions often have 
comparably lesser capacity and often face external challenges that affect timely 
implementation as per agreed schedule. Thus, they need more time and more support both for 
start-up and implementation. Projects in peripheral regions should thus be of adequate duration 
to avoid problems in implementation and failure to implement within the allocated time.. 
• If the CfP in general, or individual projects specifically, had a limited objective, the project 
duration could be shorter, e.g. 12-18 months. In the current context, such a scenario could be 
considered e.g. for projects to support adaptation of CSOs to the new legislative environment. 
Since the adaptation has to happen rapidly, short durations could be deemed appropriate. For 
any project design that is more complex, however, from a technical and programme 
management perspective durations of less than 18 months are not deemed appropri. 
• From TAU experience, even if tax/duty issue is solved, ideal duration of grants so far are 18-24 
months. < 18 months is difficult for CSO projects, as start-up is always delayed. 24 months > 
encourages slow implementation. Extensions of 15-30% of time are common; closure period of at 
least 5-6 months is realistic. Current TAU contract ends Dec 2011. Thus, 2-phased CfP launched in 
April 2009 could only support 18 months projects extension project if TAU support was required 
until end of programme. Alternative would be extension of TAU contract (using FA contingency.)  
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.    
Eligibility of 
INGO ; 
former 
grantees 
• Especially in peripheral regions, the number of CSOs with a strong presence is limited. Thus, if 
previous grantees are to be made in-eligible for further funding, this would be reduction of the 
number of (relatively) capacitated potential applicants and might give rise to weak projects being 
funded for inadequately capacitated CSOs. Also, some CSF projects specifically aim at establishing 
institutions in such regions. Disallowing the possibility for continued funding could jeopardise the 
very presence of these institutions. One of findings of the 2008 NSA Mapping was about the 
emergence of various regional NSA networks. For maximum coverage and effect the new call 
could focus on these NSA structures. . 
• If Capacity Building of local CSOs through/by INGOs was an objective, than INGOs should be 
eligible to be lead applicants. Eligibility of previous grantees has to be considered for specific 
objectives to be defined for the CfP. If an objective was, e.g. to continue supporting CSO fora that 
have been supported within the CSF framework so far (regional - APDF, SPDF; or sectoral - CTF), 
then previous grantees should be eligible for funding under the 2009 CfP.  
• 2006 and 2007 CfPs allowed INGOs as lead applicants; 2008 did not. Technically, excluding 
INGOs reduces opportunities to use INGO capacity for implementation and CB of LNGOs. 
Politically, "nationalisation" of the CSF may be seen as positive. Eligibility of previous grantees as 
lead applicants was not allowed in 2008. Technically, it robs CSF of opportunity to "reward" 
positive cases and continue support to good initiatives. Politically, benefiting a wider group may 
be seen as positive.   
  
2009 Small 
grants ? 
• It takes longer to implement the entire CfP process, if a small grants CfP was to precede the 
large grants CfP. A combination of launching a small grants CfP and a restricted CfP would be the 
lengthiest procedure; while omitting a small grants CfP and implementing an open CfP would be 
the quickest procedure.  
• Small grants in 2008 were instrumental in providing information and training in all regions, 
including the periphery, to enable submission of an adequate number of satisfactory proposals. 
TAU can organise such events, if adequate budget is provided to TAU. If the number of regions 
eligible under the CfP were to be limited, the CfP for Small Grants could also be limited to 
projects in those regions and/or the TAU activity (and budget) to organise such events could be 
limited. 
• In 2006 and 2008, small grants were used to prepare the ground for large grants CfP through 
info&training. Procedurally, these are service agreements camouflaged as grants. Advantage: 
More CSOs build capacity through participation in EC CfP procedure and project implementation. 
Disadvantage: Huge administrative burden for limited output. Adds another 4-5 months to CfP 
process. Alternative would be to have TAU organise info&training sessions; TAU budget for this 
would have to be made available.    
  
Grant size 
• If the CfP in general, or individual projects specifically, had a limited objective, the grant size 
could also be limited. E.g., if grants had the exclusive objective of supporting adaptation to the 
new CSO legislation, a limited amount per organisation might suffice, as additional staff costs and 
mobility costs as well as duration might be limited. However, the capacity of EC (especially FCS) 
to administer a large number of grants will have to be taken into consideration in determining 
grant size. If objectives were to be similar to the 2006-2008 CfP objectives, the TAU would advise 
against a grant size of less than 100 KEURO. 
• If the CfP in general, or individual projects specifically, had a limited objective and a 
correspongly limited grant size, the project duration could also be limited. The less complex and 
smaller in terms of funding projects are, the shorter the duration necessary to implement them. 
For the type of projects supported so far, TAU would advise against project durations of less than 
18 months. However, should the PSC decide on limited objectives and grant sizes, durations could 
subsequently be shorter.  
• Grant sizes so far have been < 100 KEURO - 200/250 KEURO >. Smaller grant sizes are less 
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efficient (as core costs for staff and office e.g. are multiplied) and cause high transaction costs at 
TAU and EC levels. Grants below 100 KEURO carry more risk for EC as no intermediate payment, 
thus less monitoring and control. Smaller grant sizes satisfy needs of less capacitated CSOs and 
stand-alone projects but also discourage networking and collaboration with other CSO.  
   
Subgranting 
• The objective to cover all regions of Ethiopia with this CfP while limited funding is available 
could be ensured if sub-granting to a fixed number of regions in different lots was made 
mandatory. Thus, organisations would have to find subgrantees oin the respective regions. 
However, the amount per region/sub-grantee would be rather limited (subgrant size of 10 
KEURO max). 
• Subgranting could be an option to support narrower objectives for a larger number of CSOs. 
E.g. more capacitated CSOs could thus be entrusted with on-granting smaller amounts to less 
capacitated CSOs to facilitate the latter's adaptation measures. With wider objectives, 
subgranting has so far not been seen as a favourite solution as it entails a loss of control of the 
Contracting Authority. 
• Subgranting could be an option to expedite implementation, thus allowing to implement 
projects with limited duration. However, as sub-granting also increases the complexity of 
projects, only well capacitated organisations should be entrusted with the responsibility for such 
sub-granting. Since the sub-grants can each only be up to 10 KEURO, this tool is relevant only for 
very narrowly defined objectives.  
• INGOs with their established capacity could arguably play a role in sub-granting as 
intermediary organisations. Sub-granting could also be an option to support partnerships and 
networks established within previous CSF projects; hence, there could be a link between 
eligibility of previous grantees and sub-granting. However, allocating the responsibility for sub-
granting to one of many partners could also lead to disturbing/disrupting established 
partnerships. 
• Sub-granting can be used as a tool to allocate management responsibility to intermediary 
organisations (lead applicants). Within their grants, they on-grant parts of the project budget to 
subgrantees. Thus, projects of larger size can be supported while the number of contracts to be 
managed by EC remains lower. 
• Re/Sub-granting is allowable as per PRAG for up to 10x up to 10 KEURO each. PSC decided 
against in past, wanting more time to assess possibility. Advantage: Greater # of CSOs benefit 
from CSF programme; permits support to activities of limited scope. Disadvantage: Risk increases 
as EC loses control of decision whom to support and how to monitor. 
  
Programme 
mangement 
ressources 
• While a two-phased CfP is a lighter burden on applicants, evaluaton committee members and 
external assessors, it creates greater work load for the Chair of the evaluation committee. In 
terms of timeline, a two-phased procedure takes longer, thus the award of grants will be closer to 
the end of the TAU contract than with a 1-phase CfP. 
• While a spread over many/all regions places demand on programme management in terms of 
monitoring, this can be maintained with the current TAU contract. 
• While narrower objectives would create "economies of scale" in terms of technical assistance 
to grantees, TAU and EC are used to and coping well with the wide portfolio of objectives of 
current CSF contracts. 
• A two-phased CfP takes min 9 months, a 1-phase 6 months. Closure of projects takes approx. 6 
months. To support projects of 18 months without extension, a 2-phase CfP would have to be 
launched in April 2009. Only shorter durations are possible with later launch dates. Projects could 
be supported/closed after Dec 2011 if TAU contract was extended. 
• INGOs have demonstrated their value in 2006 CSF grants. From a technical point of view, 
nothing supports their exclusion. In terms of programme management, it is preferable to allow 
previous grantees to participate; both b/c they will bring increased capacity and also as an 
incentive to successfully implement 2006/7 projects. 
• Small grants place a relatively heavy management burden on TAU and EC (including evaluation 
committee). If regional info sessions were to be considered indispensable, TAU could facilitate 
these without small grants. However, TAU does not have resources for trainings/help desks. 
• For programme management, a miniscule grant creates almost an equal amount of work to a 
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huge grant. Thus, it is preferable if grants are not too small.  
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6.  PROGRAMME MONITORING AND EVALUATION SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES 
The question of monitoring and evaluation systems and process for NSA support programmes 
is a crucial question, as much for the comprehension of the effects of the programme 
activities, following its completion, on the associative dynamism as for the possibility of 
reorienting a programme still underway. 
The problem present is characterised by a double difficulty: on the one hand the NSA support 
programmes have dealings with social dynamics that are very hard to measure and on the 
other hand there is no history or tradition of previous Community intervention and the 
experience from which one may take inspiration. 
To this it must be added that the adoption of the project logic, and not the process logic, as 
would be advisable, by a good number of the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF 
often involved the utilisation of monitoring and evaluation systems that were not at all 
appropriate. These systems indeed were based on indicators conceived to measure the 
pertinence, efficiency, efficacy, impact and viability of the completed activity or to be 
undertaken without taking the actor into consideration. 
As such, the NSA capacity building support programmes in the Cotonou agreement should 
base themselves primarily on accompaniment of the actor towards its roles, like that of the 
dialogue, which have nothing, or very little to do, with the completion of the action. In 
summary, the risk is always that of adopting the typical programme logic of micro-
management, even in the monitoring and evaluation. 
In reality, the major difficulty to focus the evaluation on a process and not on an action, in 
terms of NSA capacity building, is that the process only becomes meaningful in the mid-long 
term. This contrasts with the need of the monitoring and evaluation exercise, which 
necessitates immediate intervention, often during the implementation of a programme. 
Nevertheless, these arguments do not justify the fact that monitoring and evaluation 
systems were rarely adopted by the NSA support programmes under the 9th EDF. 
 
6.1. The situation for 9th EDF programmes 
Indeed, in terms of monitoring and evaluation systems, only 10% of programmes analysed had 
any internal systems (on the scale of M&E plans and tools and/or on the scale of a specialist 
position within the PMU) as noted in the graph below.  
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In 5% of cases, the systems are in the process of elaboration (notably in the framework of the 
programmes that are still in a relatively preliminary phase, but also in the framework of the 
more advanced programmes where the needs in terms of internal monitoring were often 
raised following the midterm evaluation or following a ROM mission) and in another 5% of 
cases the systems, even when foreseen, have not yet been implemented. 
What is relatively worrying is that nearly half of the programmes do not have, and did not plan 
for such a system, beyond the standard reporting procedures (technical and financial reports 
of the TA, technical and financial reports of the grantee organisations in the framework of the 
calls for proposal etc).  
However, the team was able to identify a number of innovative experiences in terms of the 
monitoring and evaluation that deserve to be capitalised, notably because of the complexity of 
monitoring such capacity building programmes which, as already mentioned several times in 
this document, have proven to be vast and complex endeavours, oriented towards the 
promotion of profound changes that go far beyond the immediately tangible results. One can 
refer oneself, for example, to the matrix system used by the CSF in Ethiopia to link the 
anticipated results of the funded projects to the global results envisaged by the programme; to 
the monitoring database developed in Tanzania, which allowed a real time monitoring of the 
results of the programme or to the organisational capacity assessment approach of beneficiary 
organisations (before and after the activity) used by the CSP in Uganda, among others. 
 
 
About the M&E systems set up by the NSA support programmes in Tanzania an Ethiopia  
The NSA support programme in Tanzania has developed a M&E system, which links the log-frame with 
activities planned and realized for each result area. Such a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation 
system has been put in place to track the progress of programme implementation and to quickly 
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identify any aspects of the programme approach that might need to be reviewed. The system aims at 
keeping track of intervention activities, ensuring that the approved work-plan is adhered to, and 
records details such as the location of events, the topics covered and the number and type of NSAs 
participating. As activities are carried out, often by consultants, the information contained in their 
reports is entered into the monitoring data base 
 
 
The CSF in Ethiopia has developed, as part of its M&E plan,  a specific CSF reporting matrix (as part of 
the M&E plan. All grantees are required to annex the CSF reporting matrix to each interim report 
submitted to the programme. This generates a body of data which is invaluable to the CSF in analysis the 
impact that it is making in specific result areas. The five results of the CSF have been extrapolated for 
the purposes of the matrix into 8 monitoring themes, under which each of the grantees and their 
partners are expected to provide information, as indicated below: 
  
Question  Monitoring Theme                              Key Indicator 
What impact has the CSF made on…?        CSO Visibility                       Increased Profile of CSO in Public 
Arena 
What impact has the CSF made on…?          Consultation of CS in Policy & Planning Increased inclusion of CSOs 
in decision making processes on policy and delivery 
What impact has the CSF made on…?           Involvement of CS in service delivery Increased participation of 
CSOs in service delivery to Ethiopians 
What impact has the CSF made on…?          Government-CSO partnership on rights Increased number of 
government-civil society partnerships to address rights 
What impact has the CSF made on…?    Increased awareness of rights  Increased awareness raising of rights 
among public 
What impact has the CSF made on…?   CS Networking                                         Increased and stronger 
partnerships and networking amongst CSOs 
What impact has the CSF made on…? Constituency Accountability                    Improved accountability to 
and consultation with target constituency by CSOs 
 
What impact has the CSF made on…? CSO Sustainability                                     Improved institutional 
capacity and resource management 
 
 
 
6.2. Impact Indicators 
All monitoring and evaluation systems must be based on the selection of a battery of impact 
indicators through which to observe and identify the changes induced by the programme. As 
such, in an NSA support programme, the fundamental question is to understand, in order to 
have any idea of the results and subsequent impact of the project, what needs and can be 
measured. 
While the logical framework, particularly on the level of the results obtained, can orient an 
evaluation exercise, the difficulty remains that of resolving the contradiction of immediately 
measuring what is not the completion of an action but a process, which needs to be analysed 
from a mid-to-long term perspective. 
Being concerned with changes that are linked to social dynamics, by nature notoriously hard 
to measure and master, the evaluation exercise must take into consideration the impact 
indicators that could be pertinent with the themes which are the object of the programme 
intervention, namely NSA capacity building. 
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Indeed, measuring the impact of an NSA capacity building programme starting with the 
changes produced in the social or political context in which these NSAs operate runs the risk of 
being a useless exercise, seeing as it is almost impossible to establish the direct causality links 
between the programme and the NSA beneficiaries and between the NSA beneficiaries and 
the social reality. 
The paradox would be to attach to a programme, the objective of which is the reinforcement 
of NSAs so that they can better fulfil their role as regards the socio-political context, changes 
which have nothing, or very little to do with it, as for example the reduction of cases of 
poverty, or the diminution of school re-sits, or the amelioration of the sanitary conditions of 
populations. 
Even if the analysis of the 40 programmes has shown how the research in this domain was still 
in its early steps, a possible path for experimentation could be found in the application of 
impact indicators on the institutional and organisational changes produced within the 
beneficiary organisations. To this end, the time fact is decisive, seeing as the changes could 
not be measure until 6-12 months after the end of the support programme received by the 
organisation. 
In order to do this it is important, as the experience within the Ugandan programme shows 
(although DRC and Niger will also be true soon enough), to undertake an institutional 
diagnostic of the beneficiary organisation both before and after the receipt of support. 
 
 
 
The use of innovative tools such as OCA in the CSCBP in Uganda 
A first capacity assessment exercise was conducted for the first 33 grantees as well as at a later stage for 
the 16 grantees which were contracted later. This exercise was conducted by intermediary organisations 
using the Organisational Capacity Assessment Tool on which they had been trained by the PMU. A 
second OCA was conducted at the end of the programme, implemented by an external consultant.   
 
This allowed: 
ii) To make a comparison between the capacity of the grantees as reflected in  OCA 1 and the 
capacity as assessed in OCA 2.   
iii) To identify facilitating and inhibiting factors for the progress of each organization 
iv) To recommend further specific changes needed to strengthen each grantee. 
v) To identify the best methodologies to use for CB  
 
Pros Cons 
The OCA process enabled the CSCBP to crystallize on the priority capacity gaps and needs The OCA 
was undertaken by IOs and there is uncertainty as to whether it captured and presented priorities for 
all the grantees. Key concern is that grantees presented gaps in context of qualifying to participate in 
the CSCBP programme and tended to “shy” away from disclosing other institutional capacity gaps. 
The capacity building effort prepared grantees to become effective implementers of the CSCBP
 Grantee specific needs were not adequately 
attended to partly due to shortcomings of the IOs, but also, due to lack of follow up actions either by 
PMU or IOs. 
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Grantees benefited from the OCA as it revealed some of the gaps that would otherwise not be 
recognized (e.g., internal administrative  and governance issues) Some of the trainings focused on 
CSCBP procedures and requirements (e.g., proposal writing, log-frame development), as such, grantees 
are not able to directly apply them elsewhere. 
 
 
It is important to underline the fact that in this perspective the interest does not need to be 
exclusively centred on the changes brought within the organisation, but also on the changes 
that have been programmed. In this sense, an organisation that has programmed for the 
review of its internal organisation to be more efficient in its action is without doubt an 
element that needs to be taken into account in the evaluation exercise, even if the changes 
have not yet taken place. 
It is evident that this process cannot, at least for the time being, bring about univocal 
solutions, considering the existing rift between the time requirements of the evaluation and 
the temporal context in which the social process operates. The objective in every case cannot 
ever be that of “grasping” the reality, but to get closer to it, thus bridging the gap between 
the CB discourse and strategies and the current facts. This is the great contribution that the 
epistemology of social sciences has provided to all of those who try to read and interpret the 
changes promoted and channelled by social processes, an epistemology where the theme of 
support to NSAs needs to be included. 
In addition, on the methodological scale the impact evaluation exercise is even harder, due, on 
hand, to the fact that it is not possible to use “proxy indicators” and, on the other hand, as a 
result of the disruption of the evaluation logic which characterises NSA capacity building 
interventions. 
 
 An innovative evaluation tool : ouctcome mapping 
http://www.idrc.ca/ 
Outcome Mapping focuses on one particular category of results - changes in the behaviour of people, 
groups, and organizations with whom a program works directly. These changes are called "outcomes." 
Through Outcome Mapping, development programs can claim contributions to the achievement of 
outcomes rather than claiming the achievement of development impacts. Although these outcomes, in 
turn, enhance the possibility of development impacts, the relationship is not necessarily one of direct 
cause and effect. Instead of attempting to measure the impact of the program's partners on 
development, Outcome Mapping concentrates on monitoring and evaluating its results in terms of the 
influence of the program on the roles these partners play in development.  
 
Defining outcomes as "changes in behaviour" emphasizes that, to be effective, development research 
programs must go further than information creation and dissemination; they must actively engage 
development actors in the adaptation and application. Such engagement means that partners will derive 
benefit and credit for fulfilling their development roles whereas development programs will be credited 
with their contributions to this process. With Outcome Mapping, programs identify the partners with 
whom they will work and then devise strategies to help equip their partners with the tools, techniques, 
and resources to contribute to the development process. Focusing monitoring and evaluation on 
changes in partners also illustrates that, although a program can influence the achievement of 
outcomes, it cannot control them because ultimate responsibility for change rests with its boundary 
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partners, and their partners and other actors. The desired changes are not prescribed by the 
development program; rather, Outcome Mapping provides a framework and vocabulary for 
understanding the changes and for assessing efforts aimed at contributing to them.  
 
6.3. The disruption of the evaluation logic: when failure turns into success 
It is not rare for NSA support programmes to assess a number of actions in terms of failures 
when in reality they should be deemed real successes, as much for the programme as for the 
beneficiary organisation. Indeed, the course of capacity building, especially when it touches on 
fundamental internal organisational and leadership issues, is not always linear. Often, progress 
is not attained without tense internal discussions, tensions and conflicts. As such, the 
strengthening of organisations frequently encompasses situation of crisis. 
Yet the question is still that of the temporal aspect, as the result of the evaluation exercise will 
ultimately depend on the specific moment at which it is carried out. If the exercise takes place 
during the internal discussion phase of the organisation, one might be tempted to see the 
programme as a failure, and not a success. In reality, one can never know in the short term 
whether the actions of a reinforcement programme have produced the expected results or 
not. 
As an example, one can criticise the case of support to Malian umbrella organisations under 
the ARIANE programme for the creation of a web portal destined for the totality of CSOs, for 
which a sum had been foreseen in the PE. Yet, because of difficulties, the web portal could not 
be realised and the programme management preferred instead to avoid the discussions 
thereon. 
In this case the evaluation analysis would have two options: either consider the action as a 
failure or take into account the positivity of the internal debate of the organisations on the 
necessity of a fundamental communication tool for representing its activities and even 
establishing partnerships outside the country. 
The solution is a mere question of the point of view; on the one hand it is undeniable that the 
action was not realised and the resources remained unused; on the other the debate and 
confrontation undertaken within the umbrella organisations can be considered as a 
fundamental asset, as much for the knowledge that they developed on the importance of 
communication tools over the web, as for the fact that all of the umbrella organisations active 
on the national level finally found themselves united over a common issue, something not 
among their normal habits. 
In reality, it cannot be forgotten that the goal of this action was to build capacity in terms of 
the Malian umbrella organisations’ communication through the creation of a web portal for 
civil society. Yet we do not know if this initiative will be realised before the end of the ARIANE 
programme, through to its support and resources, or if it will be realised in a few years through 
to the dynamism that was created around the initiative. 
Once more the evaluation requires as much time as possible but, above all, to face the 
dynamics and processes and not the isolated actions that run the risk of being misinterpreted 
and, as such, misevaluated. A capacity building action evaluated today as a failure, as the 
corresponding funding in the PE was not used, can by contrast be considered, tomorrow, as a 
very positive action, and a success thanks to the dynamism unleashed by the programme. 
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6.4. Taking into account the “inferred effects” or the “unexpected effects” 
The question of the dynamics unleashed represents an ulterior challenge for the evaluation. In 
effect, an NSA support programme intervenes in a complex context where one cannot know all 
of the implications linked to social dynamics. 
Sometimes there are effects that are not considered and, by contrast, prove to be of 
significant importance regarding the goals of NSA capacity building. These are effects that can 
be defined as “inferred effects” or “unexpected effects”. 
In this framework one can cite the case of a Central African organisation supported a few years 
ago by an EU NGO through the bias of a capacity building programme that foresaw a strategic 
planning exercise. This strategic planning exercise, at the time, provoked a very hard conflict 
within the organisation (a small development NGO) and, in particular, between the founding 
leaders. The internal dissidence that was unleashed lead to a break up in the organisation that 
led to the cessation of activities.  
In this case one can without doubt conclude that the capacity building initiative did not only 
fail to achieve the expected results, but caused the beneficiary organisation to disappear from 
the scene. The evaluation exercise could, therefore, only give a very negative verdict. 
In reality, the situation is not that simple. Indeed, the leaders promoting internal dissidence, 
having learned of the political stakes over the course of the planning exercise, founded 
another NGO, the NGO Echelle, which to this day, only four years from its creation, is the most 
important Central African development NGO and, as such, is the organisation that trains the 
leading personnel of the Central African Republic associative movement. 
Today, the NGO Echelle has become not only the contact point of the national associative 
movement, but the most solicited Central African collective actor, thanks to its vision and 
skills, extremely well honed, as much by the government as by the donor community. 
At the roots of the success of Echelle there is, therefore, the determination of several leaders 
who emerged from the crisis of a small organisation; a crisis undeniably provoked by internal 
factors, but severely magnified through the capacity building initiative. 
This is exactly what would be termed an “inferred effect” or “unexpected result”. However it is 
also the proof that CSO capacity building can be evaluated not only in terms of the mid to long 
term, but also that sometimes the dynamics produced around the beneficiary organisation are 
more interesting than the action itself. 
The act of capacity building must therefore be evaluated not only for the results produced but 
for the dynamism that it could spark off. 
 
7. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION WITHIN NSA SUPPORT PROGRAMMES   
7.1. The role of communication and the superimposition with the need of visibility 
The Cotonou Agreement clearly highlights how a continuous information flow and an 
appropriate communication strategy are two incontrovertible elements for the 
implementation of a coherent and permanent consultation process with non state actors, for 
the building of their capacity and to ensure their active participation in the dialogue on 
economic, social and institutional policy. 
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On the basis of the analysis of 400 NSA support programmes it has been noted that, more and 
more, there is confusion over, on the one hand, the role of communication and information in 
the programme and, on the other, the relative aspect of the programme’s visibility itself. 
The analysis undertaken focuses first and foremost on the communications aspect, being an 
integral part of the fundamental principles of the capacity building strategy as was previously 
mentioned in Chapter ( of this report. 
Now, if communication is a fundamental aspect of NSA support programmes, it is necessary 
that a strategy is identified during the design phase of the programme, and that all of the 
appropriate technical tools for its implementation are taken into account. In reality, the 
documentary analysis shows how rarely the financing proposals contain a structured 
communications strategy component with the budgets devoted to this end. 
Among other things, it is noteworthy that a certain monotony exists as far as communication 
instruments are concerned under most programmes, which could reveal a weak reflection as 
regards communications strategies that are adapted to different types of programmes, to the 
actors concerned and, of course, to the socio-political context in which the programme is 
taking place. Of the 40 programmes analysed only 18 had a website, whereas under the 
remaining programmes there was no real attempt to experiment with efficient forms of 
communication at all. It must be noted that some programmes, for example PASOC in 
Mauritania (figure 1 below), ARIANE in Mali and the OSCAR programme in Benin, were granted 
interesting instruments to ensure a broad overview of the life of the programme, much like a 
bulletin board, in all three cases downloadable from the website. 
 
Figure 5 : Visualisation of the on line bulletin of the “Civil Society and good governance support 
programme” (PASOC) in Mauritania. 
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7.2.  Communication as a capacity building instrument 
As was mentioned, if the role of the communication component is considered as an important 
transversal instrument for the capacity building of a programme vis-a-vis the actors concerned, 
then, by the same token, it is important to remember which of the operational aspects must 
be considered under a communications strategy, on the basis of the concrete experiences 
undertaken in different programmes. 
In a first instance communication must be a “two way” capacity building instrument, based on 
an interaction between the programme and the non state actors, “above all the third and 
fourth tier organisations) and vice versa. In the case where the tool is a website, this 
interaction is possible through the creation of a message board and thematic contributions on 
specific subjects to animate virtual forums which, generally, can cover the primary stakes for 
NSAs. An interesting example is the NSA support programme website in Somalia, as indicated 
in the figure below, or the PAANE website in Angola. In this last case, for example, where the 
dialogue between non state actors and public institutions is somewhat strained, the 
programme represents an interesting facilitation instrument, being an ulterior forum for 
exchange and dialogue. 
 
Figure 6 : Visualisation of a page from the website of the “Strengthening Somali Civil Society” 
Programme”. 
 
 
  
The analysis undertaken by the team clearly shows that only 31% (that is to say 5 of the 16 still 
active) of the programmes used a website as a two way communication tool through a forum 
that allows CSOs to communicate and position themselves in relation to different stakes.  
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31%
69%
Oui
Non
 
A second aspect concerns the importance of facilitating dialogue and information exchanges 
between NSAs and between the latter and public institutions, through the creation of a 
favourable environment for the exchange of information and opinions. This aspect becomes 
more and more unavoidable, especially when one refers to the programmes that have, as a 
“mission”, that of promoting and “building” fora for dialogue and influence as regards national 
policy. 
Communication, in terms of capacity building, cannot avoid the development and sharing of 
experiences between non state actors, technical assistance operators in the context, 
Delegation officials and the national actors concerned, including the donor organisations. This 
sharing of experience concerns, above all, the promotion of best practices. Unfortunately it 
must be noted how, in almost all of the websites of NSA capacity building programmes 
analysed, best practices are rarely taken into account, and the same tendency can be observed 
on the EC websites. 
In the vein of communication, it must be mentioned how the aspect that concerns the 
presentation of a section on the analysis of the dynamics of NSAs in a country, which would be 
of great relevance as mentioned in the paragraph concerning the fundamental criteria of 
mapping, only in 19% of cases do the programme websites offer an adequately clear section 
on the dynamics, as indicated by the graph below. 
 
19%
81%
Oui
Non
 
 
 
7.3. Communication as an instrument for the promotion of strategic position of a 
programme and its “mission” as regards the stakes of NSAs. 
As was explained in the previous paragraphs, in many cases the strategic positioning of NSA 
support programmes is not sufficiently clear and even in the cases where some of the 
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aforementioned positioning elements are more explicit, they are not well demonstrated in the 
communication plan. 
This raises the need for a programme to have communication instruments adapted to the 
context and, above all, to its goals in order to efficiently represent the anchorage of the 
programme to the social and political challenges to which the NSAs must face up.  
In essence, communication must be conceived in a manner so as to facilitate and shed light 
upon, on the one hand, the coherence of the community strategy in the country and, on the 
other, to reinforce the positioning of NSAs in the socio-political framework of the country. 
Furthermore, from the scenario offered by the analysis of the internet sites of the NSA 
programmes, it can be noted that only in 19% of cases can programmes show strategic 
positioning and the long term framework within which their programme falls. 
 
19%
81%
Oui
Non
 
 
Keeping the goal of clarifying the strategic positioning of the programme and, thereby, the 
community intervention strategy in the country, it can be noted hereafter that only 44% of 
programmes have, in their website, a link to the Delegation, as noted in the following graph, 
whereas 56% of these sites simply do not have this link. 
  
44%
56%
Oui
Non
 
It must also be mentioned that some Delegations still do not have their own website, which 
makes it very hard for the NSA support programme to represent its strategic positioning in an 
efficient way. 
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7.4. Communication for the promotion of transparency 
All NSA support programmes must guarantee not only the maximum transparency in all phases 
of their life cycle, but also continuous access to all of the information stakeholders in the 
cooperation cycle. 
In general, the Cotonou agreement foresees the involvement of NSAs as much in the definition 
exercise of the CSP as more in general in the whole community cooperation cycle (annual 
cooperation, midterm review, sectoral and thematic reviews etc.). This exercise requires a 
transparent communication to allow not only information exchange but also an efficient 
exchange between NSAs and decision makers. The analysis of the NSA support programme and 
concerned Delegation websites brings to light a general deficit in communication in this area, 
as well as a significant failing on the matter of communication tools adapted to this task.  
On the level of the Programmes lifespan, communication favours transparency on three basic 
aspects, namely: (i) the management of normal Work Programme activities; (ii) the 
management of calls for proposals; (iii) the management of the regular PMU activities. 
As regards the management of standard Work Programme activities, the analysis undertaken 
within the framework of the capitalisation study shows that the information is not always 
promoted. In essence, the information on meetings, training seminars and thematic 
documents should always be published according to the principle already expounded for the 
promotion of access to information by the general public, something which seems quite rare 
under the 40 NSA support programmes, save for one or two interesting experiences, such as in 
Tanzania. The following figure is an example of how the internet site of the Tanzanian NSA 
support programme dedicated an ad hoc space to the annual work plan, with the aim of raising 
awareness of the activities that the programme will achieve in the coming months. 
Figure 7: Visualisation of a page of the Tanzanian NSA Support Programme website 
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When it comes to the general transparency of a call for proposals, in the majority of 
programme websites that adopt this tool for financing agreements, there is a space devoted to 
the publication of the call for proposal guidelines, as well as the submission form, often 
downloadable. By contrast, analysis of the 40 programmes shows that the publication of the 
applicant lists, the titles of current projects, scores received and synthesis files for the projects 
retained are still a rarity. 
The tendency apparent from the analysis provokes thoughts on the efforts to which these 
programmes must aspire to reach the satisfactory levels of transparency. The left hand side of 
the figure below shows an interesting example as regards NSA support programmes.  
Figure 8 : Visualisation of a web page from the site of the Mauritius NSA Support Programme 
 
 
 
 
As one can see, several pages on the site provide detailed information on the operation of the 
calls for proposals. 
By the same token, the website of the Beninese Civil Society Organisation Support Programme 
(OSCAR) contains clear and complete information for possible tenderers as regards the call for 
proposals procedure. 
In terms of best practices, the table below demonstrates another example of efficient and 
comprehensive communication as regards the attribution of grants under the call for proposals 
of the ARIANE project in Mali. 
Table 5 : Visualisation of a page of the website of the Malian NSA Support Programme, relative 
to the grants given under the “Support for development initiatives” component. 
  
GRANT CONTRACTS ALLOCATED IN FEBRUARY 2009 
 
FINANCING SOURCE: 9 ACP MLI 017 
Grants allocated under call for proposals ARIANE/2008-2009/AP3, published on 12th June 2008 
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File No.  
Beneficiary: 
Name and Address 
Title of the Action Location of the 
activity 
Implementation
Length of the 
activity 
(months) 
Sum of the 
grant 
(< FCFA >) 
Percentage of 
the total 
eligible costs 
for the activity 
(%) 
 
AP3/1/001 
Œuvre Malienne 
pour le 
Développement des 
Zones Arides 
(OMADEZA) 
Women and Local Governance 
Kayes Region 6 13 496 445 90.00% 
 
 
AP3/1/004 
Association 
Guidimakha Jikke 
Prevention and management of 
conflicts linked to the exploitation 
of natural resources in the 
Djélébou, Karakoro and Sahel 
communities 
Kayes Region 6 12 398 870 90.00% 
 
AP3/1/009 
CPCD - Association 
Diombougou 
Training project for female 
association leaders from 
Diombougou, conception and 
management of associated micro 
projects 
Kayes Region 6 8 412 500 76.39% 
 
For the third aspect, lastly, that of the ordinary activities of the programme carried out by the 
PMU, the experience led in several countries clearly demonstrates the importance of the 
element of transparency. Making an external public understand, notably NSAs, the 
management modalities adopted by the programme, as well as the management tools 
adopted by the PMU, is an important factor as regards transparency, as well as an element 
that facilitates the work of the PMU even in the interaction with NSAs. The information on the 
state of progress of a programme and the difficulties as regards the implementation confers 
more strength and legitimacy on the operators of the programme. Even in this case, the 
bulletin of the ARIANE programme can be consider a best practices to be replicated by other 
programmes. 
7.5. Communication instruments 
As regards the analysis of the communication instruments adopted by the 40 programmes 
studied in the capitalisation study, it must be highlighted that there was a certain monotony in 
the approach and, as was mentioned, a certain deficit in terms of appropriate tools for the end 
goals and the target public of the programmes. 
In effect, the analysis revealed that the website is the tool most used by the programmes, even 
if only 18 of the 40 programmes in fact have one, revealing an insufficient appreciation of the 
need for an efficient and transparent communication strategy for the inclusion of NSA and for 
their access to community resources. 
This raises serious thoughts on access to information: according to the experiences underway 
it seems relevant to adopt a website, especially for the programmes which have strong 
components involving: 
• Support of dialogue between public institutions and NSA; 
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• Influence on public policy and lobbying; 
• Support to 3rd and 4th level organisations which are well enough equipped and have an 
internet site, and have the necessary IT skills. 
An ulterior problem is that of the presentation of information, which seems to be rarely taken 
into account, either by the technicians or by the programme managers. The case of support to 
civil society in Uganda is a clear example of this lack of vision and long term strategy. In this 
specific case, for example, the end of the project also signified the end of the website and, as 
such, the information and capitalisation of the experience garnered was lost. 
This shows that the question of information conservation following the end of a programme 
must absolutely be taken into account from the start of the programme. To this end, there can 
be two possible scenarios to avoid wasting important information and experience. 
The first possibility concerns the storage of the information and the establishment of a link to 
the website of the programme in the Delegation of the country concerned. This option would 
appear to be the easiest to achieve, as well as the least expensive in economical terms. 
The second option concerns the storage of information at the heart of the Commission, for 
example at Unit E4, or other units. 
The following table shows the list of websites of NSA support programmes analysed in this 
study. 
Table 6: The list of websites of 9th EDF NSA Support Programmes 
 
Botswana   www.nsabotswana.org 
Cameroun   www.pasoc-cameroun.org 
Mali   www.ariane-ml.org 
Guinée Bissau  www.apoiosociedadecivilgb.org 
Ethiopie   www.deleth.ec.europa.eu 
Tanzanie   www.nsatz.org 
Rép. Dominicaine  www.pril.org.do 
Angola   www.paane.com  
RDC   www.projet-ane.org 
Niger   www.pasoc-niger.org 
Bénin   www.oscarbenin.org 
Ouganda   www.societyfund.or.ug 
Mauritanie   www.pasoc-mauritanie.org 
Mauritius   www.gov.mu 
Sénégal   www.ugp-ane.org 
Suriname   www.suriname-ngo-strenghtening.org  
Malawi   (en phase de réalisation) 
Somalie   www.somali-civilsociety.org 
 
As mentioned, the website represents a useful tool but there are also other interesting 
experiences that should be explored, for example the Rural Organisation Support Programme 
in Guinea (PACNOP). Bearing in mind the fact the beneficiaries of this programme are rural 
organisations, the programmes used proximity, that is to say through the rural radios present 
in the different sub-prefectures in the country, allowing for a significant territorial coverage. 
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 7.6.Institutional visibility and communication 
All NSA support programmes and, in particular those supporting civil society organisations, 
must therefore face the question of visibility and institutional communication.  
If on the one hand communication is a capacity building instrument that must accompany the 
programme during its life and, even, afterwards through the capitalisation and storage of the 
information produced, then on the other institutional communication has more of a 
communicative role as regards external stakeholders. 
In this sense institutional communication is important not only on the country level where the 
programme is being implemented, but also on the international level. The implementation of 
the sub-regional network, for example, is becoming essential in the framework of interaction 
where, as is increasingly the case, NSAs participate in sub-regional thematic platforms. 
From the analysis undertaken, it has emerged that, apart from a few minor cases, the 
existence of links on similar programme websites on a sub-regional level represent a mere 25% 
of the total. 
25%
75%
Oui
Non
 
 
Among the best practices in these domains, the Niger NSA support programmes (PASOC) and 
the ARIANE programme in Mali, as indicated below, must be noted. 
Figure 9 : CSO Support Programme in Niger and the webpage of the ARIANE programme in 
Mali 
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When it comes to visibility, its fundamental role is that of bringing to light not only the 
community financing, but also the belonging to a global EU strategy in the country. To this end 
it is important to note that the aspects concerning the visibility strategy and the concrete tools 
to be foreseen in the programmes are paid due attention in the “Communication and Visibility 
Manual for the External Actions of the European Union, published by the EuropeAid 
Cooperation Office. 
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Annex 1 : Grid for the in-depth analysis 
 
COUNTRY : 
PROGRAM TITLE :       
DURATION :    
SITUATION :     
BUDGET :  
 
Level 1 of analysis – EU and ACP States participatory approaches 
 
PHASE ISSUES COMMENTS 
1.0 
PREFACE 
1.0.1. Country Categorisation 
(i. Country with a culture of NSA participation in the 
development process; ii. country with a rather limited tradition 
of dialogue and participation; iii. Very limited space for NSA and 
LA involvement) 
 
1.1.1. NSA participation in the elaboration of CSP (consultation & 
engagement process and major tools deployed; evolution from 9th to 10th 
EDF)  
 
 
1.1.2. CB /NSA support programmes within the CSP Relevance of CB 
programmes & other CS-targeted interventions / evolution (9th to 10th 
EDF) in terms of resources, strategic positioning, etc 
 
 
1.1. 
NSA 
INFORMATI
ON AND 
INVOLVEM
ENT IN THE 
STRATEGIC 
PROGRAM
MING 
CYCLE 
1.1.3. Mainstreaming CB in the EU cooperation strategy:  
How is SC considered within other NIP programmes (not directly targeting 
CS – “service provision vs. development actor”) and what mechanisms are 
developed to ensure the association of NSA in the definition of sectoral 
policies and strategies? /  Complementarity with initiatives under thematic 
programmes (NSA & LA, EIDHR, etc) 
 
1.2.1. NSA involvement in the development process and major national 
debates ANE (PRSP ; decentralisation, etc) – (who, how, when, 
engagement leverage capacity to influence policies, etc) 
 
 1.2. 
NSA 
INVOLVEM
ENT IN THE 
DEVELOPM
ENT 
PROCESS 
AND 
MAJOR 
NATIONAL 
DEBATES 
1.2.2. Brief analysis of major umbrella organisations in the country 
(number, strengths, constituencies, legitimacy, etc) 
 
 
 
Level 2 of analysis 
“Project management cycle” of CB programmes 
 
PHASE ISSUES COMMENTS 
 
 
 
2.1.1. Analysis and capitalisation of mapping studies (pre-feasibility 
studies) : 
x Objectives, purpose and expected results of the Mapping study 
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2.1 
PROGR
AMME 
IDENTIF
ICATIO
N 
STAGE 
 
goals (a tool to spell out & understand the challenges faced by 
CSO? a cartography?) 
x Theoretical framework (notion and categorization of NSA, 
operational definition of CB) 
x Scope of the study (information covered and structure of the 
report ; categories of NSA included in the study, role of the 
private sector and LA other donors, CB efforts and INGO, 
institutional mechanisms between government and CS; etc)  
x Methodological approach (quantitative vs. qualitative; tolls and 
sources of information; participatory approach, time-span and 
phases; etc) 
x Participation of NSA and other relevant stakeholders in the 
study (deployed tools) 
x Use of the results of the study (in the definition of a CB 
program ; in the drafting of a general EU strategy  in support of 
NSA in the country ; etc) 
x Lessons learnt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.1.2.Analysis and capitalisation of feasibility studies (when different 
from mapping studies):  
x Analysis of their relevance and added value ( vis-à-vis the resuts of 
the mapping  or when a mapping is not conducted) 
x Use of the results of the study (in the definition of a CB program ; in 
the drafting of a general EU strategy  in support of NSA in the 
country ; etc) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. 
PROGR
AMME 
INSTRU
CTION 
STAGE 
2.2.1. Analysis and capitalisation of strategies in support of NSA 
particularly in the sphere of CB :  
x Guiding principles of the programme (CB as a process; CS legimitate 
roles ; diversity of CS, muti-layered partnership ; reevance of the 
context ; etc);  
x Overall and specific objectives and expeced results 
x Target groups (families of SC; sectors, rural vs. urban; service delivery vs. 
lobbying and advocacy; levels of structuration; the role of the private 
sector; the role of LA; etc) 
x Major components & activities under the programme (institutional 
strengthening, empowerment of local communities ;  institutional and 
regulation framework development, consultation space ;  etc) 
x Assumed risks and major assumptions 
x Coherence of the strategy in support of CS vis-à-vis the development 
and national challenges identified in the CSP (level 1 of analysis) + other 
donor/national/INGO interventions. 
x Complementarity between the mix of instruments (mainly geographical 
instruments vis-à-vis thematic lines: EIDHR, NSA&LA ) 
 
 
 2.2.2. Analysis and capitalisation of the  institutional and 
management arrangements of the programme: 
x Duration and geographical coverage 
x Steering and monitoring arrangement (layers, by who, what role for 
CSO?) 
x Management arrangements (PMU vs. DEC vs. national government 
formulas; direct or indirect labor; type of structure -consultancy vs. 
INGO vs. national platform ; number and profile of TA; etc). SWOT 
analysis of major options and analysis of financial implications 
x Analysis of the role of the TA 
x The role of national technical expertise 
x Cost analysis  (budget repartition, activity funds vs. Administrative costs; 
TA contract coverage; etc) 
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 2.2.3. Analysis of the operational notion of CB and the typology, 
entwinning and complementarity of the mix of deployed 
instruments and tools –foreseen and used- for CB purposes 
x  Work programme tools vs. call for Proposals. Strengths and  
x The use of Intermediary organisations 
x CB mechanisms (tutoring, funding, formal and informal training, 
etc) and addressed topics 
 
 2.2.4. Mainsteraming cross-cutting issues : 
x Gender, environment, HR, indigenous rights, etc 
 
2.3.1. The role of the various stakeholders 
x EC role throughout programme implementation. The notion of 
facilitation. 
x National government role (NAo and line ministries; involvement in 
programme implementation) 
 INGOs role (beneficiaries vs. supporters of local CSO  vs. excluded 
from the programme …; How to associate them and establish 
partnerships?) 
x LA and line  technical national services role 
x  Multi-actor dialogue  
 
 
 
 
2.3. 
 
PROGR
AMME 
IMPLE
MENTA
TION 
STAGE 
2.3.2. National vs international expertise and the issue of the existing 
capacity building supply. 
 
2.3.3. Analysis of the CfP  mechanism:  
x Objectives, priorities and target groups (first and second 
generation programmes; consistency with the priorities identified 
in the mapping exercise and national challenges) 
x Eligibility criteria (focus on the actor : Who’s eligible ?) 
x Selection criteria (focus on the action; the question of relevance) 
x Information dissemination and access 
x The issue of the contribution of CSO grantees 
x The issue of financial responsibility 
x Associated risks (service delivery major focus; incomplete or 
overlapping proposals; rural gap; grassroots organisations lack of 
capacity; etc) 
x Positive discrimination mechanisms (geographical focus; sectoral 
considerations; gender ; etc) 
x The use of distinctive approaches to target diverse categories (CS, 
private sector, etc) & levels of intervention  (umbrella 
organisations, 2nd level, grassroots organisations, etc) in respect of 
their distinctive vocations and mandates. 
 
2.3.4. Coordination mechanisms with other CSP/NIP programmes 
(monitoring of SWAPs and budget support,  ; CS engagement in the 
implementation of programmes etc) and other donors 
 
2.3.5. The room for innovation  
2.3.6 Major constraints and obstacles faced by the programme  
 
2.3.7. Visibility of the programme 
x Communication systems and tools (website; newsletters; etc) 
x Visibility mechanisms 
 
2.4. 
PROGR
AMME 
EVALUA
TION 
AND 
CAPITA
2.4.1. Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 
x A results vs. a process approach 
x Indicators of process, performance and impact 
x Objective sand scope of the evaluations (mid-term reviews and 
final evaluations) 
x Stakeholder engagement in the monitoring and evaluation of the 
programme (who and how) 
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LIZATIO
N 
STAGE 
 
2.4.2. Information, capitalisation and institutional learning mechanisms   
 
Conclusions framed as good and innovative practices and lessons learnt 
 
ISSUES COMMENTS 
Identified Best/Good practices  
 
Innovative practices  
 
Lessons learnt  
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Annex 2 : Grid for the synthetic analysis 
COUNTRY : 
CB PROGRAMME :       
LENGTH :    
SITUATION :     
AMOUNT :  
 
Analysis Level 1 
The participative approacges of the EU and the ACP State 
 
PHASE QUESTIONS ANSWERS 
1.0 
PRECONDITI
ONS 
1.0.2. Country Categorisation  
1.1. 
INFORMATI
ON AND 
INCLUSION 
OF NSAS IN 
THE 
STRATEGIC 
PROGRAMM
ING 
1.1.4. Inclusion of NSAs in the definition of the CSP and 
information dissemination: 
How does the ECD articulate dialogue with the NSAs and 
facilitate information exchange? (Main instruments)  
 
 
 
Analysis Level 2 
The project management cycle of the NSA CB programmes 
 
PHASE QUESTIONS ANSWERS 
2.1.2. Mapping exercise: 
x The objectives of the mapping exercise 
x The scope of the study 
x Other notes on the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
IDENTIF
ICATIO
N OF 
NSA 
CB 
PROGR
AMMES 
 
2.1.3. The feasibility studies/formulation (when they exist 
outside the mapping study) 
Analysis of their relevance and added value, as 
regards the results of the mapping study or when a 
mapping study has not been undertaken 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. 
FORMU
LATION 
OF 
NSA 
CB 
2.2.4. The support strategies for NSAs/CS in terms of 
capacity building:  
x The general and specific objectives sought 
x The target actors (direct or indirect programme beneficiaries, 
types of NSAs and structure level) 
x The position of the private sector 
x The components of the programme (institutional support, 
institutional framework, partner cooperation framework, 
information etc.) 
x  
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2.2.5. The institutional set-up and the management systems 
of the TA: 
x The length of the programme and the geographical 
coverage 
x The piloting system 
x The management system (direct governance or indirect 
governance) and the formula used 
 
2.2.6. The instruments for the NSA/SC supprt in terms of 
capacity building: Elaboration of a capacity building 
plan vs call for proposals (the “supply vs demand” 
logic).   
 
PROGR
AMMES 
2.2.7. Taking transversal themes into account 
x Type 
x Environment 
x Human Rights 
x Indigenous People 
 
2.3.1. The roles of the actors involved 
x The role of European NGOs within the programme 
x The role of local authorities and decentralised technical 
services 
 
 
 
2.3. 
IMPLE
MENTA
TION 
OF CB 
PROGR
AMMES  
2.3.2. The guidelines of calls for proposals:  
x The eligibility criteria of actors. The question of 
institutional reliability and establishment 
x The activity selection criteria. The question of relevance 
2.3.3. Information and visibility 
x The Programme communication tools and systems 
x The set up in terms of visibility of the Programme 
 
2.4. 
EVALUA
TION  
2.4.2. The systems and set-up of the monitoring and 
evaluation of programmes 
2.4.3. The nature and characterstics of backstopping 
 
 
 
Conclusion in terms of best practices/innovative experiences/lessons learned 
 
QUESTIONS ANSWERS 
Best Practices Identified  
 
 
Innovative Experiences  
 
 
 
Lessons Learned  
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Annexe 3 : Grid for the quality analysis of information and communication 
 
Country 
Web address of 
the European 
Commission 
Delegation 
 
Web address of 
the programme 
Web 
address 
of the 
NAO 
Is the website 
linked to the 
ECD website? 
 
Does the 
programme 
website contain 
the guidelines for 
tenderers to the 
calls for 
proposals? 
 
Does the 
programme 
website have 
links to other 
similar NSA 
support 
programmes? 
  
Does the 
programme 
website offer 
NSAs the 
chance to 
participate 
through the 
posting of 
messages, 
contributions 
etc.?  
Does the 
programme 
website 
contain a clear 
section on the 
dynamics of 
NSAs? 
  
Is the strategic 
position of the 
programme 
demonstrated 
by the 
website? 
  
Does the 
programme 
website 
evince best 
practices? 
 
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
Annexe 4 : Agenda of the workshop 1-3 April 2009 
 
 
Restitution Seminar of the « Capitalisation Study on capacity building 
support programmes for Non State Actors under the 9th EDF »  
 
Brussels, 1st to 3rd April 2009 
 
Address: April 1:     54 Rue Joseph II, 1000 Brussels 
                 April 2-3:  36 Rue Froissart, 1040 Brussels  
 
- Seminar agenda – 
 
Wednesday 1st April 2009 
 
08:30-09:00 
 
 
09:00-10:45 
 
 
 
 
10:45-11:15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11:15-11:30 
Registration of the participants 
     (Rotonde 01/01) 
 
Introduction 
- Welcome and opening of the seminar 
- Study and Seminar Presentation: objectives, scope and targeted results  
- Presentation of the participants 
 
 
 
Presentation of the study 
 
Presentation of the study methodology and key concepts 
 
- The Study’s key concepts: 
o The  Non-State Actors and Civil Society concepts;  
o Actors typology and structuring levels; 
o The concept of capacity building and levels (individual, organisational and sectoral); 
- Categorisation of the context: typology per country; 
- Methodology used in the study: deep analysis and synthesis analysis of the NSA Capacity-Building 
programmes.  
 
Coffee break 
     (Room 1/3) 
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11:30- 13:00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st Session : « Objectives of NSA Support programmes and their strategic 
positioning : from the project elaboration  to the mapping exercise »  
(plenary session – Rotonde 01/01) 
 
Topics for discussion 
 
- The principles of the Cotonou Agreement related to NSA participation into the social and political 
dialogue.  
- Coherence with the aid effectiveness principles related to role and participation of the CS 
- Finalities and guiding principles of the capacity building programmes:  
o The question of neutrality and strategic positioning of the NSA capacity- building 
programmes;  
o The concept of governance and multi-actors partnership (democratic and political 
governance and the CSO role ; local governance and public sphere management); 
o The process approach and difference with the micro-project programmes and thematic 
lines: what is the added value of the Capacity-Building programmes? 
o The respect of the mission and role of CSO in the Programme : how to support the 
process in progress without creating “artificial social dynamics”;  
o « First » and « second generation » Programmes: capacity-building and anchoring to 
the concrete stakes of development. 
 
- General and specific objectives and strategy relevance: 
o Programme relevance and coherence in relation to the country’s issues and context. 
Relation to PRSP and sector strategies and policies and policies of good governance;  
o The programme’s coherence, relevance and complementarities with principles and 
instruments of the EU development policy and its role in CSP; 
o Synergies and possible complementarities between geographical programs and 
thematic programs. 
 
- Identification of NSA Capacity-building Programmes and the mapping exercise: 
o The objectives and the mapping/diagnosis exercise and the undertaking of feasibility 
studies;  
o How to perform a mapping and its fundamental aspects; 
o Involvement of the beneficiaries in the identification phase of the Programmes. 
 
13:00-14:00 
 
Lunch break  
 
14:00-14:30 
 
Working sessions on specific issues upon request by the Delegations  
 
 
14:30-16:00 
 
 
Presentation of 3 good practices related to strategic positioning and/or identification 
and formulation of NSA Support programmes (by the ECD /TA programmes)   (Rotonde 
01/01) 
 
- The Somalia example : implementation of a strategy with variable geometry with the 
support of the INGO 
- The example of the PAANE in Angola : the positioning requirement in a difficult context  
- The elaboration of a mapping in order to identify a strategy to support civil society in 
the middle and long term in Central Africa Republic. 
 
 
16:00-16:15 
 
 
Coffee break 
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16:15-17:15 
 
 
 
 
17:15-17:45 
 
1st session ctd.: working groups' discussions on the positioning of these programmes 
in the frame of the 10th EDF  
     (Group 1: Rotonde 01/01) 
     (Group 2: Room 02/73) 
 
 
Restitution of the 1st session working groups  
 
17:45-18:00 
 
1st day operational conclusions : recommendations and tools 
     (Rotonde 01/01) 
 
18:00 Welcome cocktail (J54 Cafetaria) 
 
 
 
 
Thursday 2nd April 2009 
 
9:00-10:00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10:00 – 11:00 
 
2nd session : « the institutional set-up, the Programme internal governance 
institutions, role and profile of the TA and consultation with the donors» (plenary 
session – Room 1A) 
 
Topics for  discussion 
- Management system and options to be considered (centralised management vs. decentralised 
management ; direct decentralised operations and indirect decentralised operation)  
o Financing of activities by programme estimate or by TA contract  
o The issue of the TA financial responsibility  
 
- The steering set-up 
o Role of NSAs in the programme management and monitoring 
- Role of relevant  stakeholders  (role of the NSAs – actors and beneficiaries -; role of the TA ; role of the 
ECD; role of the NAO and of governments; role of local/regional contacts and  correspondents; INGO 
role) 
- Profile and role of the TA : functions of administrative management, facilitation and accompaniment  
o Backstopping role and definitions  
o ToR drafting and selection systems 
- Coordination with other donors : coordination and consultation mechanisms with other donors  
o Multi-actors funds system. Examples.  
- Costs analysis 
 
Presentation of 5 examples of modalities of institutional set-up (by ECD/TA 
programmes)  
 
- System of direct decentralised operations and the  « Civil Society Support net » initiative 
in Tanzania (Videoconference) 
- System of indirect decentralised operation in Guinea Conakry 
- System of indirect decentralised operation in Mali 
- The delegation agreement  signed with DFID in Sierra Leone   
- The institutional setting of the NSA Support Programme in PNG: the Department For 
Community Development (DFCD) as the implementing agency and role of the TA  
 
 
11:00-11:15 
 
Coffee break (1st floor) 
 
 
11:15-12:15 
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 2nd session ctd.: working groups' discussions 
     (Group 1 Room 1A) 
     (Group 2 Room 1B) 
     (Group 3 Room 4C) 
 
 
12:15-13:00 
 
 
Restitution of the  2nd session working groups  
 
13:00-14:00 
 
Lunch break 
 
 
14:00-14:30 
 
Working sessions on specific issues upon request of the Delegations 
 
14:30-15:15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15:15 – 15:45 
 
3rd Session : «Concrete experiences with NSAs, other than CSO » (Plenary session – 
Room 1A) 
 
Topics for discussion 
 
- The issue of different missions and actors' differentiation 
- The role of mapping in the identification of the  actors 
- The risk of narrowing CS to NGOs 
- Eligibility of private sector organisations 
- The issue of community-based organisations   
 
Presentation of 2 good practices in matters of Community-based Organisations and 
non-CS actors (by ECD/TA programmes) 
 
- Potentialities of trade unions and private sector organisations as well as confessional 
organizations in DRC 
- The targeting on the peasant organizations in Guinea Conakry  
 
 
15:45-16:15 
 
 
Coffee break (1st floor) 
 
16:15-16:45 
 
Presentation on: « Information, Communication and Visibility of NSA support 
programmes: concrete experiences » (plenary session – Room 1A) 
 
 
16:45-17:00 
 
Operational conclusions of the second working day : recommendations and tools  
 
 
  
 
17:30- 19:00 
 
Possible working sessions on specific programmes (upon request of interested 
delegations) 
 
 
 
20:00 
 
 
Dinner  
RESTAURANT "Les Larmes du Tigre" 
Rue de Wynants 21, 1000 Brussels 
Tel.: 322/512 18 77 
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Friday 3 April  2009 
 
 
9:00 – 10:15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10:15-11:00 
 
 
4th session: “Capacity building: definitions and operational modalities” 
(Plenary session – Room 1A) 
 
Topics for discussion 
 
- The programmes’ components 
- Tools used for capacity-building and their relevance in relation to missions and structuring 
CSO levels    
- The elaboration of capacity-building scheme versus calls for proposals and mixed 
approaches 
o The pro-active approach: elaboration of a capacity-building scheme 
 Standardised actions and individual paths of capacity building 
 CSO’s Tutoring and accompanying systems 
 
o The calls for proposals (thematic priorities of guidelines: targeting by CSO’s  
structuring level and by themes/targeted sector: the Programme’s role in setting-up 
proposals) 
 Risks associated to calls for proposals-based approach 
 Mechanisms promoting the association between CSOs 
 The actors’ eligibility criteria and the actions’ selection criteria (the 
relevance criteria and the criteria’s grid) 
 The centralised and decentralised selection 
 The function of pre-selection 
 The role of assessors/evaluators  
 The sub-granting funding 
 How concretely calls for proposals contributed to the RC 
 
- The introduction of new procedures 
  
 
Presentation of different approaches (by ECD/TA programmes) : 
 
- The “call for proposal” approach in Ethiopia. The guidelines 
- The support from the NSAs for the RC: the two-pillar approach in South Africa 
and priorities of the European cooperation, in particular in support to the 
justice sector  
- “The capacity-building scheme” approach undertaken in Mali 
- The adaptation of the tool for call for proposals in Mali 
-  “The capacity-building scheme” approach undertaken in Angola 
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11:00-11:15 
 
Coffee Break (1st floor) 
 
 
11:15-12:40 
 
4th session ctd.: Discussion in working groups 
     (Group 1: Room 1A) 
     (Group 2: Room 1B) 
     (Group 3: Room 4C) 
 
 
12:40-13:00 
 
Restitution of the 4th session working groups  
 
 
 
13:00-14:00 
 
Lunch 
 
14:00-14:30 
 
Discussions on participants’ request  
 
 
14:30-16:00 
 
5th session: « Systems and arrangements for programmes’ monitoring and 
evaluation » (Plenary session – Room 1A) 
 
Topics for discussion 
- The results approach vs. the process approach 
- The monitoring tools and the definition of the indicators of monitoring and impact 
- The definition of objectives and the impact of evaluations 
- The involvement of stakeholders  
 
 
Presentation of identified good practices (by ECD/TA programmes) : 
- The monitoring system undertaken in Ethiopia linking projects’ results to the 
programme’s results (CSF reporting matrix) 
 
 
16:00-16:15 
 
Coffee Break (1st floor) 
 
 
16:15-17:00 
 
General conclusions and closing of the seminar  
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      (Room 1A) 
 
 
17:30- 19:00 
 
Possible working sessions on specific programmes (upon request from 
interested delegations) 
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Annexe 5 : Participants of the Brussels Seminar (1-3 April 2009) 
DCE /UGP Nom Prénom Adresse mail 
        
DCE Angola FERNANDES Paula Cristina 
paula-
cristina.fernandes@ec.europa.eu 
UGP - Angola TIRZI Maria Concetta paanecoord@hotmail.com 
DCE Bénin VOEVODSKY Ivan ivan.voevodsky@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Burkina Faso RYCKAERT  Patrick pros.ryckaert@yahoo.fr 
DCE Burundi CAVERT Pierre-Antoine 
pierre-
antoine.cavert@ec.europa.eu 
UGP - Burundi BWAKAYABU Sylvie bsylviec@yahoo.fr 
UGP - Burundi LACHARME  Marc marc_lacharme@yahoo.fr 
DCE Cameroun BRIGNONE  Marta Anna 
marta-
anna.brignogne@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Cameroun COURTIN  Christophe christophe.courtin@yahoo.fr 
UGP  Comores CHUNLEAU Yves yves.chunleau@yahoo.fr 
DCE RCA MALPAS  Nicole nicole.malpas@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Djibouti VERGAMOTA Kaluwa 
Kaluwa.VERGAMOTA@ec.europa.
eu 
UGP Ethiopia TIEDEMANN Thomas thomastcsf@ethionet.et 
DCE Ghana MOEHRING  Ute ute.moehring@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Guinée Conakry BONALBERTI  Vania vania.bonalberti@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Guinée Conakry REMUZAT Claude pacnop.cowiram@yahoo.fr 
UGP Guinée Conakry ATANGA Jean-Claude aischagn@yahoo.fr 
DCE Haiti DE GOUSSENCOURT  Isabelle 
isabelle.de-
goussencourt@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Kenya BAZIKAMWE  Sotirios sotirios.bazikamwe@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Kenya HANDS Richard Richard.Hands@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Somalia PAVARINI Francesca 
francesca.pavarini@ext.ec.europa.
eu 
DCE Lesotho HOSTE  Amaury amaury.hoste@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Mali WAAUB Guy guy.waaub@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Mali AWITY Kofi kawity@ariane-ml.org 
UGP Mali KEITA Anne akeita@ariane-ml.org 
DCE Maurice BALLOO Madev madev.balloo@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Mauritania COLLETTE Sophie sophie.collette@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Mauritanie SORBA François 
francois.sorba@pasoc-
mauritanie.com 
DCE Niger CANNATA  Nadia nada.cannata@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Nigeria BRESSELERS Walter walterbresseleers@hotmail.com 
UGP PNG JONES Mel meljones51@hotmail.com 
DCE RDC KASSONGO KINGOMBE Alphonse 
alphonse.kassongo-
kingombe@ec.europa.eu 
UGP RDC QUINCI Filippo quinci.filippo@libero.it 
DCE Rwanda GEOFFROY Véronique veronique.geoffroy@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Sénégal GONZALEZ DIEZ  Amparo 
amparo.gonzalez-
diez@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Afrique du Sud MULLER Jozet jozet.muller@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Afrique du Sud VALETTE -LANDREY Caroline caroline.valette@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Sierra Leone HANDKE Markus markus.handke@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Soudan ABBAS BADAWI Zeinab  
zeinab.abbas-
badawi@ec.europa.eu 
UGP Suriname LEISER Christine leiser.snisprogram@parbo.net 
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DCE Tanzanie RYAN Fergal fergalryan@yahoo.com 
DCE Zambia VILLA CHACON Juan juan.villa-chacon@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Zimbabwe KALENGA  Linda linda.kalenga@ec.europa.eu 
DCE Zimbabwe ROSSETTI Emilio emilio.rossetti@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO C1 LAZAREWICZ Natalia natalia.lazarewicz@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO C4 GONZALO PUEBLA Francisca 
francisca.gonzalo-
puebla@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO C5 CARRERO AGUADO Laura 
laura.carrero-
aguado@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO F NAGODA Jérémy jeremy.nagoda@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO F1 MONTAGNER Maxime maxime.montagner@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO F1 GHILLAIN Pierre pierre.ghilain@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO F2 PIRCHNER  Markus markus.pirchner@ec.europa.eu 
DEV A2 LAKOVA Ivanka ivanka.lakova@ec.europa.eu 
DEV A2 VILLEMAGNE CROS Carine 
carine.villemagne-
cros@ec.europa.eu 
RELEX A2 PIERARD  Cedric cedric.pierard@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO E4 ANDRE  Corinne corinne.andre@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO E4 DEBONGNIE  André andre.debongnie@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO E4 DELLICOUR Dominique dominique.dellicour@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO E4 EL-KUM MOLINA  Susana 
susana.el-kum-
molina@ec.europa.eu 
AIDCO E4 ROFI Daniela daniela.rofi@ec.europa.eu 
Expert FALISSE Michel  falisse@scarlet.be 
Expert FLORIDI Maurizio mfloridi@yahoo.fr 
Expert SANZ CORELLA Beatriz beatrizs@pangea.org 
Expert VERDECCHIA Stefano s.verdecchia@devcapacity.it 
        
 
 
